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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since the 1980s, Egyptian economic development has faced various obstacles that 
hindered its economic growth and diminished Egypt's endeavors to those of meeting the existing 
challenges and crises and their repercussions on the national economy.  The increasing indebtness, 
the fall of revenues coming from oil and oil-related activities, then the structural adjustment 
policies, the East Asian Stock Market crises of the late 1990s, added to terrorist attacks on 
tourism, have all denied the Egyptian economy a steady and rapid growth. This critical outcome 
invites investigation of the reasons for these problems and the possible answers and means to 
avoid their recurrence for the sake of a more secure developmental future.   
 The structure of the Egyptian economy seems to have invited such an outcome. Egypt has 
relied heavily since the 1970s on vulnerable sources of income that have resulted in creating an 
embedded structural obstacle for a steady and healthy economic development. Revenues from 
petroleum, either directly through exporting it or indirectly through expatriates' remittances from 
the Gulf, have moved with world prices for this source of energy, which have declined in the 
1980s. Tourism, despite heavy investments in infrastructure directed to this activity and despite 
the favorable climate resulting from the Peace Process, was still dependant on other international 
factors that the Egyptian government has little control over. With the terrorist attack in Luxor and 
the accidents that preceded it, a strong blow was given to all investment that went to this sector. 
The repercussions of this blow mingled with the crises of the stock market in East Asia. The 
Egyptian government had not been an actor or a party to these developments, but rather it was a 
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victim. All these factors have led to a slowing down of the economic recovery that Egypt was 
witnessing in the mid 1990s. As for Suez Canal, little has been expected concerning the growth of 
its revenues once it started to operate with its full capacity. This almost steady revenue has not 
kept pace with the rapid growth of population, which calls for equivalent growth for the major 
sources of income of the Egyptian economy and revenues from Suez Canal is one of these 
sources.  
 The majority of the Egyptian population is still rural, and agriculture is still the major 
activity. Yet, based on the experience of most of the underdeveloped countries, depending on 
primary goods means being subject to uncertainties. This fact should be realized even if we do not 
adopt a Structuralist perspective seeing countries specializing in primary goods as losing in the 
terms of trade relative to those exporting manufactured goods. The 1980s was a clear witness for 
the vulnerability of countries specializing in the former activity. On the other hand, industry posts 
itself as an activity that provides stability for a national economy. As proven by the experience of 
the Asian Tigers and the Newly Industrializing Countries, an integrated industrial structure that 
produces various commodities is more likely to provide stability and development for a nation. A 
comparison between the economies of countries that developed an advanced industrial structure 
and those that relied on producing and exporting primary goods (notably Sub-Saharan Africa), 
even without any theoretical analysis, will prove this outcome.  
This hints at a possible answer for the problems facing Egyptian development. The answer 
suggested here is for developing an integrated industrial structure that is capable of absorbing 
shocks created by the international market and re-orienting production accordingly. In the age of 
Globalization, a call for an integrated industrial structure is not a call for self-sufficiency in every 
aspect in the fashion of the Import Substitution Industrialization strategies of the post-colonial era. 
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I realize that these strategies are outdated and I am not arguing for them although they provide 
some interesting insights, which will be addressed later in this thesis. A call for an integrated 
economic structure should rather acknowledge the new world conditions of our present and be 
formulated according to the logic of free trade and comparative advantage as long as pulling back 
from the WTO and the GATT Agreement is not foreseeable. Consequently, an integrated 
industrial structure is meant to make exports or potential exports more competitive both 
domestically and internationally. Costs and technology are crucial factors in boosting comparative 
advantage for an export commodity; and an integrated industrial structure should be targeting this. 
It is not simply a call to produce everything and achieve self-sufficiency in every aspect because 
even a country as large and well resourced as India cannot realize this objective. It is rather a call 
for an understanding of the basic industries that can feed competitive industries and trying to 
develop an integrated economic structure enjoying the linkages effect between the two kinds of 
industries. 
Arguing for this kind of industrial structure leads us to explore the topic of my thesis and 
its research questions. An integrated industrial structure could not be reached without the 
presence of a backbone that feeds other industries and creates linkages. What is referred to as 
heavy industry, especially iron and steel and machinery are the most capable of providing this 
backbone as will be indicated in my following analysis. Thus, wondering if reinforcing heavy 
industry in Egypt can provide such a backbone leads us to the first research question: Is there a 
need for Heavy Industry? Why is it needed for the development of Egypt? What are its advantages 
as compared to other industries and economic activities? What are the criteria to be used in 
judging its importance (e.g. economic profitability, linkage effects, strategic need)? 
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Answering the first research question will lead us to considering the second one, which is: 
how can heavy industrialization be developed in Egypt? Who would carry the burden of this 
process, the public or the private sector or a combination of the efforts of the two parties? 
In my thesis I will try to explore these two questions, trying to provide an insight for a 
policy or a drive to be pursued for the sake of Egypt's future development. I am trying to argue for 
a long run strategy that avoids the shortcomings of seeking short run gains and continuous change 
of policies, and I am assuming that such a strategy should tackle and give more attention to heavy 
industry. I hope to succeed in this endeavor through this research. 
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CHAPTER I:  
WHY ESTABLISHING HEAVY INDUSTRY IN EGYPT 
 
1- A Theoretical Overview 
A- Heavy Industry 
The term “Heavy Industry” comprises a wide range of industries providing strong 
linkages for the economy and especially for the industrial sector. It includes industries like: 
Iron and Steel, Aluminum, Petrochemicals, machinery and equipment…etc. Most of these 
industries are capital intensive ones feeding other industries with intermediate goods (e.g.: 
Iron rods, Aluminum), or machinery meant for the production process of various 
industries. For the sake of brevity, in this thesis I am going to stress steel largely due to its 
various industrial linkages and necessity for the economy, but I will also consider other 
intermediate goods, especially aluminum and petrochemicals (due to their relevance for the 
Egyptian economy). The machinery industry would also be very important to my 
discussion due to its relevance to developing technological capabilities.  
 
B- Specialization Versus ISI Strategies 
1- Neoclassical Perspective 
I shall start my theoretical analysis with Neoclassicism since it is the dominant paradigm 
now in development and economics. This dominance has been witnessed since the 1980s, when 
the world was experiencing supply shocks resulting from the dramatic increase in the price of oil. 
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Such an increase impacted profoundly on the economies of Third World countries, increasing their 
indebtedness and causing the failure of those based on Import Substitution. Moreover, the rise of 
more rightist administrations in the USA and England, and then the failure of the command 
economies of East Europe and the fall of the Soviet Union, were all political rather than economic 
reasons that bolstered the dominance of the Neoclassical perspective. This dominance was further 
reinforced by Neoclassical-oriented international institutions like the WTO, World Bank and the 
IMF that compelled Third World countries seeking assistance to adopt their sponsored policies.  
 The basic assumption of the school is that the market mechanism is self-regulating and is 
always moving towards equilibrium, which is the optimal condition, through the interaction 
between supply and demand at the micro (i.e.: firm supply and consumer demand) and macro (i.e.: 
Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand for a national economy) levels. Governments should 
not intervene in the functioning of the economy, and this is a basic cornerstone for the arguments 
of this school and will be explored more in the second chapter of this thesis.  
What is of relevance to this section of my thesis is the school's concepts about trade. The 
Neoclassical school believes that free trade leads to benefit for all as profit and consumption are 
expected to be maximized worldwide. Each country should specialize in the product that it has a 
comparative advantage in and export it, and it is only by this means that a nation, as well as the 
world, can benefit. It is not a matter of heavy or light Industry, it is a matter of what a country can 
produce efficiently and better than others and, thus, specialize in it. 
The concept of Comparative Advantage stems from the ideas of Ricardo that were 
modified afterwards by the Neoclassicists.  
According to the law of Comparative Advantage, even if one nation is less 
efficient than (has an absolute disadvantage with respect to) the other nation in the 
production of both commodities, there is still a basis for mutually beneficial trade. 
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The first nation should specialize in the production of and export the commodity in 
which its absolute disadvantage is smaller (this is the commodity of its comparative 
advantage) and import the commodity in which its absolute disadvantage is greater 
(this is the commodity of its Comparative disadvantage)
1
. 
 
This is the crux of the concept of Comparative Advantage. For instance, it can be 
interpreted as indicating that developing countries can have this advantage in agricultural products 
even if the developed world can produce them more efficiently. This is attributed to the fact that 
the inefficiency of developing countries in producing industrial products is even higher than in 
agricultural goods. Thus, the developed world is likely to specialize in industrial products while 
the developing world is likely to specialize in agricultural goods.  
The cost of the product is crucial for determining the efficiency of a country in producing 
it. For Ricardo, cost was determined believing in the labor theory of value, which identifies labor 
as the sole factor of production that influences cost putting some unrealistic assumptions for the 
sake of simplicity (hence land, capital and management were not given much consideration as 
factors of production). This theory was renounced, however, and the Neoclassicists adopted the 
concept of opportunity cost, which calculates cost of a certain product by the “amount of a second 
commodity that must be given up to release just enough resources to produce one additional unit 
of the first commodity [product].”2 Having a lower opportunity cost for a certain product entitles 
the country in question a comparative advantage in its production and vice versa.  
 A more developed theory for trade and comparative advantage was provided by the 
Hecksher-Ohlin theorem. This theorem constructed a model based on certain assumptions and 
simplifications like having two nations, two factors of production (i.e.: capital and labor) and two 
commodities (one labor intensive and the other capital intensive). These two countries were 
                                                   
1 Dominik Salvatore, International Economics, 6th ed., (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1999), 31.  
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assumed to have the same tastes, use the same technology, utilize all their resources, have a 
constant return to scale in producing the two commodities and operate under a free market system 
that also does not levy trade barriers. Factors of production mobility across the two nations was 
not acknowledged and trade between them was assumed to be balanced. With these debatable 
assumptions the Hechsher-Ohlin theorem states that: 
A nation will export the commodity whose production requires the 
intensive use of the nation’s relatively abundant and cheap factor and import the 
commodity whose production requires the intensive use of the nation’s relatively 
scarce and expensive factor. In short, the relatively labor-rich nation exports the 
relatively labor-intensive commodity and imports the relatively capital-intensive 
commodity
3
. 
Thus, the theorem is based on the idea that the abundance of a factor of production 
determines what a country is going to specialize in. Factor abundance could be detected by the 
number of units of that factor (e.g.: the number of machines), or by the relative prices of these 
factors of production. The price of capital is interest (r) while the price of labor is wage (w). 
Hence, the capital abundance in a certain country can be determined either by the capital per labor 
ratio (K/L) or by the (r/w) ratio. If the two ratios conflicted with each other, the second one (i.e. 
r/w) is given more credit
4
. It should be noted that technology is not given its due attention and is 
assumed to be normalized internationally. The concept of developing technological capabilities of 
developing countries (the concept that would be discussed later in this chapter) is depicting a 
negation for the mentioned assumption, which is crucial for the theorem. Using the Hechsher-
Ohlin concepts, the industrialized world should specialize in capital intensive commodities (for 
being capital abundant) while developing countries have to specialize in labor intensive goods (for 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Ibid., 37. 
3 Ibid., 119. 
4 Ibid., 115. 
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being labor abundant and having relatively low wage rates). Specialization is believed to benefit 
both parties, increase output and result in world’s welfare.  
The school believes that trade liberalism is benefiting Third World countries, not only by 
increasing the world’s output of various commodities thanks to specialization, but also by 
facilitating adaptation of learning, technology, and entrepreneurial maturation in these countries. 
An industrializing latecomer is enabled by trade to acquire the latest available technology and 
hence it has no need for developing its own technology by developing the relevant Heavy 
Industrial sector for that purpose. The imported technology might develop a sector that would 
provide a comparative advantage for a country. The emerging leading sector would become a 
"center of capital accumulation, backward and forward linkages and ultimately exports."
5
 A much 
deeper analysis for technology in relation to Heavy Industry will be discussed later in this chapter 
of the thesis. 
It should be noted that when the Neoclassical school started to dominate the 
developmental arena, it was replacing the dominance of the Structuralist school. No wonder that 
much of the Neoclassicists efforts went to criticizing the Import Substitution Industrialization 
strategy by which Third World countries tried to close the gap with the developed world through 
replacing imports by domestic production and industrialization. Their critique of the ISI shows 
what the Neoclassical school believes in. In 1970, a Neoclassical OECD study for a number of 
countries criticized ISI policies. This study was reinforced by another research conducted in 1971 
by the World Bank and the Inter American Development Bank on trade, which had similar 
conclusions. The Neoclassicists saw that a major fault was committed by disregarding agriculture 
for the sake of industry. They argued that Third World countries have comparative advantage in 
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agriculture and should specialize in it. They regarded industry as wasting too much investment that 
outstrips resulting output. Industry in these countries does not even create sufficient job 
opportunities because of its capital-intensive techniques. Moreover, a waste of resources resulted 
from under-utilization of industrial potentials that was created by Third World countries’ 
industries but not fully utilized for various reasons. A number of governmental policies and 
practices relevant to ISI policies were also criticized like overvaluation of currency, harming 
exports and their comparative advantage, the presence of imperfect information in the hands of the 
bureaucracy, applying restrictions and controls that discourage private initiative, and adopting 
protectionist measures
6
.  For the Neoclassicists, protectionism leads to inefficiency and poor 
quality besides inappropriate allocation of resources
7
. Bates criticized Import Substitution 
Industrialization strategies from a similar perspective. He regarded these strategies as 
discriminating against agriculture, which he regarded as the source of foreign exchange for 
developing countries. His criticism went on to other policies, which are not directly related to 
Heavy Industry, like overvaluation of currency
8
. 
If the above mentioned studies talk about industry generally in relation to agriculture and 
primary goods, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) study reached conclusions 
that are more relevant for my study. It criticized policies that made capital intensive techniques 
much more favorable than labor intensive ones, despite the fact that Third World countries have 
comparative advantage in labor intensive techniques as the Neoclassicists stress. Socialist policies 
led to an increase in the price of labor, while currency overvaluation, low interest rates…etc. led 
                                                                                                                                                                    
5 Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The politics of growth in the Newly Industrializing 
Countries, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 10. 
6 John Rapley, Understanding Development: Theory and practice in the Third World, (Boulder, Colorado, 
USA: Lynne Rienner publishers, 1996), 60-61. 
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to decreasing the cost of capital. This led to adoption of capital intensive techniques that are only 
relevant for developed countries, creating few jobs and eliminating traditional industries
9
. This 
argumentation is basically favoring labor-intensive Light Industries seeing that they are more 
beneficial than Heavy Industries, which tend to be more capital intensive.  
Thus, concerning underdeveloped countries, the Neoclassicists call for specializing in 
primary goods, and more moderately for specializing in labor-intensive industries. Their arguments 
stand firmly against industries that a country does not have a comparative advantage in, and it is 
clear that most Third World countries cannot possibly have comparative advantage in Heavy 
Industries as having such an advantage entails economy of scale and maturity of these industries 
that is realized with time. According to Auty, in his study on Industrial Policy in the Newly 
Industrializing Countries (NICs), the Neoclassicists criticizes Heavy and Chemical 
Industrialization (HCI) due to a number of reasons. Their main criticism is based on the 
assumption that such a drive will deny the concerned country the opportunity to diversify its 
portfolio and limit it instead to a number of projects that require large sums of capital. This 
concentration involves a factor of risk, which underdeveloped economies are less likely to endure 
its shortcomings. Instead of a HCI drive, the Neoclassicists advocate diversifying the portfolio and 
investing in small and numerous projects which will together provide higher output, reduce risk 
and give more flexibility to the industrial sector.  
Neoclassicists also criticize HCI due to the long gestation and payback periods for 
investments directed to HCI projects. The arguments of the school is concerned with short run 
benefits that would persist on the long run. They are not, however, interested in activities that 
                                                                                                                                                                    
7 Tom Hewitt, Hazel Johnson & David Wield, Industrialization and Development, (Oxford University 
Press in association with the Open University, 1992), 155-156. 
8 Rapley, 64-65 
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might have long run benefits after enduring an initial stage of unattractive investment. They point 
to the assumption that demand changes over time, and thus, by the time a HCI project would 
finally recover and start to yield profits, demand for the product that it produces might have 
diminished. Finally, the Neoclassicists argue that HCI requires investments in infrastructure and 
coordination between these investments and investments in HCI projects so that the needed 
outcome could be realized. This process they regard as complex, and they suggest another 
strategy. They rather call for leaving HCI to evolve by itself when the needed environment for 
such a development exists. Thus, when infrastructure, capital markets, labor skills, technological 
ability, and entrepreneurial experience are developed, such a HCI evolution could be realized. 
They asserted also the need for the presence of a growing demand for a certain product that would 
induce competitive production at home that would substitute for importing the product
10
. They 
even question the concept of externalities (or linkages) provided by Heavy Industry wondering 
how it can be measured.  
Thus, with their disregard for the importance of externalities that Heavy Industry 
produces, and with their stress on the risk evolving from concentrating resources on a limited 
number of projects that do not yield instant returns, the Neoclassicists were against a Heavy 
Industrialization drive. Yet, externalities and linkages produced by Heavy Industry (which will be 
discussed in the following subsections) can encourage taking the risk of devoting large 
investments for Heavy Industrial projects, which yield long run benefits. On the other hand, this 
risk can be diminished by a wise industrial policy with which governments can guide the economy 
                                                                                                                                                                    
9 Ibid., 63. 
10 Richard M. Auty, Economic Development and industrial policy (Korea, Brazil, Mexico, India and 
China, (Mansell Publishing Limited, England & USA, 1994), 4, 5& 34. 
  
13 
and foreign capital can help in this process. This will be illustrated more in the case studies in the 
second chapter of the thesis. 
 
2- Structuralist and Dependency Theories' Perspective 
The Neoclassical school fails to explain the surplus that the industrial world extracts from 
other agricultural economies by trade due to income elasticity of demand. This concept shows that 
as income increases demand for basic goods decreases, and for manufactured goods increases. On 
the supply side, the developed world gives higher wages for its labor as compared to those given to 
underdeveloped labor. This means that the price of products manufactured in developed countries 
will get higher while the price of primary commodities produced in underdeveloped countries 
would not rise similarly. Also, there are more suppliers for primary goods than for manufactured 
goods, a factor that is to the advantage of the developed countries specializing in manufactured 
goods since prices of goods they acquire from underdeveloped countries will fall. As a result, 
underdeveloped countries’ expenditure on manufactured imported goods coming from developed 
countries will rise more than the expenditure of the developed world on primary goods produced 
by the underdeveloped world.  To cover this growing gap, underdeveloped countries have to 
increase their production and, henceforth, specialize more in primary goods. Consequently, they 
should allocate more resources to get the same quantities that they before used to get of the 
manufactured imported goods. The result is a loss from trade for underdeveloped countries.  
This was pointed out by Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer in their famous thesis which is the 
cornerstone of Structuralist thought. It concludes that countries specializing in primary goods 
might be better off, but still their gain is incomparable to the Industrial world. On the long run the 
gap shall widen more and more. The only way out of this, as can be anticipated, is through 
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industrialization that would diversify the economies of underdeveloped countries and stop their 
absolute reliance on exporting primary goods. Such an industrialization and diversification drive 
invites thinking about Heavy Industry due to its centrality for this drive.  
The Dependency School also moved on similar lines and is to a great extent an outgrowth 
of Structuralism. Their basic concept is the core periphery relationship, where the development of 
the core results from the underdevelopment of the periphery. Underdevelopment is not an initial 
phase that countries start at and then develop from, underdevelopment is rather the result of 
intensification of relations with the core which exploits the primary resources of the periphery and 
exports manufactured goods back to it using it as a market. Again this points out the dangers 
inherent in specializing in primary goods and, thus, it holds an embedded call for industrialization of 
the periphery. 
Structuralists strongly stress industrialization. Some of them, such as Baran, point to the 
fact that industrialization is important even for the development of agriculture. This can be realized 
through absorbing the surplus of labor and providing agriculture with fertilizers, machinery and 
equipment, electric power…etc11. Needless to say, Heavy Industry provides most of these goods 
meant for serving agriculture.  Hence, these forward linkages would be of much importance for 
underdeveloped countries, most of which specialize in agricultural products.  
The fact that Heavy Industries depend on economies of scale (as with any industrial activity 
but more even than other industries, and thus should be expected to have high costs in the 
inception, which diminish as time goes by, yielding profits on the long run) seems not to disturb the 
Structuralists. They believe that productivity increases with the increase in output and that a 
process of learning is developed and new and superior technologies are being incorporated. This 
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industry would then be able to foster the productivity of other sectors of the economy through 
providing machinery and equipment; and in this regard, it should be understood that this is relevant 
to Heavy Industry. They refute the logic of Neoclassical argumentation about acquiring industrial 
inputs from imports neglecting the need for developing linkages through an integrated industrial 
structure. The Structuralists criticize this view since they regard it as denying other sectors from 
having productivity gains, and they call for an integrated industrial sector producing machinery, 
intermediate inputs and consumer goods
12
. This is also attributed to the school's fear that 
depending on imports will lead to extensive dependence on foreign imported technology that might 
be expensive and outdated as well as being inappropriate for the domestic economy.  
 Structuralists argued for creating more linkages in the economy and increasing capital 
stock, both of which they regarded as fostering the growth of an economy. Industry is regarded as 
providing many externalities to other industries and to other sectors of the economy. These 
externalities are manifested in the indirect benefit from a certain industry assisting other industries 
noting that industrialization is believed generally to provide more linkages than other activities. 
Forward linkages (in the form of the final product of an industry acting as an intermediate good for 
other industries) and backward linkages (in the form of inputs demanded) are most likely to be 
created by industrialization. Thus, Structuralists believed that many externalities benefiting an 
economy are produced by industrialization. This is reflected in the increase in productivity that 
happens when output rises and is an outcome of increasing learning and incorporating new 
technologies. Also, industry produces externalities by providing machinery and equipment to other 
                                                                                                                                                                    
11 Kenneth P. Jameson & Charles K. Wilber, The Political Economy of Development and 
Underdevelopment, 6th ed.  (McGraw-Hill, inc., USA, 1996), 94- 99. 
12 Hewitt, 142& 143. 
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industries and sectors, reducing the cost of production for these activities
13
. This analysis especially 
fits Heavy Industry as it is the most capable of producing linkages and the sector that provides 
most machinery and equipment to other sectors.  
As for capital accumulation, the school believes that an increase in the capital stock of a 
country leads to a faster rate of output growth. An increase in output will cause an increase in 
capital accumulation through investment in machinery, building and other productive assets. This 
will lead to a faster increase in capital stock which leads by its turn, as I pointed out before, to 
higher rates of output growth. Yet, this is not necessarily the case, as the Structuralists admit, and 
that is why they stress the importance of investing the surplus into productive investments instead 
of using it for consumption
14
. The emphasis on increasing the capital stock shows the 
Structuralists’ interest in Heavy Industries. 
 It is clear from this emphasis on linkages and capital accumulation, that the Structuralists 
favor establishing a Heavy Industry as it is the sector most capable of realizing both objectives. 
What might be added to this is that some Structuralists call for an integrated economic structure, 
which cannot escape the necessity of establishing a Heavy Industry. What led a group of 
Structuralists to think in this way is the critique that they have received together with their ISI 
policies. This critique pointed out the fact that the idea of linkages seems to be useless as many of 
the inputs of industries being created for this purpose are being imported from outside. They 
argued that when industrialization is confined to establishing consumer goods’ industries, it is most 
likely that productivity gains would not be moved among various industrial sectors. This is because 
this type of industries will tend to import its intermediate and capital goods. It is no wonder that 
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some Structuralists argue for establishing an integrated industrial sector producing consumer goods 
in addition to intermediate goods and machinery
15
. 
 Sutcliffe moved on similar lines criticizing ISI policies:  
The whole concept of import substitution must be rejected. It results from a 
pre-occupation with existing patterns of demand, which are themselves influenced 
by the economic and social structure whose reorganization is the objective of 
industrialization. With the help of import substitution as a criterion of investment, 
priority would go for example to the vehicle assembly plants rather than to the 
establishment of an iron and steel industry
16
.  
 
Sutcliffe is here pointing out the need to consider what is benefiting the economy (e.g.: 
Steel industry and the various linkages it creates), rather than what meets domestic demand but 
may be less valuable for the growth of an economy (in this case vehicle assembly). It should be 
noted that in many Third World countries, (Egypt is not an exception), assembly industries have 
not created linkages as they were confined to assembling semi-finished vehicles for the sake of 
reducing costs and creating more job opportunities. This can be an appealing strategy for an ISI 
policy, but an Iron and Steel complex should be considered more for the sake of linkages. The 
point here is one of aiming at an integrated industrial structure with its various sectors feeding each 
other rather than a structure that simply substitutes local products for imports. 
Sutcliffe had still further reservations about ISI policies, notably their tendency to be 
sequential, starting with consumer goods industries, then moving to intermediate goods and so on. 
The first stage, targeting consumer goods industries means relying on imported capital and 
techniques. He claims that there is little opportunity once techniques have been developed for them 
to change, although these techniques might not be the most efficient given the conditions of the 
                                                   
15 Ibid., 142&143. 
16 J. L. L. La Croix, quoted in R. B. Sutcliffe, Industry and Underdevelopment (Addison Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1971), 267. 
  
18 
country in question
17
. This assumption can be reinforced by the historical experience of 
industrializing countries of the late 1800s. Speaking of the economic downturn of that time that 
witnessed also the erosion of Britain’s advantage of being the first to industrialize, Kemp said: 
The weight of past investment, made at an earlier technological stage, 
limited the possibility for changing over to new methods. Especially in an uncertain 
economic climate it appeared safer to continue with obsolescent equipment… 
Certainly the late comers were not subject to the incubus of an inheritance of a 
dead weight of obsolescent equipment. Generally speaking, they had a larger 
proportion of more modern equipment embodying later techniques and giving them 
certain advantages
18
. 
 
 Thus, it is clear that a country should be selective in the techniques that it uses even from 
the start. It is wiser to develop a country’s own techniques and capital than to start with imported 
ones and suffer from the consequences on the long run if they are not appropriate.  
 
C-The Labor/Capital Intensive Debate 
 Heavy Industries are capital-intensive in nature. Hence, this leads us to a discussion on the 
relevance of capital-intensive industries to underdeveloped countries. It is argued that 
underdeveloped countries are labor abundant as compared to the developed industrialized world. 
W.A. Lewis states that due to traditional family farming, which is a common practice in 
underdeveloped agricultural societies, wages are set at subsistence levels. That is why Third World 
countries are endowed by an abundance of cheap labor
19
. It is no wonder that many thinkers, 
especially those belonging to the Neoclassical school, believe that underdeveloped countries should 
exploit their comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries. Thus, they argue for specialization 
in labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive industries.  
                                                   
17 Sutcliffe, 268. 
18 Tom Kemp, Historical Patterns of Industrialization (London: Longman, 1978), 104. 
19 Rapley, 16. 
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 Yet, Gelenson and Leibenstein had a different view. They refute the arguments that 
underdeveloped nations, being endowed with labor and where capital is rare, should focus on 
labor-intensive industries. They believe that the projected outcome from investment is increasing 
the productivity of workers. This can only be achieved by a high capital per labor ratio and thus the 
application of modern technology on a large scale
20
. Needless to say, Heavy Industries are 
examples of such industries needing a high capital per labor ratio, and they also can provide capital 
to other industries (even for labor intensive industries) increasing their productivity. The two 
thinkers also point out that the "failure to introduce capital intensive techniques at the outset of the 
industrialization process may create insurmountable institutional barriers to modernization. If labor 
intensive techniques are used now, vested interests may set themselves against the adoption of 
technical improvements in the future."
21
 
 As for Sutcliffe, he mentioned a number of advantages for capital-intensive industries. 
These industries are more likely to enjoy availability of spare parts for their machines in the world 
market, since the developed world specializes in capital intensive industries. Also, many capital-
intensive industries (e.g.: iron and steel), are less wasteful of by products, use a small number of 
workers, and thus provide an opportunity for raising the skill of the labor force involved. 
Moreover, Hirschman claims that the gap in productivity between the developed and 
underdeveloped worlds is higher in activities other than capital-intensive ones. Capital-intensive 
industries produce fewer differentials in productivity between the two worlds due to their reliance 
on machinery. This makes capital-intensive industries less influenced by the skill and behavior of 
labor used. Thus, establishment of capital-intensive industries should help to close the gap in 
                                                   
20 Murray D. Bryce, Industrial Development: A guide for accelerating economic and growth (NY-Toronto-
London: McGraw- Hill Book Company, INC., 1960), 24. 
21 Sutcliffe, 184. 
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productivity between the developed and the underdeveloped countries. Also, Sutcliffe argues that 
competing with foreign industrial production requires efficiency in production which cannot be 
realized except through using similar techniques to that of the industrialized world which uses 
capital-intensive ones
22
.  
The most important point in his analysis points to the linkages that are created by capital-
intensive industries, which Sutcliffe regarded as being greater than that provided by other activities. 
By using machinery, capital intensive techniques can stimulate other industries and services like 
machine servicing, repairing...etc. They can also provide raw materials like chemicals to other labor 
intensive industries, which create more job opportunities, and they can stimulate these industries by 
providing their needed machinery
23
. The discussion here is relevant to Heavy Industry. 
 Sutcliffe points to the fact that establishing capital intensive goods does not necessarily 
mean abandoning the opportunity of specializing in labor-intensive goods, a point which is of much 
relevance to my thesis.  
A country may for example, use the most capital-intensive techniques 
available to produce everything which is made domestically, and yet it may at the 
same time specialize in those industries which are in any case more labor intensive 
than most others
24
.  
 
Thus, one can deduce that, capital-intensive industries like Heavy Industries can be 
complementary industries or a backbone to an economy specializing in labor-intensive industries.  
 Yet, what seems to discourage establishing a Heavy Industry in underdeveloped countries is 
what Sutcliffe pointed to as being labor intensive Heavy Industries. These are considered labor 
intensive in the developed world in the sense that they rely on highly skilled labor producing less 
standardized production in some of these industries. This poses a problem for underdeveloped 
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countries where skilled labor is scarce. Such Heavy Industries include: Structural metal products, 
roller bearing, iron and steel, steam engines, turbines, machine tools, motors, generators, aircraft 
production and metal working machinery
25
. I believe that for the case of Egypt, the scarcity of 
skilled labor is not as profound as elsewhere, since many of these mentioned industries already 
exist. Yet, this indicates the importance of training workers and creating training centers, with this 
being a potential role of the government in establishing and reinforcing the existing Heavy Industry 
in Egypt. We shall explore this issue in the second chapter of this thesis. 
 
D- How to Select a Project 
 Murray Bryce provided guidance from within a neoclassical perspective for selecting a 
national project based on a number of criteria. His analysis is based on the soundness of a certain 
project, and its ability to yield profits, regardless of its nature (Light or Heavy Industry…etc.). He 
believes that in underdeveloped countries productivity in industry is higher than in the agricultural 
sector. Industry can lead to diversification of economic activities and exports resulting from them, 
creation of more job opportunities, increase in national income, and generally it pays more than 
extraction of raw materials. 
In many instances, Bryce adopts a Neoclassical perspective. He believes that small countries 
cannot progress much in self-sufficiency, and industrialization should not be given a top priority in 
an early phase of a developmental program. Also, he agrees with intensifying production of primary 
goods in this early phase and then later moving to large-scale industrialization arguing that the 
income of the people of underdeveloped countries is mostly coming from agriculture.  
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Bryce had no prejudice towards Heavy and light industries. He regards Heavy Industry, like 
other industries, as being only sound for a large industrial economy with large domestic markets 
since it needs high technology, scientific skills and auxiliary facilities that are all lacking in a non-
industrialized country. His view concerning Heavy Industry is a more global Neoclassical one, and, 
thus, is one that stands firmly against the logic behind ISI policies. That is why he refutes the 
arguments that Heavy Industry is needed even with sacrifices, saying that this is true on a global 
scale but not for a small underdeveloped country. For this country, it is cheaper to import its 
needed Heavy Industrial commodity.  
The only exception he mentioned is when this country is resource-endowed having 
spectacular reserves of iron ore, coal…etc. However, the weak points of his arguments can be 
identified as focusing on the short run, while the realization of the benefits from Heavy Industry 
should be expected mostly on the long run. He also seems to fail to acknowledge the effect of 
linkages and the strategic need for Heavy Industry.  
 For Bryce, generally what creates a sound project are: its ability to yield early profits for the 
economy and for the investor, the presence of a market to absorb its product, and the existence of 
prospective advantage from producing a good locally as reflected in costs unless it is protected by 
tariffs for a long time. As for the third factor, cost advantages can be realized through access to 
cheaper or better raw materials, and similarly low cost or more efficient labor, better accessibility to 
the market, lower cost financing, a larger scale of operation, better equipment or processes, more 
capable management, better market arrangements and a more integrated manufacturing operation
26
. 
In this regard it should be mentioned that the dimension of cost is now acquiring much more 
relevance due to the application of the GATT agreement, with which tariff protection is to be lifted 
                                                   
26 Bryce, 15&16. 
  
23 
denying governments the opportunity to intervene and protect a high cost industry leaving only 
more costly protection and promotion policy options (e.g.: subsidizing inputs to a growing or an 
important industry).  
Among the cost advantages stated by Bryce, Egypt can have an advantage in cheap labor 
and in some Heavy Industries, like Aluminum, since it has available raw materials as will be 
discussed later in this thesis. A strategy creating more cost advantages can be targeted to make 
Heavy Industry more favorable. Nevertheless, I believe that encountering costs in the first stage of 
implementing a Heavy Industrialization project should not discourage an underdeveloped country 
from moving in this line due to the long run benefits arousing from such a project.  
It should always be expected that Heavy Industries meet high costs in the beginning, which 
diminish with increasing production. From an economic perspective, this can be attributed to the 
fixed cost of capital (as compared to variable costs of labor and inputs), given that most of the 
Heavy Industries are capital intensive relying on sophisticated machinery that should not be 
expected to be cheap. With economy of scale and with total output of these machines increasing as 
time goes, average fixed cost (fixed cost per unit of output produced) becomes less, which is not 
the case for variable costs (labor wages, raw material...etc.) Thus, as time progresses, and provided 
that depreciation is at low levels, cost will fall for Heavy Industries. 
 
 
Table 1:Calculation of Costs 
Equation Abbreviations 
TC = FC + VC  
(TC = Total Cost, FC = Fixed Cost, VC = Variable Cost) 
AFC = FC / TP  
(AFC = Average Fixed Cost, TP = Total production) 
AVC = VC / TP  
(AVC = Average Variable Cost) 
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AC = AFC + AVC  (AC = Average Cost) 
 
 Returning back to Bryce, he provides an insight to find new industrialization opportunities. 
For him finding these would entail: 
1. Studying imports 
2. Investing existing local resources (e.g.: raw materials and other productive elements) 
3. 3-Studying available skills of labor and management 
4. Conducting studies on existing industries to give an insight for a new project 
5. Considering changes of technology and re-examining existing local resources based on this. 
6. Investigating inter-industrial linkages 
7. Conducting evaluations for developmental plans seeing how introducing certain new goods 
have changed the markets. 
8. Reviewing old projects that might not have been applicable in the past and might be of 
relevance now. 
9. Studying industrial experiences elsewhere 
10. Using industry lists of other countries like the USA or UK that might suggest ideas and 
opportunities. 
For Bryce, these provide a means for screening projects
27
. This methodology is very 
suggestive and I believe should be carried on when thinking of establishing Heavy industries. The 
most relevant points in Bryce's analysis are: the 6
th
 point, which is studying linkages, and the 9
th
 
about studying experiences elsewhere (that is why I am devoting a section towards the end of this 
thesis for Heavy Industrialization experiences in newly industrializing countries). The 8
th
 point, 
about studying old projects, suggests that we should analyze the Heavy Industrialization drive of 
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the 1960s in Egypt. While the 4
th
 point that deals with analyzing existing industries has led me to 
discuss the present condition of Heavy Industry in Egypt (this comes later in this chapter). The first 
and the second points about studying imports and investigating existing local resources, and to 
some extent the third point on available skills, might provide criteria for giving more attention for 
developing certain Heavy Industries relative to others. 
 Furthermore, Bryce discussed a number of criteria for judging the value of industrial 
projects. He mentioned the factor intensity criterion (labor versus capital intensity), which I have 
discussed before. Plant size and complexity is a second criterion. As for the second criterion, he 
referred to the steppingstone theory according to which non-industrial societies should move in 
their industrialization from small simple industrial operations to larger more complex ones (Heavy 
Industry can be anticipated as an example). Through this development, this society is gaining skills, 
experience and capital, which would be helpful for larger industrial operations. Small and simple 
operations have immediate returns and are not using complicated techniques. This makes these 
operations, and industries relying on them, more favorable as compared to larger industries needing 
partnerships and borrowed capital that yield distant returns and which also need developed 
entrepreneurial skills and attitudes
28
.  
Moving on the same line, it was argued that large industries should not be carried on in 
backward countries due to lack of sufficient capital, transportation, technical and executive skills 
and transportation
29
. Bryce himself criticizes this view. He acknowledges that small and simple 
industries, being more labor intensive and for various other reasons, are beneficial for 
underdeveloped countries. Yet, he regards large and small industries as complementary, rather than 
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being competitive, and thus they are feeding each other. Medium and large industries, which have 
obvious economic, technical and financial gains for an underdeveloped economy, should not be 
overlooked. What matters for Bryce is the cost-benefit analysis for a certain project regardless of 
the nature of the project
30
. 
 Yet, I do not think that the Egyptian economy is too backward to be relevant for the 
steppingstone theory. Egypt was among the first, if not the first, to attempt to industrialize in the 
Middle East and this was in the first half of the 1800s during the time of Mohamed Ali’s 
modernization drive. In the 1960s, and even before that, it had established an industrial sector that 
has become among the leading sectors of the Egyptian economy, as I will discuss later in this 
chapter. Thus, preconditions to move from small and simple operations to other complex and larger 
operations and industries are already existing and should be developed further.  
Among the other criteria discussed by Bryce were the foreign exchange criterion (how 
much a project would generate of foreign exchange), commercial profitability criterion, and finally 
national economic profitability ("The total net measurable rate of return to the economy on an 
investment.")
31
 These last three criteria are not relevant to my analysis because I do not assume that 
establishing Heavy Industry would provide profits or foreign exchange in the first stages. As Heavy 
Industries mature on the long run they certainly should be expected to meet these three criteria. 
 Taken from another perspective, Auty discusses the viability of a Heavy and Chemical 
Industrial project in a Third World country. His analysis is based on a comparison of constructing a 
plant in an underdeveloped country and another in a developed country using 1980s standards. 
According to Auty’s analysis: 
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1- In developing countries, construction costs are 20% higher than in a developed country. 
This results in a 6.5% differential in production costs encountered by a developing country 
as compared to a developed country. This is due to the need for substantial infrastructural 
provision and importation of specialized equipment.   
2- In the first five years of operation, capacity used in a developing country’s plant is about 
90% and this is attributed to start-up difficulties. This results in a further 11% increase in 
costs as compared to developed countries. 
3- This means that a developing country encounters about 17.5% more costs than a developed 
country in the first five years. 
4- Yet, if the product is produced domestically, about 10% can be saved as this percentage is 
relevant to a typical import freight. As for the other 7.5%, it is a percentage that could be 
covered by an import duty within the limits permitted by the GATT agreement. Thus, even 
in the first five years the costs of production in a developing country will be equivalent to 
that of similar imported goods. 
5- After the first five years, it is possible to operate at full capacity as there would no longer be 
start up problems.  
6- What makes things even better is paying back debts by the 8th year. This debt is a big 
burden as it is most likely to be substantial. The presence of entry barriers, resulting from 
high capital needed for an HCI project, leads to borrowing heavily in the first years of 
project implementation. Having settled the debts, the project will yield high cash flows by 
the 9
th
 year.   
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7- The minimal outcome that can be expected then is a fall of about 2/5 of the start-up years 
average costs. If externalities created by this plant are taken into consideration, the benefits 
out of it would be augmented
32
.   
Auty is a little skeptical about the presence of such efficient HCI firms in developing countries, 
and believes in the possibility of the presence of other factors. Yet, his analysis provides a 
theoretical and empirical justification for constructing an HCI project that would not need much 
protection and that would yield profits in the long run without burdening developing countries’ 
economies with huge losses even in the initial years. His analysis also takes the GATT agreement 
into consideration, not assuming a theoretical Autarkic situation, which makes his analysis more 
appealing. 
 
E- The Concept of Stages 
Chenery and Syrquin thought of industrialization as proceeding in stages. They believed 
that as development proceeds, Light Industries expands at the expense of primary goods. Then, in 
the next stage Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI) expand and become dominant. They based this 
finding on the study they both commissioned on the development of 100 countries between the 
1950s and 1980s. Through empirical data they were able to show that the share of output coming 
from Heavy and Chemical Industries tripled with the rise of per capita GDP.  When per capita GDP 
reaches the level of $1,000 Heavy and Chemical Industries are increasing in importance and they 
dominate at the expense of light industries
33
. Thus, both thinkers acknowledged the importance of 
Heavy Industry as its expansion is a characteristic of a developed economy and is a measure of a 
society’s development. 
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 Based on a different classification of industries, Hoffmann also thinks of industrialization as 
developing in stages. In the first stage, consumer goods industries (e.g.: food, textiles, leather and 
furniture) dominate industrial production. In the second stage, capital goods industries' output 
starts to reach almost half the output of consumer goods industries. Then, the third stage sees a 
more balanced position between the two types of industries with a tendency for capital goods 
industries (e.g.: metal-working, vehicle building, engineering and chemical industries) to expand 
more rapidly as compared to consumer ones
34
. Thus, the model also acknowledges the proportional 
relation between capital goods and industrial development. 
Yet, this model provokes many criticisms and doubts that question its viability. There is 
statistical skepticism on Hoffmann's findings since certain industries were hard to classify and, 
consequently, were excluded from classification. Stages were seen as being set arbitrarily, added to 
the fact that new technologies can give underdeveloped countries seeking industrialization an 
opportunity to get higher output at even earlier stages. Moreover, capital/consumer industries’ 
output ratio cannot be a guide to decide the level of development reached by a certain economy. I 
believe that testifying the maturity of an economy is a far more complicated task than measuring the 
referred to output ratio. A country might have a mature economy producing various commodities 
(capital and consumer), but because of a high demand on consumer goods (due to an income boom 
for instance), more consumer goods would be produced relative to capital goods. In this case, if we 
measured the capital/consumer output ratio, it would give misleading information about the 
maturity of the economy being tested. Finally, the analysis also disregards the presence of 
government dirigisme in certain economies. This intervention might determine this output ratio 
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rather than letting the rules of the market move in the prescribed stages
35
. However, despite all this 
criticism, the model is still suggestive of a pattern of industrial development that should be given its 
due credit. The progress of capital goods industries is an indication of a progress in industrial 
development, and this should not be denied even if we acknowledge criticism of this model. 
Yet, I believe that capital goods industries should be complementary to consumer goods 
industries providing the backbone for the latter industries, rather than regarding the process as a 
matter of stages. I am stressing here the complementary relation between the two types of 
industries, which I have pointed out previously. Supporting this view is what is stated by the 
UNIDO. The organization states that establishing Heavy Industry is needed to support and feed 
basic needs industries for consumer durables, clothing, housing and transportation. It stated three 
reasons which are: 
1. Materials and capital goods provided by Heavy Industry to these industries. 
2. Developing rural areas, given that most of the poor population of underdeveloped 
countries, need irrigation facilities, land improvement, fertilizers, tools and implements, 
farm tractors and machinery which can all be provided by Heavy Industry. 
3. Choice of appropriate technologies for consumer industries and agriculture calls for 
development of technology which in its turn depends on capital goods producers and 
suppliers
36
. 
 Thus, rather than thinking in terms of stages and capital industries or Heavy industries 
taking over the role of consumer industries or light industries, one should think instead of the 
linkages created between all of these industries and the necessity of developing each of them for the 
                                                   
35 Ibid., 36-39. 
36 Pradip K. Ghosh, Industrialization and Development: A Third World perspective (London: Green Wood 
Press, 1984), 96. 
  
31 
sake of the whole economy. I believe that these inter-complementarities should be developed from 
the early stages and this belief is based on the concept of linkages, which I shall discuss in the 
following sub-section. 
 
F-Linkages 
 Industrialization, and Heavy Industry in particular, has been stressed by a number of 
theorists who regarded the industrialization process as fostering the development of 
underdeveloped societies. One of the old theories in this regard is the Harrod – Domar model of 
economic growth. It claims that shifting from consumer to Heavy Industries leads to higher rates of 
economic growth. Their arguments fit more a closed economy endowed with various resources, 
where savings are converted directly to investment and, consequently, to an output. Others 
believing in this model suppose that shifting from consumer goods production to other 
manufacturing activities will lead to this outcome, attributing it to "dynamic linkages, spillover 
effects and external economies."
37
 
 Hirschman is one of the prominent thinkers who spoke about the concept of linkages in 
relation to industrialization. Industrialization is believed by him to create plenty of linkages. Yet, 
certain conditions should be met in order to achieve this objective and to avoid it being deflected 
towards causing larger imports of intermediate inputs, unutilized capacity and higher prices...etc. 
Linkages can only be created when industries being established become the source of demand and 
supply of intermediate goods and services for each other. He criticized reliance on input-output 
tables of different countries as a measure to test the development of linkages; rather 
interdependence between industries is meant to meet final demand, which has something of a 
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unique character for each country. Final demand depends on tastes, which cannot be assumed to be 
similar in every country given the cultural varieties and sociological differences present in our 
world. That is why Hirschman asserts that it would be incorrect to test the efficiency of policies 
based on inter-industrial linkages with reference only to the growth rates achieved in different 
countries
38
.  
 Raj argues that potential linkages in certain industries were regarded as inducing greater 
investment in them. Yet, he added that other factors should also be considered like the availability 
of various resources such as entrepreneurship, natural resources, foreign exchange, savings, and the 
presence of favorable governmental policies and clear developmental objectives. Raj concludes that 
we cannot reach a universal generalization by analyzing the industrial structure of various nations 
through inter-country comparisons. He points to a study that confirms this conclusion done by 
Panchamukhi's on the role of linkages in the industrialization of some of developing Asian states
39
. 
Hence, the arguments of Raj in this regard do not differ much than that of Hirschman. 
 Staley explained the interdependence between industry and agriculture for achieving 
development. With reference to the dependence of agriculture on industry, it is clear that he was 
referring more to Heavy industry saying that industry provides agriculture with machines and other 
services as well as absorbing surplus manpower and thus helps in the development of agriculture 
and rural areas
40
. 
 More specifically, Murphy talked about linkages that result from a Heavy and Chemical 
Industrialization Big Push strategy, like the ones that had been pursued by Brazil and India and 
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which will be discussed later. Such a strategy aiming at maximizing economy of scale “through 
simultaneous entry into several HCI sectors which have complementary demand” has “substantial 
economy wide benefits.”41 He argues that industrial investment in a sector that seems unprofitable 
can still have embedded welfare effects as well as other positive effects on income due to the inter-
relatedness of industrialization among various sectors. The Big Push strategy can reduce the cost of 
subsidies and tariffs, meant to assist the rising industries, due to the flow of benefits between 
sectors
42
. Such a strategy is, thus, very reliant on the concept of linkages and the importance of 
establishing an integrated economic structure with Heavy Industry playing a central role in this.  
 
 
 
G- Debate on Technology 
1- The Neoclassical/Structuralist debate 
 I am devoting to the Neoclassical Structuralist debate on technology (rather than their 
general debate on Heavy Industry) this sub-section. The debate over technology is relevant to 
Heavy Industry in many ways (and especially the machinery sector) as will be shown in this sub-
section. 
 The Neoclassical school believes in the applicability of technology everywhere. Thus, they 
call for relying on foreign technology if it is cheaper than producing it at home. They advocate 
importing it believing that this imported technology can be used immediately by underdeveloped 
countries, and also that it contributes to learning and know how. They thought of technology as a 
cost that the underdeveloped should not suffer much from. This cost avoidance can be realized by 
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using a technology that has been tested before and which is to be acquired from the developed 
world. Similarly, it is believed that late industrializing countries can take advantage from being late 
by acquiring the latest available technology
43
. These arguments blow away the logic for a need for 
establishing a Heavy Industrial backbone, since machinery and equipment to be used in other 
industries (e.g.: consumer goods industries) and activities (e.g.: agriculture) can be acquired 
through imports from the far advanced developed world. 
Before even moving to the Structuralist criticism of the Neoclassical assumptions 
supporting this conclusion, Raj pointed out something that questions these assumptions. Raj 
believed that the technology that evolved in the industrialized world is one that is inappropriate for 
industrializing underdeveloped countries. This technology is more capital intensive, labor saving as 
well as being energy intensive and using intensively other resources
44
. A problem might result for 
underdeveloped countries given their relative scarce factor endowments, except for labor.  
 Frances Stewart pointed out that an imported technology comes as a package that 
incorporates many things, which she identified as: nature and specification of the product being 
produced, scale of production, raw materials and skill requirements, raw material processing and 
marketing, the characteristics of the labor force (e.g.: education and wage), and often the package 
also includes marketing arrangements. When a developing country imports a technology from the 
developed world it actually imports all of the package, which incorporates many factors specific to 
the country that produced this technology. Thus, by using this assumption, she argues that 
importing technology will lead to imbedding problems (like capital intensity or excessive scale of 
production) for the future development of a country involved in this practice. She even claimed that 
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this would lead to inequality in the distribution of income
45
. This agrees with the view offered by 
Celso Furtado who believed that imported technology causes structural deformation for the 
peripheral economies importing it. This technology is not designed for absorbing the labor surplus 
of peripheral economies. It also targets luxury goods, and, consequently, excludes the masses so 
that only a small segment of society benefits from the scarce resources of an underdeveloped 
country
46
.  
Rather, Stewart argues for establishing capital goods industries in underdeveloped countries 
considering it to be a great developer of technology in a country. Her arguments are justified by 
referring to Freeman’s arguments on the concentration of research and development in Heavy 
Industries since new processes and products in various industrial sectors call for new machines
47
. 
Added to this, Stewart points out that Heavy Industries (as compared to consumer goods 
industries) stimulate the upgrading of old machines, and are more stimulating to innovation in other 
industries due to “changed scale of requirements following the innovation, or because of changed 
technical requirements.”48 In most of this analysis on Heavy Industry, she was specifically pointing 
to machine making industry. She finally asserts with Rosenburg that “countries which have no 
capital goods sector also tend to lack the base of skills, knowledge, facilities and organization upon 
which further technical progress so largely depends.”49 
Returning to the Dependentista (relating to the Dependency school) perspective, which we 
have discussed with the ideas of Furtado, Evans pointed to the disarticulation of peripheral 
economies due to their reliance on foreign technology, capital and equipment. For instance, a 
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certain good which is produced in an underdeveloped country is most likely to necessitate 
importing machinery and various other inputs. Thus, linkages would not be produced locally, but 
rather the production process is being linked with foreign suppliers and industries. For that reason, 
the multiplier effect that results from linkages is not being exploited in peripheral economies; the 
multiplier effect of industrial investment in the periphery is rather moving to the center (i.e.: the 
developed world).  
The Structuralists have dealt with this issue in many instances. They believed that 
technology should be developed locally to avoid importing inappropriate technologies, that foreign 
technologies could lead to slowing down or blocking longer-term technological development, and 
they argued for developing technological capabilities and learning
50
. This capability is reflected in 
the ability to search for available alternatives, select appropriate technology, adapt technology to 
meet production conditions, and conduct research and institutionalize Research and Development. 
In the Third World, developing one's own relevant technology helps in the process of learning.  
Abandoning the process of developing local technology will only result in lacking technological 
capabilities. Consequently, this will lead to limiting these countries’ negotiation power when trying 
to acquire technology or trying to adapt it to local conditions. As Jenkins asserts, that is why 
modern Structuralists stress the importance of developing domestic technological capabilities 
through learning rather than importing technology. They believe that Third World countries have 
the capability for developing technology relevant to their conditions even at the first stages of 
development.  
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 As for choosing alternatives and adapting technology, the Structuralists state that 
"significant numbers of innovations are originated by people through learning by doing and learning 
by using."
51
 Hence, user's innovation also influences a country’s technological capabilities in certain 
industries.  This is a point that the Structuralists regard as giving hope for underdeveloped 
countries to develop their technologies without needing to depend much on basic research and 
science. No wonder that the Structuralists, when speaking of Research and Development (R&D) 
and acknowledging its high costs that can be an obstacle for poor underdeveloped societies, say 
that:  
The strength of R&D capabilities in a given country is not a function simply 
of the existence of formal research institutes and laboratories. Perhaps equally 
important is the accumulated informal and frequently undocumented knowledge 
acquired by the indigenous work force through a protracted process of learning by 
doing and transmitted through formal or informal on the job training
52
.  
 
 Nevertheless, a gloomy outlook to the concept of developing a local technology is asserted 
by Raj who said that the selection of a technology is limited for intermediate goods industries, 
among which is steel
53
. Sutcliffe, furthermore, claims that only a few industries are of a 
technologically flexible nature (i.e.: various capital intensities are available which can be selected 
according to relevance). This is because technology, being developed in the West, is mostly capital 
intensive
54
.  
Sutcliffe referred to data collected from the USA, noting the technological flexibilities of 
various industries. The least technologically flexible were: electric machinery, other machinery, 
products of petroleum and coal, fabricated metal products, non metallic mineral products, furniture 
and fixtures, printing and publishing and primary metals. Those of intermediate flexibilities were: 
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textiles, pulp and paper products, apparel, and transport equipment. For another study, Sutcliffe 
pointed out that those industries which are highly technologically flexible are iron and steel, cotton 
yarn and cloth, and textile weaving and spinning
55
. 
 Based on this, it should be assumed that Heavy Industry in Egypt (machinery industry in 
this case) would be very helpful to the national economy through providing the relevant capital 
intensity for those industries of high and intermediate flexible technologies. This assumption is 
asserted by the fact that the textiles industry, which is mentioned as being intermediate in its 
flexibility, is a very important industry in Egypt and one that Egypt can have a comparative 
advantage in, in the age of Globalization. The same applies to cotton yarn, cloth and textile 
weaving and spinning which are highly flexible, according to the studies stated by Sutcliffe. These 
industries can act as export commodities based on the high quality and availability of the Egyptian 
cotton crop. More jobs can be created if capital intensity is adjusted. Flexibility does not mean 
necessarily having labor-intensive alternatives, but costs can be minimized if energy use is adjusted 
utilizing a locally produced technologically adjusted machinery in the production of these 
commodities. This local technology should be developed in a way that saves energy without being 
drastically less efficient than its foreign competitors. Cutting expenses and giving more opportunity 
for increasing labor intensity would achieve the double goal of increasing job opportunities and 
increasing the comparative advantage of what can act as excellent export commodities, by this I 
mean cotton related industries. 
 
2-Fordism and Post-Fordism   
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A change in production operations has been witnessed in the world since the 1970s, in a 
way that many writers referred to as a shift from Fordism to Post-Fordism. Fordism meant dividing 
the production process of a certain good into a number of small tasks that do not require much skill 
from involved workers whose job is reduced to routine work. The speed of production was based 
on the speed of the line. Fordism entailed using highly specific machinery, which meant the need for 
large-scale standardized production to cover large investments in the specialized machinery used in 
the production process. Inflexibility of production results, and cost is expected to increase as large 
inventories of spare parts are maintained for a "just in case" basis
56
. 
 Thus, Fordism involved mass production and economies of scale with which productivity 
increases and consequently wages and mass demand grow. With full utilization of capacity, and as a 
result of increasing investment in better mass production equipment and techniques, profits 
increase
57
. This was reflected even on the social conditions of industrialized countries: 
"Consumption of standardized, mass commodities by nuclear households and provision of 
standardized, collective goods and services by the bureaucratic state."
58
 Thus, technology used in 
the Fordist age impacted profoundly on society, but what is of relevance to my study is that not 
every nation was able to adopt such technologies due to the need for huge investments and 
economy of scale...etc. It can be expected that underdeveloped nations, seeking industrialization, 
would have met high costs in the inception period due to this. 
Yet, due to technical changes in the production processes, the world has witnessed since 
the 1970s a new age with the rise of what is referred to as Post-Fordism. This age is witnessing 
more flexibility in production so that many models could be produced by the same assembly line 
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and inventories are kept to a minimum. It is regarded as flexible specialization where relatively 
small units produce in a decentralized way and where subcontracting arrangements can be 
arranged
59
.  
Another dimension of Post-Fordism is the possibility of operating with a relatively smaller 
plant size than that common in Fordist production methods. With both flexibility and small-scale 
production that can be adjusted to meet the present demand, the “Just in time” (JIT) strategy 
became possible. The JIT strategy is a cost effective one and the risk from it is minimal, yet, it 
necessitates the presence of skilled labor and organizational and innovational skills that might be 
scarce in an industrializing developing country
60
.  
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the literature on Post-Fordism is more relevant 
for export commodities and provides hope for industrializing underdeveloped countries in this 
regard. This is attributable to the concept of flexible specialization which means that these countries 
are not compelled to operate on a large-scale to cover expenses and to be efficient. Some thinkers 
even spoke of a return to craft production together with smaller firms production since both no 
longer have a disadvantage. Smaller batch production would still be efficient.  
Even in Heavy Industry, Post-Fordist methods were introduced and provided more 
opportunities for Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) to proceed towards Heavy 
Industrialization. The introduction of mini mills in steel production since the 1980s has contributed 
to this factor. Mini-mills can operate to 1/10 or 1/7 of the scale of an integrated plant, thus offering 
the possibility of producing relatively smaller batches than those produced by integrated plants. The 
production of these mini-mills even competes with that of the integrated plant in certain products 
(e.g.: flat products as compared to rounded ones). With these developments and their further 
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progression, more hope is provided for Third World countries to establish a Heavy Industrial sector 
with less costs and risk. Thus, the high risk and costs that constructing a large integrated plant is 
encountering can be avoided. An integrated plant experiences three to four stages, the first of 
which is characterized by unattractive investment due to the high costs resulting from the need for 
substantial infrastructural investment and for not operating on an optimal scale. In the subsequent 
stages, the integrated plant should use economy of scale to cover its costs. This requires the 
presence of demand that can match this substantial production. All of these stages involved a risk 
that mini mills can avoid. Added to this, the 1970s witnessed the introduction of products that does 
not require scale production in the way steel and aluminum need. These new products were mainly 
coming from petrochemicals and an example of these products is engineered polymers
61
. 
What can be interesting about the literature on Post-Fordism are three points. The first 
point is that thinking of flexible specialization, I believe, blows away the whole logic behind 
Neoclassical trade theory. The concept of mass demand that induces mass production of 
standardized products is the logic that stands behind specialization in a world economy in the 
manner that the school advocates. If demand is tending to move to less standardized products, and 
technologies have the capability of shifting production so that flexible specialization results, then a 
certain country should not necessarily specialize in producing a certain commodity but rather can 
shift production from one commodity to another. It also does not realize a comparative advantage 
from large-scale production as it can rather produce in small batches. If this is the case, then 
establishing Heavy Industries in Third World countries should not require large-scale production to 
cover expenses. Furthermore, Post-Fordism implies the emergence of a more diversified economy 
than that called for by the Neoclassicists.  
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The second point is the belief that producing for specialist and volatile markets necessitates 
flexible specialization that should rely on skills, flexibility and networking among task specialist 
units in order to change volumes and combination of goods in order to meet changing demand 
without meeting productivity losses
62
. Sabel goes further to say that flexible specialization invites 
the return to locally integrated regional economies based around specialization in a certain product.  
[The] agglomeration of value chain in an industry provides vital support for 
an industrial paradigm composed of loose confederation of specialist firms 
responding rapidly to changing market environments.
63
  
 
This imbedded call for linkages to be directed to producing a commodity that a country can 
specialize in, and shift in producing various models of this commodity according to changes in 
tastes and demand, invites us to think of reinforcing Heavy Industry.  Heavy Industry can provide 
export commodity industries with machinery and intermediate inputs that meet the changing 
demand of these industries. If, for instance, the textiles industry in Egypt is to produce less 
standardized products that necessitate different models of machines, and if the demand for various 
models of textiles change unpredictably with new models being favored, then it is justifiable to 
develop a local machinery sector that would help in developing local technological capabilities in a 
way that permits the local machinery industry to instantly adjust its production to meet new tastes 
world-wide. If local technological capabilities are not properly developed, or if the textiles industry 
is to rely on imported machinery, a delay in shifting production according to changing tastes might 
result. Also, depending on imported machinery denies the textiles industry from any innovational 
capability, and thus the textiles industry in Egypt would not develop new models for its products 
but would rather be a follower or imitator of existing models. In a Post-Fordist age, a delay in 
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catching up with producing new models and the lack of innovational capabilities are great 
disadvantages. If a machinery sector feeding the textiles industry in Egypt is developed, this 
industry might escape these disadvantages. This might be accompanied with calling MNCs to 
participate in joint ventures with local capital in the textiles machinery sector so as to facilitate the 
process of learning through adopting international models and then moving towards developing 
local technological capabilities.  
Finally, the third point is that Post-Fordism, as a concept, is received by some thinkers with 
skepticism. For them, Fordism will persist and adapt. Competitiveness is not a question of only 
efficiency, which can be realized in a supposedly Post-Fordist age without necessarily operating in a 
large scale. MNCs can dominate markets with other means like their grip over finance, distribution 
networks, market outlets, advertising...etc
64
. This calls for an institution that can preserve the 
interests of domestic firms and promote their products. An active role for government can be a 
possibility, and this active role will be the subject of my discussion later in the second chapter of 
this thesis. 
 
2-Present Condition of Heavy Industries in Egypt 
A- Prologue 
Regardless of Egypt’s position as an underdeveloped country and the dominance of 
agriculture in its economic structure, its Heavy Industrial sector is in many regards well established 
and is varied including Iron and Steel, Aluminum and various other metals as well as petrochemical, 
machinery and other industries. The Heavy Industrialization drive dates back to the time of the 
Revolution, which gave more attention to Heavy Industry, than at any time before or after. 
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Heavy Industry is still advocated by many Egyptian writers. For instance, Dr. Mamdouh Al-
Sharkawi from the Institute of National Planning, in the Egypt Human Development Report 
2000/2001, provided a suggested pattern for industrial development in the age of Globalization. He 
urged focusing on industries with strong backward and forward linkages that help in starting up 
new industries that use domestic inputs and resources. These suggested industries should be able to 
compete with imported similar products in quality and price. Added to this, these industries should 
seek export markets and maximize job opportunities. Al-Sharkawi pointed out industries that he 
regarded as meeting these conditions which were: "chemicals, cement, garments, shoes and leather 
products, toys and sport equipment, aluminum, and iron and steel"
65
. Among these industries we 
can see that many belong to the Heavy Industries that my thesis is arguing for establishing and 
reinforcing in Egypt. 
Gouda Abdel Khalek provided a study on Egyptian industries and their current condition. 
Away from Heavy Industries and speaking of industries that provide the highest value added for the 
Egyptian economy, he showed that there was a dramatic decline in the share of value added of the 
textile industry from 34% in 1975 to 5% in 1995/96, which seems to be striking given the 
comparative advantage that Egypt can have in this industry if it was provided its due attention. Yet, 
he pointed out that the private sector shows progress in ready made clothes production and a rise 
of exports was witnessed from 15 million L.E in 1980s to 322.4 million L.E in 1990/91
66
. Food and 
other related industries share of value added reached 1/3 in the late1980s before eroding. I should 
elaborate that the mentioned industries are labor intensive in nature as well as promising for private 
investment thanks to labor and resource abundance. More job opportunities are further expected to 
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be realized from using the appropriate technology that takes into consideration factor endowments 
(labor, natural,…etc.) as well as other conditions. This calls again for establishing and reinforcing a 
Heavy Industrial backbone providing these industries (especially the textiles industry that is 
expected to expand due to the potential comparative advantage that it has) with the appropriate 
machinery and equipment (also a cheaper domestic supply of machinery and equipment can be 
realized when the growing demand for them induce their mass production). Having appropriate and 
cheaper machinery will encourage more private investment in industries like textiles and food 
processing. Supporting this view on the appropriate technology to be used, Abdel Khalek talks 
about the capital deepening happening in some of the naturally labor intensive industries like wood 
and furniture and paper printing and publishing which have led to lower factor productivity and to 
raising questions on the right technology to be imported
67
.  
Moving closer to our research, it should be noted from Abdel Khalek’s analysis that the 
existing Heavy Industry in Egypt is not that of a nation in the first stage of industrial development. 
A broad category, it incorporates many Heavy Industries, having a share of value added to the 
public sector of 33% in 1995/96, and it is employing 34% of the public sector labor force. This 
category included non-metallic and mineral products, metals and metal products and equipment
68
. 
Yet, in my analysis I will focus on intermediate industries, especially the iron and steel industries, 
and to a lesser degree the aluminum industry, as well as the petrochemical industry (which is a 
promising one given the oil and natural gas reserves in Egypt), and finally the machinery industry 
(due to its centrality for the discussion over building technological capabilities). 
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B- Iron and Steel Industry 
The iron and steel industry is of vital importance for various industrial sectors and to other 
economic activities. Steel is used in construction, transportation, water and sewage pipes, durables, 
and machines while other byproducts are used in other industrial activities like the chemical, and 
cement industries and others
69
.   
Despite the gloomy picture that might be attached to heavy industries when looking to their 
profitability, Abdel Khalek provides a different perspective. In his book Stabilization and 
Adjustment in Egypt: Reform or De-Industrialization, he discussed in details two of the main 
Heavy Industries established in Egypt, which are iron and steel, and aluminum, and the impact of 
ERSAP and Globalization on them. The iron and steel industry he referred to as being a very 
important industry for the structure of a nation's economy because of the strong forward linkages 
that it provides and that I have pointed out before. In Egypt, the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company 
is the main company involved in producing this product and it is a large complex employing around 
23,000 workers. Its activities encompass mining the Pig ore, transporting it and producing steel
70
. 
The Egyptian Iron and Steel Company has the advantage of being the only Egyptian company 
having blast furnaces, added to its “wide range of long and flat products.”71   
Abdel Khalek asserts that the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company adjusts its output so as to 
meet the demand for its final production (reflected in the sales of this product). Consequently, it 
does not function with its maximum capacity, which is about 1.2 million tones of steel annually. 
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This means that the company can be more cost effective if production was expanded using the 
concept of economy of scale and provided that further demand for it is to be stimulated. I argue 
that an expansion for the Egyptian industrial sector (especially the machinery sector) will achieve 
this target. Abdel Khalek clearly stated that this industry is a capital-intensive and even an energy-
intensive one that targets the domestic market. Yet, what is surprising is that only 85% of this 
industry’s output is sold in Egypt, and thus that about 15% of its production is being exported72. 
This means that the steel production of the Iron and Steel Company is not only targeting the 
domestic market but can also act as an export commodity. 
Linkages created by this industry are numerous. Various forward linkages are being 
provided by this industry such as intermediate goods for other industries (e.g.: iron and steel rods). 
Also, this industry is creating backward linkages. In its industrial process, the Egyptian Iron and 
Steel Company uses iron ore from Bahraya oases, limestone from BeinKhaled quarries in Minya 
governorate and dolomite from Adabiya in the Suez governorate. Ferro-Manganese and graphite 
rods, that used to be imported, are now being supplied from local producers. Generally 85% of the 
inputs of this industry in the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company are locally produced. Thus, the iron 
and steel industry has backward linkages (for its needed inputs) with mining added to the stated 
forward linkages. The value of this industry to the Egyptian economy should be decided putting 
these facts into consideration. 
Yet, it should be known that the steel industry in the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company is 
facing a number of problems. The first of these problems concerns the inputs and requirements 
needed for this industry. Iron ore is abundant in Egypt in a way that encourages the establishment 
of this industry. Nevertheless, the quality of the ore is not the best and the ore needs special 
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treatment without which the resulting produced steel will be of higher cost. Studies are being 
carried out regarding treatment of the iron ore to make the steel industry more competitive. Also 
transferring the iron ore from the mines to the factory is an expensive process and the same is true 
in the case of coke. This rising costs has impacted on the price of steel produced by the company in 
a way that threatened its competitiveness in even the domestic market. Imports of steel from 
Eastern European countries are the one posing this threat thanks to their cheaper prices and 
dumping prices practices. The Iron and Steel Company found itself obliged to close two of its four 
blast furnaces in 1998 in order to reduce cost. In 1999 one of the two furnaces started to operate 
again while the other was closed temporarily for maintenance
73
.  Yet, the government is looking 
forward to levy antidumping fees on imported steel from Eastern European countries in order to 
protect the local industry
74
.  
The second problem is using obsolete machinery together with new ones. When new 
machinery is obtained for the iron and steel factories, they are not replacing the old ones but rather 
the old and the new are being used together. The logic of this is not to waste resources by getting 
rid of old machines while they can still function. However, this eventually leads to deterioration in 
productivity, efficiency, the use of inputs, energy and fuel and maintenance expenses. Thus, the old 
machinery should be eliminated completely and be replaced by new technologically advanced 
machinery in order to foster the productivity and efficiency of the steel produced in Egypt.  
A third problem is one that is typical for the public sector, which is the over-staffing of the 
firms in a way that reduces productivity and raises costs. Finally, the inadequacy in infrastructure, 
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especially transportation (transportation of coke and iron ore to factories) and electricity provided 
to factories, results in many production problems
75
. Yet, it should be noted that the infrastructure 
has recently been much improved in Egypt and costs due to inadequate infrastructure should be 
expected to be minimized.     
As for the effects of the ERSAP, Abdel Khalek said that it has some positive measures 
benefiting this industry while other measures are negative in their effect. Increasing the prices of 
energy sources that this industry depend on (e.g.: electricity, coal…etc.), liberalizing interest rates 
(and thus increasing the value of the company's debts), liberalizing input prices (which might have 
been previously subsidized), as well as introducing a sales tax on inputs and finished output, are all 
among the negative impacts of the ERSAP on this industry. Yet, there are some positive 
implications for the ERSAP on this industry like liberalizing prices for its final product and 
devaluation. Devaluation has been pointed out by Abdel Khalek, but more emphasis should be put 
nowadays on this issue due to the present drastic devaluation of the Egyptian pound. This 
devaluation is providing a sort of protection for this industry. Added to this, this industry depends 
on inputs, 85% of which are locally produced or provided; thus, devaluation would not raise much 
the prices of inputs due to the rise in the prices of imports. On the contrary, devaluation will lead to 
the reduction of the price of inputs, as compared to imported inputs, and to an increased 
competitiveness for this industry.  Added to this, Abdel Khalek suggested a number of measures to 
reduce energy consumption of this industry and thus reduce the costs and increase profitability. 
Added to the Iron and Steel Company, there are a number of other publicly owned firms 
involved in producing Iron and Steel, like Al-Delta for Steel, the National Company for Metallic 
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Industries, The Egyptian Company for Bronze Factories. They are of a lesser value than the Iron 
and Steel Company.  
Yet, more recently the private sector has started to contribute positively to this industry in a 
way that is promising of expanding production of this commodity. Egypt was witnessing “strong 
growth in demand for steel, both for long products for the booming construction sector and flat 
products for industrial equipment and consumer goods. The demand growth has spurred large 
private investments in the sector but has also led to an influx of inexpensive imports that have hurt 
the profitability of the domestic producers.”76 Thus, the private sector was attracted to the steel 
industry opening a new scope for the expansion of this industry. This was possible thanks to the 
Hadid Ezz Company, which has now outstripped the Iron and Steel Company in production. Hadid 
Ezz is producing specialized steel and exports almost 1/3 of its products and it can even export all 
of its production
77
. Towards the end of the last century, the Ezz group was constructing in 
collaboration with foreign investors a “modern flat steel product facility” near Suez, which was to 
be accomplished by 2002 with an investment of $620 million and hopes to raise the company’s steel 
production to three million tons per year
78
. 
The further expansion of the Ezz group was fostered by buying controlling shares of the 
Alexandria National Iron and Steel Company (ANSDK). Speaking of the ANSDK, it is one of the 
two major steel producers in Egypt (the other being the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company that I 
have already talked about). It was established in 1986 and Japanese investors were involved in the 
company by making it a joint venture. Starting with 750,000 rebars per year, it reached a 1.8 
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million tons per year in 1998 and realized a $400 million in sales. It exported 20% of its production 
(especially to Arab countries) and provided the Egyptian market with 35% of its demand of 
rebars
79
. The ANSDK, however, uses imported iron ore while using Egyptian natural gas in its 
production processes. The used natural gas is extracted from offshore natural gas fields near 
Alexandria. In November 1999 it became the “country’s second flat products producer” after 
establishing a one million metric ton per year “DRI-fed hot strip mill with a thin slab caster.”80  
The Ezz group bought 28% of the shares of the ANSDK, and a member of the group 
became a joint managing director and chairman of both ANSDK and the Al-Ezz Steel Company. 
Both companies’ brands were unified under the name of Ezz-Dekhila. With this merger the Ezz 
group was entitled to control about 67% of the steel market share in Egypt and the merged 
company now controls about 60% of the Egyptian market. The production of the company is of a 
high quality, which is a promising performance
81
. 
The performance and the expansion of the activities of the Ezz group is not the only 
indicator that the steel industry is in fact growing as well as promising in Egypt. For instance, the 
General Lithograph Egypt Company has conducted a feasibility study on constructing an 
electrolytic tinning line with a capacity of 100,000 tons per year (t/yr) in 6
th
 of October city. The 
Egyptian American Steel Rolling Company built two mills each of which with the capacity of 
producing 500,000 tons per year (t/yr), one for bar and wire rod rolling and the other for bar 
rolling. In the year 2000, a mill with the capacity of 300,000 tons per year (t/yr) bar was being 
constructed by the El-Attal Steel company, while the Suez Steel Company by then had already a 
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mini-mill with a starting capacity of 600,000 tons per year (t/yr) at Adabiya
82
. It is clear, thus, that 
Egypt is starting to make a good use of the technique of the mini-mill.  
Furthermore, according to data from the “US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook-
1999”, the Arab Company for Special Steel had an expected output in the year 2000 of 60,000 
metric tons per year and the company was targeting the realization of full capacity of 160,000 
metric tons per year by the year 2003. It was expected that half of the output would be exported. It 
should be noted that this company “was the only producer of specialty steels, including stainless, in 
the country.”83 At Port-Saed, The Arab Steel Company was constructing a plant with a projected 
capacity of 600,000 tons per year, one third of which was meant to be exported. Prospects of 
foreign capital investment in this industry was witnessed in the plant that was planned near Aswan. 
The Aswan Development and Mining Company in association with the Aswan Iron and Steel 
Company “comprised a multinational consortium formed to build an integrated iron and steel mill 
and mine complex to exploit iron deposits near Aswan. The consortium was awarded a 30 (thirty)-
year mining concession that covered the iron deposits in 1998. Tenders went out in 1999 for the 
development and operational contract for the mine.”84 Unfortunately, the implementation of this 
ambitious project was suspended due to charges of corruption and stealing public funds.          
 
C- Aluminum Industry 
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The usage of Aluminum is growing and its application in various fields is increasing. It is 
characterized by its lightness, however, its strength can match that of the steel after some treatment 
and it can resist corrosion effectively. That is why Aluminum is used more now in the 
transportation industry (e.g.: aircraft, ships, automobile…etc.) Aluminum has been used for a long 
time in making the bodies of Buses and trucks. Some of these bodies are being exclusively made of 
it. Also, Aluminum is used in electrical engineering, construction, chemical and food industries. In 
the field of housing it became a competitor to wood and iron in making doors, stair rails, 
windows…etc85. 
In Egypt, there are some privately owned companies that produce aluminum of secondary 
value. Yet, the production of Aluminum in Egypt is based mainly on the Nagaa Hamadi Egyptian 
Aluminum Company, which its production started in 1975. The industry is dependent on Bauxite 
ores, and Egypt has not got reserves of these ores. Alumina is being imported from outside, yet, the 
availability of electricity from the High Dam has made of the Aluminum Industry in Egypt a sound 
project. It is no wonder that the Aluminum plant is located in Upper Egypt, in Nagaa Hamadi, near 
the source of electricity in Aswan. The industry is performing well and is exporting a large 
percentage of its production (about 60% of its production in 1997) mainly to Europe
86
. It is worth 
mentioning that when it was first produced, the output was of poor quality, but, Aluminum 
matching “highest international standards” is being produced now in some factories87. Signs of an 
expansion for the production of Aluminum can be witnessed. In the year 2000 the production of the 
Egyptian Aluminum Company was 195,000 tons per year (t/yr); it was expected then that by 2002 
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the production would reach 245,000 tons per year (t/yr) and it was projected that the production in 
2008 would reach 300,000 metric tons per year
88
.  
Late in 1997, the good and promising financial position of the company has made it a good 
candidate for raising more capital through the stock market, which was something promising of a 
tremendous expansion for the company: 
Indeed, the demand for stock in Egypt Aluminum is high with both local 
and international investors because of high profit margins, strong management, and 
high future earnings prospects that make it a good medium- and long-term 
investment. Brokers expect the offering to be at least three times oversubscribed. 
At a share price of LE75, it will have an initial market capitalization of over LE3 
billion, making it the fourth largest company on the stock exchange. Just a ten 
percent rise in the stock value, though, would make it number one -- certainly a 
possibility
89
. 
 
This good financial position has induced foreign investors to try to have majority stakes in 
the Egyptian Aluminum Company, so that for instance the Alcoa Inc. signed letters with the 
company for that reason in the late 1990s. The public sector’s grip on the company was diluted 
(despite of its good performance), and in 1998 about 20% of the company’s stakes was 
privatized
90
.    
The application of Aluminum in the domestic market has benefited the Egyptian economy. 
Aluminum has substituted wood (which is imported as well as expensive) in industries like door 
and windows manufacturing as well as other construction applications. Concerning the automotive 
industry in Egypt (led by Nasr Company), which is producing trucks and buses with a domestic 
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content of about 70:75%, Aluminum is already now used in many applications in the automotive 
industry. The availability of domestically efficiently produced Aluminum is suggesting that 
Aluminum should replace as much as possible the imported steel that is used in the manufacturing 
of these vehicles
91
.  
Speaking of the impact of ERSAP on the Aluminum Industry, Abdel Khalek shows that the 
industry clearly benefits from it. It is negatively affected by liberalizing energy prices, as this 
industry relies on electricity, and also it is negatively affected by liberalizing input prices. On the 
other hand, Liberalization of interest rates in the 1990s benefited this industry since it has large 
deposits in banks and has no debt problems; and also raising the credit ceiling enhanced the 
possibility of increasing the financial resources at its disposal. Liberalization of prices also has a 
positive impact on this industry, while again devaluation should give a huge incentive to expand 
this industry. It should be noted, as Abdel Khalek asserts, that the Aluminum industry is an export 
industry and thus trade liberalization under Globalization has no direct impact on it. Devaluation 
would give more competitive advantage for this commodity in export markets, while reducing 
reliance on energy in producing Aluminum would reduce the cost encountered by this industry, 
thus increase profitability, as he asserts. This Heavy industry can yield profits, in addition to its role 
in creating backward and forward linkages for the national economy. 
 
Table 2: some indicators from the Aluminum Company of Egypt. Values are in L.E 1000 92. 
Item 98/99 99/2000 Dev.Rate% 
Revenues    
Revenues of current Activity 1131786 1303172 115 
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Subsidies 0 0   
Securities_revenues 17267 14267 83 
transfer revenues 422073 330607 78 
Total 1571126 1648046 105 
Expenses    
Wages 130272 137549 106 
Commodity Inputs 833453 867491 104 
Non Commodity 26533 33567 127 
Purchases 0 0   
Current Transfer Expenses 521107 490224 94 
Current Ear Marked 22534 42811 190 
Income Tax 0 0   
Total 1533899 1571642 102 
Net Profit 37227 76404 205 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Balance sheet of the Aluminum Company of Egypt. Values are in L.E. 100093. 
Balance in 30/6/2000  
Assets Liabilities 
Item 30/06/1999 30/06/2000 Item 30/06/1999 30/06/2000 
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Fixed Assets 2343334 2362771 Capital 400000 400000 
Projects in Progress 914610 1000417 Reserves 1124883 1149974 
Inventories 521343 504174 
Retained 
Earnings 22500 13651 
Long Term Debts 1475 975 Provisions 861442 945980 
Financial Investments 154140 54140 
Long Term 
Loans 1226409 1334299 
Accounts Receivable 121327 207299 Credit Bank 238929 277164 
Misc.Accounts Receivable 116414 159755 Accounts Payable 162250 266688 
Cash in hand & Cash at bank 105438 290927 
Miscel.Acounts 
Payable 241668 192702 
Defict Carried Over 0 0       
Total 4278081 4580458 Total 4278081 4580458 
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Table 4: Some indicators from the Aluminum Company of Egypt94. 
Item Unit 98/99 99/2000 
Production    
Quantity Ton  189427 202812 
Value 1000 L.E 988329 1177567 
Sales    
Quantity Ton 195621 204123 
Value 1000 L.E 985093 1174965 
Exports    
Quantity Ton 110823 125105 
Value 1000 L.E 518588 685568 
        
Employees No 10761 10573 
Net Profit 1000 L.E 37227 76404 
Rate of Return on Investment % 2.06 3.305 
Wages Productivity L.E 9.905 10.579 
Labour Productivity L.E 123110 139937 
Current Ratio % 1.04 1.37 
Acid Test Ratio % 0.16 0.47 
 
D- Petrochemicals 
 According to the UNIDO Secretariat:  
There is virtually no economic sector of our modern age which does not, in 
one way or another, use petrochemical products in its development. Moreover, the 
petrochemical industry has lately become involved in creating new products which 
not only compete with, but surpass, traditional materials, such as commodity resins, 
elastomers, and engineering polymers which serve as excellent substitutes for 
metals, wood, and other construction materials in many applications. Polymers are 
also being used as glazing materials, panels, parts for transportation hardware, 
components of computers and other electronic devices, irrigation, and packing 
materials substituting paper and natural fibers. Synthetic fibers and rubber have 
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now surpassed, in many instances, traditional materials in both performance and 
economy
95
.  
 
We are speaking of an industry of tremendous importance that creates various linkages. 
These characteristics make this industry a big constituent of the industrial backbone for any 
economy. 
Despite the oil and natural gas reserves that Egypt has (which make of this country an 
exporter of both of them and a major Arab producer), Egypt has a small petrochemical industry. 
The petrochemical industry is one that provides various linkages and that can benefit the Egyptian 
economy given Egypt’s resource endowments. What seems to be a positive indicator in this regard 
is that the domestic demand for petrochemical products is growing. 
From the disposable stir sticks and sporks [spoons] used by fast-food 
restaurant chains to the multicoloured candy packaging on display at the corner 
kiosk, Egypt's demand for plastics is massive. Some 1.2 mm tons of the raw 
petrochemicals used to manufacture plastics are consumed by the local market each 
year -- which amounts to over 18 kilograms for every Egyptian citizen. Local 
production of these materials stands at around 470,000 tpy [tons per year], which 
still falls short, by about one-third, of meeting overall domestic demand. The 
shortfall, meanwhile, is imported from countries with petrochemical sectors 
developed enough to export their surplus, like Saudi Arabia, South Korea and 
India
96
.  
 
As pointed out by policy planners in Egypt, the country has many assets that helps it in 
establishing firmly a petrochemical industrial base. 
These assets are available in Egypt through the prevailing elements of 
political and economic stability, support of the State, advanced systems to attract 
investments, Egypt's geographical position and the fact that it is near world 
markets, development of demand in the local market, the reasonable prices, 
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distinguished technical experience in the field of refining and fertilizers, skilled 
labour and a cost any less than cost (elsewhere) and also the availability of natural 
gas at competitive prices in Egypt
97
. 
 
 In the mid 1990s, a project was being prepared to construct a petrochemical complex in 
Rasshukeir, north of the Suez Gulf, with $2 billion being dedicated for its accomplishment. The 
project was planned reflecting a form of the Brazilian Triple Alliance that will be discussed later. It 
involved the Federation of Industries and other private investors as well as the governmental 
petroleum sector and Egyptian Banks. FDI was called for and Japanese and US firms showed their 
interest in entering the project as partners in a joint venture. The complex was planned to produce 
various petrochemical outputs especially ethylene, Poly-ethylene (PE) (used in producing some 
plastic products), Polypropylene (PP), Polyvinychloride (PVC) (used in Car fibers, water 
pipelines…etc.) and Polystryrene as well as other products98. There was no progress though, 
although the project was not abandoned. 
 Also, a new joint stock company was established, which was called the Sidi Krir 
Petrochemical Company near Alexandria, and it was involved in building what was to be a first 
Egyptian Petrochemical complex. The target was the Egyptian domestic market, and the project 
was to be implemented by the Sidi Krir Company together with banks and insurance companies. 
The complex is now functioning (in the year 2003) and producing petrochemical products. 
At the time of establishing the Sidi Krir Petrochemical Company, the Philips Petroleum 
Company was going to participate as a majority owner in a joint venture with the Egyptian General 
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Petroleum Corporation to construct a poly-ethylene plant
99
. A further Poly-propylene plant was 
planned by Orient Petrochemicals, which represents the private sector, and the plant successfully 
started producing this product. By 2003, the company has become able to cover more than 75% of 
the Egyptian market demand for poly-ethylene which is used in various domestic industries like 
woven bags, carpets, garden furniture and packing films. Furthermore, the company was able to 
export 10% of its production with expectations of an increase of this share into 25% in the near 
future as exportation to the EU intensifies
100
. 
 Thus, it is clear that the petrochemical industry has recently received much attention and 
that a wise strategy is being pursued in this regard combining the efforts of the government, private 
sector and MNCs together. It should be noted that most of FDI in Egypt is concentrated in oil and 
natural gas joint ventures with the Egyptian government. Also, the “Arab petrochemical industry is 
entirely based on foreign technology both in process know-how and construction”101. This is truly a 
negative point that the UNIDO elaborates calling for developing R&D centers’ capabilities in the 
Arab World (which are still insignificant). Yet, depending on foreign technology until R&D 
capabilities are developed would not be problematic for this sector, which is now entirely using 
foreign technology. This provides an indication that petrochemical industry can be the most 
stimulating Heavy Industry in Egypt for MNC investment and that this industry can be a well 
established one in the future if special attention is to be devoted to it.  
 Yet, the petrochemical industry seems to call for government intervention in the fashion of 
the Developmental State of South Korea (a government that guides the market and furnishes the 
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needed conditions for the rise of certain industries making development its first priority). According 
to the UNIDO in its study on the Petrochemical industry in the Arab World, a great obstacle for 
developing this industry can be attributed to the fact that: 
The various economic sectors utilizing petrochemical products are not yet 
developed; and the available market is too small to absorb the production, 
particularly in the absence of coordination and cooperation, elements which are 
considered to be vital to this industry. In addition, there are many other technical 
obstacles such as the lack of adequate marketing experience, availability of trained 
personnel, organized and functional R&D, adequate infrastructure and required 
technology
102
.  
 
The government can boost this industry if it can act in such a way as to eradicate these 
barriers to the expansion of this important industry. Coordination, marketing, training the 
personnel, establishing R&D centers and providing needed infrastructure can all be carried out by 
the government so as to promote this industry. This active role for the government in this regard 
does not necessitate a direct control of the state over the petrochemical industry. Local private 
capital and MNCs can control the petrochemical industry, with or without government ownership 
of shares, while the state can help this industry through the above-mentioned policies.  
 In fact the government has started to think seriously of a long-term plan to boost the 
petrochemical industry in Egypt. The highlights of this plan are listed in table 5. 
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Table 5: Data from the General Authority For Investment And Free Zones Promotion & External Offices Sector 
concerning the Ministry of Petroleum’s planned Petrochemical Complex Projects (24 Planned Projects)103. 
1- Objective: 
 
 
 
2- Location: 
 
3- Capacity: 
 
 
4- Products: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5- Investments: 
 
6- Advantages of 
the Projects: 
 
 
 
7- Requirement: 
Main features of the master plan for the petrochemical sector 
development comprises the establishment of 14 complexes (24 
projects, 50 production units) for import substitution and the 
generation of export sales over $ 3 billion/ year 
North Gulf of Suez – Borg El-Arab – Sidi Krir, Alexandria. 
15 million tons per year of different petrochemical products worth 
US $ 7 billion. 
The main products are: 
 Ethane to produce Ethylene and derivatives (vinyl/ 
polyethylene/ glycol) for the manufacturers of (pipes/ 
packaging materials/ polyester). 
 Methane & Propane to produce propylene and derivatives 
(polypropylene/ acrylic fiber) for the manufacturers of (plastics 
& textiles). 
 Condensate to produce olefins and derivatives (butadiene/ 
synthetic rubber) for tyres industry. 
 Naphtha to produce aromatics and derivatives (LAB/ PX/ 
polyester/ styrene) for the manufacturers of 
(detergents/textiles/packaging) 
 
US $10 billion over 20 years 
 Satisfy the growing local demand for petrochemical products. 
 Reduce imports and cut foreign currency expenditure. 
 Achieve optimum utilization of Egypt’s natural gas resources 
and maximize the added value. 
 Support local industries depending on petrochemicals. 
Create over 100 thousand jobs (direct/ indirect). 
Investors 
 
 
This plan was launched recently and the Egyptian Holding Company for Petrochemicals 
(Echem) was established in 2002 for helping in implementing the plan.  “The company will also 
establish and possess projects, invest in standing and new Egyptian companies as well as promote 
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for investment in the field of petrochemical industry.”104 Providing information for potential 
investors about the petrochemical sector was one of the objectives of creating Echem. By June 
2003, Echem was able to attract investment of about two billion dollars for implementing the first 
stage of the proposed 20 years plan
105
. Foreign investors are given various generous incentives, 
such as being able to own 100% of their operations in Egypt, having tax exemption for 20 years, 
having grantees that their properties would never be nationalized or expropriated and finally by 
creating two “special economic zones” in which free entry and exit is permitted into the 
petrochemical industry market
106
. Also, the government is starting to induce attracting bank 
investment in implementing this plan. The National Investment Bank is expected to invest in 
constructing two new companies, one with a capacity of 350,000 tons annually of propylene and 
the other with the capacity of 80,000 tons annually of alkyl benzene
107
.  
 
E- Machinery Industry 
The machinery industry includes a wide range of industries that provide machinery and 
equipment for other industries and other economic activities like agriculture. As I have pointed out 
before, the machinery industry is one that fosters technological progress and builds technological 
capabilities. In Egypt, it can be argued that the market is stimulating for more expansion of the 
machinery industry. 
Consistently high levels of private investment in the petroleum, agriculture 
and manufacturing industries have translated into imports of machinery and 
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equipment which averaged an annual $2.5 billion in the 1975 to 1985 period, which 
slowed down in the second half of the 1980s but is now back at more than $2 
billion per year since 1990. Egypt's capital goods industry is relatively modest as 
compared to imports, because of the low level of protection it has enjoyed, with 
tariffs on imported capital goods as low as 5 to 10 percent. Now that the overall 
level of tariffs is fast coming down, it can be expected that many investors will find 
it profitable to enter this production field which is largely labor and skill 
intensive
108
. 
 
It is clear, thus, that the Egyptian market is becoming more stimulating for investment in 
machinery industry. This view is reinforced after our discussion on the steel, aluminum and 
petrochemical industries in which it was clear that these stated industries are expanding. Their 
expansion means further need for machinery. Moreover, the textiles industry, which is one of the 
most important industries in Egypt and one having a potential comparative advantage for Egypt in 
the age of Globalization, this industry has been showing signs of expansion in the demand for 
machinery as clear from table number 5. Most of this machinery is being imported (notably from 
Italy but from various other countries as well). The textiles industry is facing many problems 
associated with costs of production and competition in the export market with less expensive 
textiles production from other countries especially India and Pakistan, and competition in the 
domestic market with smuggled production from China and East Europe. High taxes on raw 
materials, especially cotton, and high wages as well as overvaluation of the currency used to hurt 
the competitiveness of this industry
109
. Thus, the dramatic devaluation of the Egyptian currency 
that has been going since 2002 should have positive impact on the competitiveness of this industry 
in Egypt. Yet, this positive impact is altered by the fact that most of the textile industry’s machinery 
is being imported. If the price of the Egyptian textiles is expected to fall due to devaluation of the 
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Egyptian pound, this fall can be offset due to the increasing cost of imported machinery with the 
rise in the value of the USD and Euro relative to the Egyptian Pound. Hence, this induces more 
thinking of firmly establishing a local machinery industry to feed this important industry (textiles 
industry) so as to diminish the cost and boost the competitiveness of the Egyptian textiles 
production. Moreover, in our discussion on Fordism and Post-Fordism, we have already dealt with 
the idea of flexible specialization and the need for a mature machinery sector serving important 
industries (and I pointed to the textiles industry in Egypt as an example) in order to help shifting 
easily and quickly in the production of models according to the changes of tastes internationally.    
It should be noted that there are already three Egyptian companies involved in providing the 
machinery accessories for the textiles industry, which are the Egyptian Metal Processing, Misr 
Manufacturing and General Cylinders
110
.  
As I pointed out before, developing a machinery sector is a complicated task which I 
suggest should follow an initial stage of Heavy Industrialization in intermediate goods like steel, 
aluminum and petrochemicals. Yet, by my brief account of the textiles industry machinery I wanted 
to point the presence of favorable conditions that can later foster stepping into a second stage of 
Heavy Industrialization strategy. In this proposed second stage, the machinery sector shall be the 
priority in order to complement the growth of various industrial sectors and boost their 
production’s competitiveness. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Imports of textiles’ machines in 2000 and 2001111. 
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Item Value $ Quantity 
2000 2001 2000 2001 
Sewing mch. Excp. household type, autom. 
Unit 
736,456 558,112 442 1534 
Sewing mch. Excp. Household type not 
autom. 
4,339,826 3,811,219 7481 8327 
Mch. For extruding, drawing, texturing 375,611 704,188 4 18 
Mch. For prepg. Textile fibers, spinning 6,458,817 7,895,796 224 382 
Weaving machines (looms) 8,603,618 8,371,715 543 651 
Knitting maching, stitch-bonding machine 7,372,868 8,518,788 1629 1171 
Auxiliary mach. For use with mch. 7,211,764 8,219,877 NA NA 
Machinery for the manufacture or finishing 474,570 NA NA NA 
 
Yet, a sector that is using less sophisticated machinery and one for which machinery 
production is promising of being competitive (if wise policies were pursued), is agriculture. 
Agriculture is still the biggest sector in Egypt, and it should be anticipated that developing a 
machinery sector to service the agricultural sector would be a great success for the Egyptian 
economy. 
Kerr extensively discussed this industry (agriculture machinery) in Egypt, the problems 
facing it and prospects for its progress. According to Kerr, until the 1980s the public sector 
dominated this industry while most agricultural machinery was imported to the extent that some 
simple machines were also imported. Generally tractors, combines, threshers, harvesters and 
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reapers were imported, while Egypt manufactured some tractor attachments like plows, scrappers, 
wagons and trailers. Agricultural machinery production started to be dominated by:  
1- The public sector firms, which were involved in producing some machinery and assembling 
imported semi-finished machines. They were using capital-intensive techniques to produce 
machinery that could have been produced by simpler techniques in private workshops. 
Some of their production (e.g.: threshers) was competitive to imported goods.  
2- Private dealers who imported machinery and started to be involved in the production 
process. Their production, however, was of low quality. However, letting them get freely 
their needed inputs and assuring them of the presence of sufficient demand would give them 
the chance of producing sophisticated machinery.  
3- Finally, those small workshops that were involved in repairing the machinery have started to 
copy models of the machinery, especially simple ones, without much innovation. These 
workshops were under-equipped and that is why they relied on big firms to carry out more 
complex tasks that need sophisticated machinery in the production process. Their 
production was discriminated against in marketing as dealers preferred to deal with big 
suppliers to avoid the risk associated with dealing with small suppliers and not being able to 
sell their product. Also, due to bureaucratic procedures, it was hard for these small 
workshops to get their production sold through the Principal Bank for Development and 
Agricultural Credit (PBDAC). Also, it was hard for them to get financial support, unlike the 
case of large public sector firms. Also, access to sophisticated inputs was restricted and 
reserved to favored firms both in the private and public sector. 
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Thus, Kerr points that what the machinery industry needs is institutional and policy reform. He 
also calls for giving the chance for small workshops to expand and not to be discriminated against 
by various governmental policies, which upset the opportunities for this industry to be firmly 
established. If wise policies were implemented, the agricultural machinery can be a success without 
burdening the government, since the burden would then be moved to the private sector.  
Domestic manufacturers were quite efficient, but they were hampered by 
institutional barriers and non price policies. In particular, denial of access to 
marketing credit limited their sales compared to dealers of the imported machine. 
For other machines that might be built locally, lack of access to material inputs 
remained a major impediment
112
. 
 
As for the auto industry, I cannot claim that it is possible to target this industry in the first 
stage of a Heavy Industrialization drive. It can be, however, considered in later stages when other 
Heavy Industries (e.g.: steel, petrochemicals, machinery …etc.) flourish. It is for that reason that I 
am not tackling this industry in detail. Yet, I am discussing here how can aggregating industries 
induce industrialization and how they can even promote the expansion of other Heavy Industries, if 
this was planned well.   
Meier provides a useful insight in this regard. He discussed a growing trend in 
industrialization of underdeveloped countries that has worked well with newly industrializing 
countries of the Far East. This is moving backwards in industrialization, starting from producing 
final goods out from semi manufactured imported industrial commodities. An example for 
industries in which we can use this strategy is the car assembling industry. The logic is that when 
demand increases on this now locally produced final commodity, domestic investment will be 
encouraged to produce the semi-manufactured commodity in a large scale since it will be much 
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cheaper on the long run than importing it. This chain is to continue moving backwards and can 
achieve industrialization with less risk.  
In Egypt, final touches industries (e.g.: Car assembling) have progressed and the demand 
for them has increased extensively. Unfortunately, there was no backwards development of the type 
that Meier spoke of. Establishing and reinforcing existing Heavy Industries is a logical step as 
demand for the locally assembled automobiles increases. Heavy Industries would act as a chain in 
producing semi-finished commodities, which were previously imported, and might encourage 
private investment in producing other stages of the chain of the production process of this 
commodity. It is worth mentioning that the devaluation of the Egyptian pound has saved such 
industries (final touches industries) from the consequences of the application of the GATT 
agreement. This devaluation increased the prices of imported final products and provided a sort of 
protection for the final touches industries in Egypt. Heavy Industry would further this protection by 
helping in providing cheap intermediary and semi-finished commodities (as production expands and 
application of economy of scale follows), instead of importing them from outside. This view is 
supported by Abdel Fadil who pointed out the uselessness of aggregating industries if it is not 
followed by industrialization. He asserted that these industries can have negative value added when 
compared to world prices if industrialization does not follow. He elaborated that car aggregation 
industry needs demand, import protective policies, technical high and intermediate management and 
also the presence of industries like iron and steel and aluminum that would service the car 
aggregation industry
113
. 
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3- Why is Heavy Industry Needed for Egypt's Development 
 Throughout this chapter, I have discussed various theoretical perspectives in order to drive 
theoretical justifications for Egypt’s need for establishing and reinforcing its Heavy Industry. I also 
discussed the present conditions of Heavy Industry in Egypt in order to show that Egypt has the 
potential for its evolution. Hence, this section would seem more or less as a conclusion or a 
summary of interesting points in the first chapter of the thesis. 
 Creating linkages is the most important motive for establishing Heavy Industries. This kind 
of industries can act as a backbone for other Egyptian industries (which are most likely to be labor 
intensive in nature), and thus it can indirectly create more job opportunities and provide more 
hopes for creating export markets. In this regard, Heavy Industry can act as an infrastructure for 
other industries, an intermediate or capital good that encounters high costs in the inception period, 
but which on the long run will prove to be very helpful for other industries. With the progress of 
time and increase in the demand for domestic Heavy Industrial output, an expansion of Heavy 
Industries will be expected. This expansion will mean operating with economies of scale and 
henceforth the costs of production for Heavy Industries will be reduced. Consequently, the price of 
the Heavy Industrial products (which are at the same time intermediate goods and machinery for 
other industries) will diminish. Reducing the cost of inputs (intermediate and capital goods 
provided by Heavy industries) to other industries will give more comparative advantage for these 
industries. Moreover, in contrary to infrastructure which is not itself a productive activity, Heavy 
Industry is a productive activity that can generate profits on the long run. This leads us to the 
second point, which is arguing for diversifying the industrial production of the Egyptian economy. 
 Heavy Industries provide Egypt with the opportunity of diversifying its industrial 
production, even if this objective is to be realized on the long run when some of these industries 
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can have comparative advantage. It should be noted that having a comparative advantage in a 
certain product is not something that is fixed, but it is changing as conditions change. Technology 
shifts can alter existing comparative advantages, the same as the emergence of other competitors 
do. If Egypt is to limit its possibilities to those industries that it now has comparative advantage in, 
then when conditions change the Egyptian economy would be left vulnerable. Heavy Industries 
increase the range of goods that Egypt can produce. It can also guarantee the persistence of the 
existing comparative advantage for certain industries and create comparative advantages for others. 
This can be reached thanks to building technological capabilities. 
 That is the third major reason for why Heavy Industry is important for the Egyptian 
economy. As the Structuralists pointed out (and I regard their arguments as valid), building 
technological capabilities and the know-how is of great importance for the Egyptian economy. This 
can only be realized through a national Heavy Industry that can feed other industries and 
agriculture with machinery and equipment that suit more Egypt’s conditions and resource 
endowments. Learning by doing, and building up local technological capabilities, will guarantee 
that changing conditions (endangering the comparative advantage of certain Egyptian industries) 
would be met accordingly. This can only be realized if technological capabilities are built up in 
Egypt so as to enable local technology to meet new challenges. 
 Finally, Heavy Industry is needed for strategic reasons, which is a point that I have not 
mentioned before though. Heavy Industry is a very vital industry for the military. Its expansion can 
reduce reliance on foreign arms’ supplies. This invites investment in Heavy Industry for strategic 
reasons, so that Egypt can equip its own military and develop with time its own military industrial 
technology. In this regard, Sullivan pointed out that Egypt is among the most 10 importers of 
weapons in the Third World. 
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I understand that military technology has now reached a level of complexity so that it is 
becoming much harder to catch up with the latest present technology. Yet, this does not deny the 
importance of building technological capabilities in this field especially that this guarantees secrecy 
in the information about military capabilities as compared to the alternative of relying on imported 
weapons and arms.  This building up process will take time, but at least it should be given a big 
push forward.  
In my analysis it has also been pointed out that Egypt do have an established Heavy 
Industrial sector and that some of the Heavy Industries are promising, notably aluminum and 
petrochemicals. Iron and steel is also performing reasonably well especially if we considered the 
forward and backward linkages it creates and that it exports part of its production. The machinery 
industry is more problematic requiring much institutional and policy reform as indicated by the case 
of agricultural machinery. This suggests that intermediate Heavy Industries should be given more 
attention or be considered first in an industrialization plan at the same time that institutional and 
policy reform and technological upgrading proceed, thus permitting the machinery industry to lead 
a second stage of Heavy Industrialization. The rise of intermediate Heavy Industries of the first 
stage will in themselves help the establishment of machinery industry in a later stage by providing 
cheap inputs for this industry (e.g.: steel, aluminum and various polymers can be used in making a 
machine).  
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CHAPTER II:  
HOW TO REALIZE A HEAVY INDUSTRIALIZATION DRIVE 
 
1- Why the Government? 
A- General Theoretical Background 
1- A Neoclassical Perspective 
Having identified the importance of creating a Heavy Industrial backbone, the question that 
will arise is how to achieve this objective. This question is a complex one to which I will devote 
this second chapter. What complicates this question is the high costs encountered by Heavy 
Industry in the inception period. Another problem is the need for a technology that might be more 
sophisticated than those used in other industries like labor-intensive industries. This involves an 
element of risk, since using this kind of technology might mean higher costs without a guarantee of 
being paid back in a short time. 
 This invites an active role for the government, as it is the only party that can invest in these 
kinds of industries without seeking profits, at least in the short run, while trying to develop a long 
term plan for developing its national economy. This role varies in its character as will be explained 
later in this chapter. I am going to start discussing why the government should play an active role in 
a Heavy Industrialization plan. 
 Starting again with the now dominant Neoclassical paradigm, it has a different perception 
for government’s role. The Neoclassicists do not deny the important role that governments should 
play, yet they considered this role to be that of a night watchman, protecting the rights of 
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individuals and their property and seeking to enforce “voluntarily negotiated private contracts”114. 
Neoclassicists deny that the different conditions of the underdeveloped countries and the rigidities 
that their economies are characterized with, as compared to the developed world, can justify 
government’s intervention in setting price signals. Neoclassicists acknowledge the presence of 
market failure that necessitates government intervention, attributing this failure to a number of 
factors like deficiencies in infrastructure, supply of technical expertise and skilled labor, lack of 
effectiveness of domestic markets for capital and knowledge of foreign markets
115
. Yet, they argue 
that the price mechanism should be left operating freely giving signals that producers and 
consumers would respond to. Thus, from a merely economic perspective, Scitovsky and Scott 
(Neoclassical school), believed in the inefficiency of industrial strategies as they provide unequal 
incentives for different economic actors
116
.  This implies a counterargument to the logic of 
establishing a Heavy Industrialization plan that should be supported by the government in the early 
stages. This criticism is based on the idea of providing unequal incentives by which the government 
could provide incentives for investing in what the Neoclassicists would claim to be unsound 
projects using a cost-benefit analysis. 
 From another angle, The Neoclassicists are skeptical about government planning for various 
reasons. The first is that governments are believed to lack adequate information as reflected in their 
knowledge about current production techniques, demand for goods, and expectation about how the 
market for these goods would change. The second is that planners do not have full control on the 
instruments they are trying to manipulate in order to carry on their plan. Governments, even with a 
substantial public sector as in Egypt, did not control all sectors of the economy and the private 
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sector still controls certain aspects. What gives credit to this argument in the case of Egypt is that 
even in the 1960s in Egypt, the private sector was still dominating some industries that depend on 
small-size enterprises. The third reason for the Neoclassicists criticism is starting planning from a 
broad national level rather than starting from the project level
117
. It should be noted that the 
common trend in development nowadays is tackling an issue on a project by project basis. For 
these reasons the school criticizes the concept of government comprehensive planning in 
underdeveloped countries and questions reliance on the government in planning a Heavy 
Industrialization drive, which can only be realized through a broad national level planning rather 
than on a project by project basis.  
 It is no wonder that two Neoclassicists (Ranis and Mahmoud) are skeptical about 
government sectoral targeting seeing it as risky to an economy, if it was guided by an ill-judged 
industrial policy. They considered Autarky (that means industrializing in a closed economy) as an 
example of such an industrial policy. They regarded the slow maturation of heavy industry as 
causing fiscal gaps and regular foreign exchange problems, which might lead to overvaluation of 
the currency (e.g.: due to printing money to cover the budget deficit). As an industrial policy, they 
advocated targeting labor-intensive industries in the beginning, then moving to capital intensive 
followed by skill intensive and finally ending with research-intensive industries. They regarded 
targeting Heavy and Chemical Industries from the start as being premature
118
.  
 Added to their criticism for providing unequal incentives and for governmental planning, the 
Neoclassicists look negatively towards governmental investment. They believe that government 
expenditure discourages private investment, causes large public deficits that have to be financed by 
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printing money (and thus causes inflation), or by borrowing (and debt results). They even claim that 
government expenditure goes to unsound investment that costs too much to support it without 
paying back similarly in the form of revenue
119
.  
 Yet, what seems interesting to know is that the Neoclassicists in fact acknowledge the role 
of government in supporting certain industries and believe in the concept of Infant Economy rather 
than the Infant Industry argumentation. The Infant Industry argumentation was first introduced by 
the German theorist List, who called for government intervention and protection for new industries 
in a late-industrializing country. He believed that new industries cannot compete immediately with 
foreign industrial output coming from industrially advanced nations and that is why these new 
industries should be protected until they are able to compete. As for the Neoclassicists, they believe 
that the concept of infant economy means leaving firms to operate freely but furnishing the needed 
environment for them to flourish. As elaborated by Teitel and Thoumi, the Infant Economy strategy 
should tackle first light industries so that when this succeeds the following stage is to support more 
complex and large investments like that meant for Heavy Industry. In the third stage various capital 
and intermediate goods are to be tackled
120
. 
 As for the Infant Industry argumentation, the Neoclassicists are skeptical about government 
ability to target and support these industries as they regard this process as necessitating knowledge 
and administrative skills that not many developing countries possess. If an industry is to have Infant 
Industry status, then it should only receive a time limited subsidy rather than having cheap loans or 
being protected by tariffs both of which the Neoclassicists regarded as distorting economic signals. 
For an industry to have this status, it should prove to yield, after maturation, an adequate return to 
compensate for the initial stages. For this to be realized, the productivity of the industry being 
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protected should rise to greater levels more than those of foreign competitors’. Being 
internationally competitive is not the only requirement for maturation. Moreover, this maturation 
means “in house improvements in the technology to squeeze ever greater output from the existing 
plant-specific assets”121.  Based on this precondition and the concept of opportunity cost, the 
Neoclassicists believe that Infant Industry stage should not last more than between 5-8 years, 
although, as Auty elaborates, certain successful HCI industries necessitated more than that like the 
Japanese automobile industry which took three decades to mature
122
. 
 It should be noted that the ideas of the Neoclassical school have gained much influence 
since the 1990s and, thus, these concepts have surpassed the status of being only a theoretical 
framework. Thanks to the GATT agreement and the establishment of the WTO, the Neoclassical 
perspective has been put into practice and is posing a great challenge to available policy options for 
governments especially if we are speaking of protectionist policies. The Uruguay Summit set a new 
stage and conditions under which Third World countries have to adapt their policies. With my 
focus on industry and trade of industrial commodities in relation to underdeveloped countries, 
certain measures were agreed on in this regard. According to the Agreement, tariffs were to be 
reduced to 3% for certain goods while it should be lifted altogether for about 40:45% of traded 
goods including steel, construction equipment, pharmaceuticals and others. Quotas on textiles were 
to be replaced by tariffs for ten years, while existing tariffs on this commodity were to be reduced 
by 25%. Dumping was not prohibited although disputes on it were to be resolved more efficiently 
and firmly. Subsidies to industry were restricted only in the field of research where governments 
were permitted to contribute to a maximum of 50% of the cost of applied research in industry. 
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More freedom was given to foreign investors in relation to government policies so that these 
investors were to be protected from requirements such as using domestic resources and supplies or 
export more than or equal to what they import. On the other hand, the Agreement gave the right of 
temporarily levying tariffs and other measures on an import that severely endangers a domestic 
industry. The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created to check the implementation of this 
agreement, and the agreement was signed in 1994 and took effect in 1995
123
.   
 Most of Third World countries (including Egypt) signed this Agreement, which clearly 
restricts governments’ protective policies. On the other hand, Structural Adjustment programs that 
many underdeveloped countries agreed on (thanks to generous IMF and World Bank assistance), 
have also restricted governments’ grip on their economies. Thus, the dominance of the Neoclassical 
perspective has created new conditions that should be considered in my analysis about the available 
policy options left for a government to induce or implement a Heavy Industrialization drive.  
 
2- A non Neoclassical Perspective 
Despite this massive Neoclassicist criticism, it should be said that since the developments of 
the 1920s, it has always been argued for an active governmental role for the sake of development 
(and industrial development in particular) as well as guaranteeing the well functioning of an 
economy. Even as early as the time of the origin of economics as a science, Smith admitted that the 
government has a role to play which he limited to three spheres, among them the defense industry. 
Yet in the 1920s, the call for a more involved government grew. The Stalinist industrialization 
process that moved ahead with magnificent success, the Fascist German and to a lesser extent 
Italian industrial achievements have shown how an active role for government can induce such a 
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progress. In these totalitarian regimes the government either controlled the whole economy as in 
the Soviet case, or guided and actively directed the economy as in the case of German Fascism 
(Nazism). Germany was able to built up a massive military industrial base in a relatively very short 
time, while the Soviet Union industrialization enabled it to be the second world power at the 
conclusion of World War Two. If these were extreme cases, yet, they pointed to the role that can 
be played by governments in the industrialization of developing countries. The Soviet model 
specifically was impressive for many Third World countries in the post-colonial era to the extent 
that many countries adopted Marxism-Leninism and joined the socialist block in the global 
ideological struggle of the Cold War. 
Even in the liberal West, the crises of the Great Depression created an atmosphere more 
favorable to what Keynes and his macroeconomic theory proposed, which was calling for an active 
role for the government to intervene in the economy. Other writers moved on the Keynesian 
perspective, for instance, Jones and Mason regarded the state as a rational decision making entity 
that through intervention in the economy can adjust market failures which private firms suffer from 
(e.g.: imperfect market, high entry barriers...etc.). They regarded public enterprises as a tool among 
various other tools that a government can intervene with
124
. They attributed the presence of an 
environment encouraging government intervention in Heavy Industry to sectoral characteristics of 
this industry, added to the vitality of technology and economics of scale for this industry. If state 
intervention is blamed due to the possibility of organizational failure, the market can equally be 
blamed for market failure. This is what justifies what they pointed out as “revealed institutional 
advantage” favoring the state and calls the government to intervene in the economy125. 
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Keynesianism was in many ways an answer for economic conditions that still exist 
nowadays. As pointed by Piore and Sabel, the technology in the age of Fordism called for mass 
production and mass consumption, which were the driving force for the government to intervene in 
a Keynesian logic to stabilize demand. The government through this ensures that supply and 
demand can match and, consequently, mass consumerism be sustained
126
. They argued that the 
change towards Post-Fordism threatened mass consumerism and mass production. Yet, I would 
point again to what was mentioned in the previous chapter about the persistence of Fordist 
relations to the present day and, thus, the need for government. Moving on the same line, Karl 
Polanyi considered government intervention as an essential factor for developing market relations. 
Continuous intervention from the government is what led to the realization and preservation of a 
free market. Bates even went further asserting that private interest is defined by governments; they 
also help in developing social classes and interest groups
127
.  
Returning back to our discussion, the Marshal Plan for reconstructing Europe and the 
emergence of the Soviet Union as a world power pole in a bipolar international system and the 
subsequent rise of socialist command economies in various places in the globe, all augmented the 
believe in a more involved government. Even Rostow, who was keen to refer to his famous book, 
The stages of economic growth, as a non-communist manifesto, believed in an active role for the 
government in developing nations. He stated that in the Pre-conditions for Take-off stage 
governments are needed to produce "social overhead capital" since there is a need to mobilize large 
sums of capital. The government also plays a central role in organizing the nation and through 
various other policies (Health, Education, Tariffs…etc.) that lead to modernization. 
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Gerschenkron in his study on late industrializing countries in the European context 
elaborated the central role that governments played in their development. Competing with already 
industrialized countries (e.g.: England was an industrializing pioneer) necessitated access to 
technology and capital in a way that the private sector could not furnish. That is why governments 
had to step in, in order to provide the suitable environment for private investment, but also to 
organize financial markets and induce decision-making. Organizing financial markets meant that 
governments acted as investment bankers in order to remove the burden of risk from the shoulders 
of private investment, while provision of incentives was a mechanism by which they were able to 
guide private decision making and point to investment opportunities which would go undetected 
otherwise
128
.  
Bryce, writing in 1960, points out why a governmental role is needed in the industrialization 
of underdeveloped countries. The government can have an active role when the private sector 
could not carry the burden of implementing a certain industrial project even if it is sound. This can 
be due to lack of interest (since private capital is interested more on short run returns and low risk 
projects), or the unavailability of resources in the hands of the private sector for large projects. The 
government can also furnish the technical, managerial, marketing and administrative skills that 
might be lacking. Certain industries (among them Heavy Industries) can only be launched by 
government initiative. The role of the state in these industries can be permanent or temporary. 
Moreover, private capital would not be interested or involved in defense industry, the government 
is the only party willing to invest in it for strategic rather than economic justifications. 
More recently, the UNIDO favored an active role for the government in technologically 
advanced industries in underdeveloped countries saying that:  
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The substantial capital needed for the commercial uncertainty of developing new 
processes and products have made active government encouragement a necessity in 
the science intensive industries
129
.  
 
The government is expected to provide financial, technical, scientific and material support 
to this kind of industries. Hence, the UNIDO provides a contradictory view to that offered by the 
Neoclassicists when writing about government’s lack of capabilities.  Speaking more specifically 
about Heavy Industry, the UNIDO says:  
In general, the expanded role in the state should encourage the growth of 
Heavy Industry in the developing countries. Such a trend would lead to the 
formation of a production structure more closely approximating that currently 
found in the developed market economies. Changes in the composition of trade 
between the economic groups and among the developing countries, in the skills 
needed for the industrial labor force, and in investment requirements for industry 
are expected to result from an expansion in the share of Heavy Industry
130
.  
 
This shows how the UNIDO is calling both for Heavy Industry in underdeveloped countries, and 
for an active role for the government in this regard.  
The Center for Development Planning, commenting on the performance of Underdeveloped 
countries trying to industrialize, said that:   
[A] marked emphasis on establishing or expanding the public sector’s industrial 
projects in the production of goods that are strategic for investment expansion 
itself and for meeting the requirements of other industrial branches or sectors of the 
economy. Prominent examples of these projects are steel, cement, industrial 
chemicals, fertilizers and petroleum products
131
.  
 
This proves the pioneering role that the public sector plays as, one of the tools in the hands 
of a government, in establishing a Heavy Industrial backbone for an industrializing underdeveloped 
economy. It should be noted that the specified industries can repay well for government 
intervention in this regard. According to Spencer, in his analysis on NICs, certain industries meet 
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this criterion. These are: those having domestic cost advantage, “scale economics and/or high 
capital requirements”, and R&D needs132. It is clear that Heavy Industry meets the second and third 
conditions. In the case of Egypt, Aluminum industry meets also the first condition due to the 
abundance of the aluminum ore and the available cheap energy (e.g.: electricity).   
 
3- An Institutional and Structuralist Perspective  
The most enthusiastic about an active role for government are the Structuralists and 
Institutionalists. Starting with the Structuralists, as I have dealt with their perspective in the 
previous chapter, they believed in an active role for the government given their suspicion, together 
with the Dependentistas, regarding local and international private capital. More generally, 
Structuralists  (e.g.: Nurkse), believed that markets in Third World countries are small and that 
there is a need for government investment in various industries which would create more demand 
and can stimulate private investment
133
. Based on this, one deduce that public investment in Heavy 
Industry would lead to an expansion in the demand for these products (e.g.: equipment and 
machinery) by producers in other industries, as well as increasing the demand of ordinary 
consumers for these products. This would benefit the economy directly through an increase in the 
production of these goods and indirectly through providing machinery to other industries. The 
perspective of this school is going to be incorporated in the subsequent subsections and that is why 
I am not dealing with it now in much detail. 
As for the Institutionalists, they were also enthusiastic about an active role for the 
government in development and in industrial development. What seems interesting is that this 
perspective is starting to be acknowledged even by one of the most enthusiastic institutions for the 
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Neoclassical paradigm. The World Bank, in a study on the East Asian industrial miracle, affirmed 
that some selective government interventions impacted positively on some economies referring to 
the East Asian countries
134
. 
In referring to the Comparative Institutional approach which contemporary Institutionalists 
adopted, Evans defined this approach as being:  
Institutional because it looks for explanations that go beyond the utilitarian 
calculations of individuals to the enduring pattern of relationships within with such 
calculations are immersed; comparative because it focuses on concrete variations 
across historical cases rather than on generic explanations
135
. 
 
The basic assumption of this school lies in believing that government intervention can foster 
comparative advantage for a certain industry. If the Neoclassical school believes that comparative 
advantage can evolve due to resource endowments, as Ricardo asserted, or due to capital/labor 
abundance or scarcity as the Hecksher & Ohlin model suggests, the Institutionalists believe in the 
ability of governments to foster comparative advantage. In this regard, they depend on the 
literature on late-industrialization and Infant Industry arguments
136
. Cline believes that comparative 
advantage is realized due to “social and institutional factors” that result from the developmental 
process, added to those factors stated by the Neoclassicists; Porter elaborates this view by saying 
that this depends on: “complex evolution of competitive and cooperative ties among local firms, on 
government policies, and a host of other social and political institutions”137. Furthermore, the 
government can help in acquiring and sustaining comparative advantage for an industry by 
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coordinating the accumulation of skills and information that is essential for technological innovation 
self-sustenance
138
.     
As for Heavy Industry, the Institutionalists called for government intervention to support 
this sector. They do not agree with the Neoclassical perspective that criticizes sectoral targeting 
considering it as risky. For the Institutionalists, this risk is overestimated and they question the 
basis of such an overestimation. They regard this overestimation as stemming from the 
standardization of the structural pattern by which the industrial world developed seeing this model 
as needing modification. Thus, they support protecting certain industries even if the expected 
comparative advantage is one that is realized in the long-term, as can be indicated from expected 
rapid increase in domestic demand, or from being resource or cheap labor endowed. The 
Institutionalists belief that certain sectors should be targeted evolves from their realization of the 
recurrence of market failures together with their belief in “strategic trade theory”. This theory 
states that extra-profits result from trade and is benefiting developed countries due to the presence 
of imperfect competitive international markets. If developing countries managed to construct 
competitive advantage in certain industries, they will be able to have some of these extra-profits
139
.  
If we considered highly advanced industrial activities as an example for the ideas of the 
“strategic trade theory”, then if Third World countries can enter to these industrial sectors that are 
now restricted to the industrial world (these industries might need sophisticated technology, skilled 
labor or large scale of production), the developing world would be able to share in the big profits 
that the industrial world receives from these technologically advanced industrial activities. Needless 
to say, states should be active in such a construction of comparative advantages in Third World 
countries, since entering to these advanced industrial sectors calls for great endeavors and 
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necessitate minimization of risk and cost in the initial stages. States, by various policies and 
incentives, can minimize this risk and cost and encourage investment in the targeted activities. By 
this way states would be helping in constructing comparative advantages for their countries in the 
targeted industries. 
Based on studying the industrialization experiences of East Asian NICs, two of the 
prominent Institutionalists, Amsden and Wade, highlighted methods of sectoral targeting that 
governments were involved in. For Amsden, what she regarded as the Second Industrial 
Revolution, that came after the well-known First Industrial Revolution of the 1700s, was 
characterized by protecting infant industries, unlike the laissez faireism of the First Revolution. 
Governments acted as entrepreneurs by protecting industries and providing subsidies and financial 
incentives, imposing performance standards to select those deserving of such treatment. Wade 
pointed out the role of government in guiding resource allocation in what he referred to as a 
“governed market” that was a characteristic of Taiwan140.   
Given their advocacy for targeting certain sectors, the Institutionalists call for targeting 
Heavy Industries. They believe that Heavy and Chemical Industries yield high Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP)
141
.  As an example for these industries, Evans pointed to the great importance 
of establishing Steel plants, a fact that many Third World countries acknowledged. He discussed 
how some of these countries were exporting iron ore and importing considerable amounts of steel 
products. Estimates showed that it would be cost reducing if these steel plants were constructed 
and Iron and Steel could be produced domestically, and added to the positive effect of linkages that 
originate from this industry. Neither MNCs nor private capital was interested in investing in Steel 
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production, and governments had to step in. In the countries that I will discuss as models later in 
this chapter (Korea, Brazil, India) this was the case and they became major world steel 
producers
142
.  
 
B- Lessons from Heavy Industrialization in the 1960s 
1- The Three Factors (An Overview) 
When discussing Heavy Industrialization and who is to implement this process, one cannot 
disregard discussing the Egyptian past experience in this regard in order to find out lessons to be 
taken into consideration in any new trial. This will surely lead us to the 1960s, as this decade 
witnessed the most serious Heavy Industrialization drive in Egypt.  
It is a historically obvious fact that the government was involved considerably, if not 
exclusively in this drive, starting from nationalizing existing large firms in various industries, and 
ending by establishing big industrial factories, passing through exploiting the agricultural sector for 
the sake of industrialization.  This might give us an insight that the Egyptian government is the only 
party that was and is capable to carry on Heavy Industrialization.  This insight is reinforced by 
acknowledging that the Egyptian government is the only party that can be interested in such a drive 
and willing to bear its costs and risks. Yet, this generalization should not be reached without 
examining this experience (the industrialization experience of the 1960s) to find out if it succeeded. 
Also, before testing this experience, one should try to explore what led the Egyptian government to 
carry alone the burden of this industrialization drive. Discussing this last question, putting certain 
assumptions in mind and trying to reach conclusions, would prove to be very helpful in finding out 
how to establish new and reinforce existing Heavy Industries. Identifying a number of factors that 
                                                   
142 Evans, Embedded Autonomy, 86. 
  
89 
induced the government to act this way and testing if these factors have changed is the objective of 
the next sections.     
In this thesis I identify three factors that led to such extensive government control over 
Heavy Industrialization in the 1960s. These are: the presence of an immature Egyptian bourgeoisie, 
the inadequacy of infrastructure, and the existence of a developed bureaucracy.  
 
2- The Egyptian Capitalist Class Prior to the 1960s 
The Dependency school provides a gloomy outlook for the bourgeoisie in underdeveloped 
countries, which raises doubts about their potential to carry on Heavy Industrialization. The school 
thought of indigenous bourgeois classes in Third World countries as being parasitic and interested 
in the dependency game. They regarded them as hostile to any ISI strategy that might endanger 
their interests. Thus, the Dependency school called for an active governmental role to bring the ISI 
strategy forward and to crush the parasitic indigenous bourgeoisie for the sake of an independent 
national developmental strategy
143
. 
Paul A. Baran confirms this view. He states that the inherited backwardness of Third World 
countries (e.g.: Egypt can be thought of as an example) deprived their Middle classes from 
gathering economic strength or insight or even self-confidence to have a leading role in society. 
This class was small in size and, as a result, it did not try to upset the existing situation, which it 
benefited from thanks to its ties with feudal landowners and foreign capital. This led to a system 
combining the worst in feudalism and capitalism with little potential for economic growth. To avoid 
feeling inferior to the aristocracy, the underdeveloped countries’ middle classes demand for 
luxurious goods increases. This induces these classes to rely on large-scale agricultural production 
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to overcome costs of production and acquire more profits. Yet, large-scale production is beyond 
the potentials of this class, and having distant markets for their products involves risk. Hence, to 
offset these shortcomings, the middle classes in these societies rely on their relations with foreign 
capital.  
Mahmoud Hussein supports this view by providing a Marxist class analysis for Egyptian 
society in the 1950s and 1960s. Within the indigenous ruling class there were those from a 
landowning background who favored industrialization, and who formed thus a rising indigenous 
Bourgeoisie (by shifting their status from land owning feudalists to industrial firms owners and 
entrepreneurs).  Yet, this Egyptian Bourgeoisie was dependent on foreign banks and companies 
controlling the market and having almost monopolistic control over the Egyptian market. Hussein 
considered Nasser's state to be the new bourgeoisie and referred to it as the state bourgeoisie as 
distinct from the traditional bourgeoisie existing before the 1960s.  He attributed the boom of the 
economy in the first half of the 1960s to the efforts of this new state bourgeoisie to expand.  For 
him this trend stopped in the mid 1960s and this new bourgeoisie grew as conservative as its 
predecessor
144
. According to Hussein, with the transformation of the state bourgeoisie to an 
established one, competition among the members of this new bourgeoisie in search for profits 
drifted this class away from the objectives of the revolution.  This profit seeking behavior led to 
giving more attention to profitable industries and disregarding unprofitable ones, with a mentality 
that resembles that of the former bourgeoisie.  Consequently, few years later, dozens of the newly 
established factories were functioning with third and even fourth of their capacity and some of 
these factories stopped functioning altogether due to lack of raw materials. Moreover, lack of 
coordination among hundreds of public sector’s enterprises resulted in the disorganization of their 
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production process
145
. Thus, industrial projects that the revolution regarded as vital for the rise of 
the Egyptian economy were disregarded and even denied from having their needed raw material, 
while competition within the new state bourgeoisie resulted in seeking individualistic interests 
rather than coordinating for the sake of the public interest and meeting the objectives of the 
revolution. In other words, the revolution seized to follow its ambitious objectives when its elite 
were transformed into a bourgeoisie. 
This analysis, if taken into consideration, might provide an insight into the incapability of 
the bourgeoisie, even today, to carry out a developmental role of the type discussed here (i.e.: 
stressing on Heavy Industrialization). Dessouki affirms this negative view about the bourgeoisie 
saying that the Nationalization process of the 1960s was attributed to the failure of capitalists to do 
their share in the 5-year plan and their tendency to invest in quick profit projects such as housing. 
On the other hand, the state's interest was in creating a powerful national economy
146
.  
Discussed from another perspective, many thinkers say that colonialism has led to 
weakening indigenous capitalist classes in underdeveloped countries. The result was the evolution 
of Capitalist classes in these countries that are only interested in trade and services
147
. That is why 
those favoring State Capitalism, even in Egypt, were the ones coming from a Petit Bourgeois 
background having the least interest in the private sector and even disappointed with the 
performance of this sector. 
Yet, discussing more thoroughly the entrepreneurial class of Egypt in the pre 1960s era 
would be of great importance to reach conclusions. It should be pointed out that there existed an 
entrepreneurial class in Egypt since the 1920s. Early in that decade Misr Bank was created by 
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Tala’at Harb for the purpose of creating a national bank that would furnish economic independence 
for Egypt. This was followed by creating a number of industries tied to the bank and aiming at 
diversifying the Egyptian economy and not leaving it solely dependent on the cotton crop. The 
annual rates of growth for capital and bonds directed to industry increased impressively from 
1.25% between 1922 and 1933 to 13.5% between 1933 and 1947 then to 13.7% until the 1952 
Revolution. Also, the concentration of capital through mergers was witnessed indicating the rise of 
big firms and readiness for establishing large-scale industries. This was reflected in the increase of 
the number of big machinery factories from five in 1917 to seventy-five in 1951
148
. This showed the 
growing attention directed to industry, which accelerated during the Second World War and was 
sustained afterwards. 
Many of the established industries were cotton related. Other entrepreneurs like Abud 
Pasha, Ali Yahya, and Farghaly established factories for sugar and cement industries
149
. Generally 
consumption industries were overwhelmingly dominating Egyptian industry in the 1940s and the 
1950s, they reached a peak of 74% of Egyptian industries while intermediate industries were 
representing 24% and investment capitalist industries only 2%
150
. Textile weaving and spinning was 
one of the most important industries in Egypt and it persisted in playing this role even in the 1960s 
due to various reasons. Among these reasons were world demand on long staple cotton, increase in 
the domestic demand on this product as population increased and the capability of the textiles 
industry to create more jobs. It is no wonder that Egyptian industry till the end of the 1950s was 
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based mainly on agriculture due to the substantial role of the Food and Spinning and Weaving 
industries
151
.  
Thus, it is clear that the Egyptian entrepreneurial class in the pre 1960s era was interested 
mainly in consumer goods industries the benefits of which come in the short run. This class was not 
as parasitic as Dependency theory might suggest in the sense of being agents of foreign capital and 
only interested in producing primary goods. Yet, it should be noted that Egypt was more of an 
agricultural economy than nowadays, and thus this entrepreneurial class cannot be said to represent 
the majority of the upper classes. Land Redistribution decrees of the early 1950s were meant, 
among various other objectives, to lead these classes to invest their money in industry. Yet, the 
response of these classes was to invest in housing instead despite the efforts of the Revolutionary 
government in 1956 to limit this trend. This persisted and industrial investment did not increase 
much
152
.  
Even for this entrepreneurial class, not much attention was directed to Heavy Industry and 
there were no indications for a progress in this regard. There was no escape from government 
intervention. It should be mentioned that even before the nationalizations of the 1960s, government 
inducement did lead to some progress on the willingness of the private sector to invest in industry. 
This was witnessed in the case of Misr Bank. The Bank established a number of important 
industrial companies in the late 1950s like Misr Lil-Alban (Milk products), Misr for Chemicals, 
Spinning and Weaving in Shibin Al-Kom, and surprisingly it did contribute to establishing the Iron 
and Steel Company
153
. Thus, an active governmental role was needed, yet whether this could have 
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developed parallel with the private sector’s contribution can be debatable. One should not 
generalize the attitude of Misr Bank and anticipate it to have been the attitude of the 
entrepreneurial class of that era.  
I shall postpone discussing a contrary view to the possible conflict in objectives between the 
entrepreneurial class and the government to a later stage in this chapter in the part dedicated for the 
models and suggestions. This contrary view is offered by the concepts of the Developmental State 
and Intermediate State. 
 
3- The Need for Infrastructure 
As for infrastructure, which is a basic factor for government support for a Heavy 
Industrialization drive, Rosenstein and Rodan (Structuralist school) believed that industrialization 
in Third World countries needs a big push, which can only be realized through public investment in 
infrastructure and planning. They regarded the private sector as incapable of performing this
154
. 
Baran again asserts that investing in infrastructure, which is needed for industrialization, is beyond 
the capabilities and interests of the underdeveloped capitalist class.  
Meier pointed out to the importance of social overhead capital represented in 
transportation, electric power, railways, highways…etc. These are infrastructure essential for 
opening the way for additional productive investment. This infrastructure should exist before 
anticipating such investment, and the needed objective could only be realized if an expected needed 
minimum of this infrastructure is present. Moreover, the maintenance that this social overhead 
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capital requires, when added to the high costs encountered in their construction in the first place, 
indicates that this infrastructure requires a high initial investment 
155
. 
It should be noted that infrastructure is both costly and in itself is an unproductive activity, 
and this might deter private investment. If we think of constructing a highway road, railway lines, 
electric generator plants, we realize how massive investment is needed for such projects that benefit 
many parties. Private investors can gain their revenue from rent or service of the infrastructural 
facility they constructed (e.g.: electricity bills, train tickets), but the risk is high. If we are speaking 
about underdeveloped countries, the issue is more complicated. The capitalist classes in these 
countries are not developed enough to carry or realize the profit from such activities. The dilemma 
is that infrastructural investment should precede establishing industrial projects, and sometimes this 
investment might be meant to encourage industrial projects. So if private capital would invest in 
infrastructure, they are more likely to wait till industrial projects are being established and factories 
start to operate and then they can charge these newly established factories with the price of the 
infrastructural service. It is obvious that this involves a great element of risk especially in the 
context of underdeveloped countries. The alternative might be the collaboration of various parties 
concerned about constructing industrial projects in a certain area and their agreement on 
establishing infrastructural facilities for the benefit of them all. This again necessitates the presence 
of a mature capitalist class that can invest these huge sums of money and that can coordinate 
among its private investors the establishment of these infrastructural facilities.  
 It is clear that Heavy Industry, like any industry, needs such social overhead capital. And it 
is clear that, especially in Egypt, only the government can provide this since it is the only institution 
that is not concerned only with profits, and that can endure the risk from and the cost of 
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infrastructural investment. This was a main reason for government intervention to achieve Heavy 
Industrialization in the 1960s. 
 
4- The Capabilities of the 1960s Egyptian Bureaucracy 
A number of writers have asserted the relative development of Third World's bureaucracies 
as compared to other institutions in a way that justifies relying on them in these countries’ 
development in general and in their industrialization in particular. Max Weber was among the first 
thinkers who thought positively of the role of bureaucracy in development. He pointed generally to 
the efficiency of the bureaucracy as a rational and modern apparatus that could be relied on in the 
Modernization process, and consequently on its aspects (e.g.: industrialization)
156
. His ideas were 
followed by many who advocated the indispensability of the role of bureaucracy in development.   
For another writer, Riggs, the concept of unbalanced systems means the shift of power to 
bureaucracy given the weakness of other political institutions.  For him this is the outcome of the 
colonial era as the administrative apparatus was adopted from the West and aided by advancement 
of technology which transitional societies (societies moving towards Modernization) were keen to 
acquire for their military, agricultural or educational objectives. This was happening while the rest 
of these societies were living traditional ways of life
157
. As a result, bureaucracies of these societies 
became far more advanced than other social groups and institutions. It is no wonder that La 
Palombara states that bureaucracy in developing societies can match the professional, technical and 
entrepreneurial available resources and utilize this in developmental efforts. The creation of what 
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La Palombara refers to as a "social overhead capital" requires the application of various available 
resources for the political and bureaucratic capacity. Hence, the bureaucracy together with head of 
the executive are expected to have a critical role in setting up, determining and implementing clear 
objectives and directives of a developing political system
158
.  
Moving on the same line of arguments, Fritz Marx believes that bureaucracy has a 
tremendous capacity to gather facts through administrative activities. It can survey public needs 
and sentiments, interest groups’ pressure, as well as government responses and its technical 
procedures to meet these needs and to reach its objectives. Bureaucracy is also an apparatus that is 
suggestive of various ideas meeting different conditions. They are able to convert abstract or broad 
understandings about objectives, to be reached, into "the detailed language of regulatory 
measures."
159
 Fritz Marx asserts the importance of civil servants he regarded as knowing everything 
in certain fields. He said that they should not be overlooked when formulating reform objectives. 
He considers higher civil service bureaucracy as a "magnifying glass" or "intelligence center" for 
society providing it with observation and evaluation
160
. Using the thinker's perspective, we realize 
that bureaucracy should be relied on in any Heavy Industrialization plan, as its capabilities would 
help formulate such a plan. This formulation would be aided by its practical knowledge to 
implement policies stemming from abstract ideas as well as being an intermediary between people's 
needs and government's goals. 
Joseph Spengler still realizes the importance of bureaucracy, but he thinks that the rise of a 
private sector is essential also. For him bureaucracy can facilitate the rise of this private economic 
system by setting a framework of law, order and security for evolving private initiatives. It can also 
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secure credit and resources and provide other things encouraging economic growth in a dual 
economy where the private sector is left to expand while the bureaucracy is involved in limited 
planning at the national level
161
. These suggestions would prove to be very helpful when discussing 
the possible role that the government can play, given the new settings, in a future Heavy 
Industrialization plan; and how it can provide a ground for private capitalists to take over its 
responsibility gradually when this industrialization plan starts to yield its profits. 
Another perspective for the role bureaucracy can play for a developing country was offered 
by Mancur Olson. He considered institutional arrangements linking state and society as critical to 
economic development, pointing out that various social groups would exert pressures to transform 
any developmental endeavor into a distributive mechanism and will organize to achieve that 
purpose. This will restrict government possible actions and options and society itself will lose the 
opportunity of long run gains. Thus, for an economic development strategy to be successful, 
institutions should be created that would restrain and control the independent organizational 
strength of these social groups for the purpose of “insulating decision makers from group pressure 
and expand the range of their directive powers.”162 It is clear that one of these institutions is 
bureaucracy, and that weakening of other societal pressure groups in a certain stage of 
development points to another important function for bureaucracy in underdeveloped countries 
seeking industrialization even with sacrifices especially if we are talking about establishing Heavy 
Industry. 
Given all these qualifications for bureaucracy in developing countries, it was not surprising 
that Egypt relied heavily on it in the 1960s. According to Waterbury, the Public Sector had to: 
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1- Promote industrialization 
2- Increase living standards of backward areas 
3- Develop infrastructure 
4-  Generate employment 
5- Yield financial surpluses for the Treasury 
6- Develop and absorb new technology 
7- Supply goods with cheap prices for the poor 
8- Compete with foreign suppliers of goods and services that are similar to that produced 
domestically
163
. 
These conflicting objectives (e.g.: supply goods with cheap prices and generate employment) 
points to the substantial role played by the public sector bureaucracy and the realization that only 
this institution is capable of performing these functions. It turned out to be a heavy burden on it, 
one that was beyond its capacities, as will be discussed later. Yet, there was not any party capable 
of performing in a better or an equal way. 
Yet, Olson (a Neoclassicist) provides a different outlook to bureaucracy. His basic 
assumption is that people are self-interested. He believed that people are better organized in small 
groups, due to free rider and bargaining costs.  In big organizations (i.e.: State apparatuses), these 
self interested individuals would act to maximize and preserve their interests by distributing income 
between themselves rather than to increase efficiency and output. There would not be any motive 
for seeking technical innovation
164
. This questions the efficiency of the bureaucracy in carrying the 
burdens of Heavy Industrialization on its shoulders.  
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Added to this, the Neoclassicists are skeptical about planning which is supposed to be 
carried out by government bureaucracies. They regard planners as lacking needed detailed 
information about current production techniques and consumers’ demand as well as foresight for 
their evolution. They thought of private entrepreneurs and the price mechanism as being much 
more helpful in this regard
165
. They believe also that the public sector yields lower financial rates of 
return as compared to the private sector. Thus, public sector’s firms constitute a burden on the 
public budget given that they are in some cases receiving subsidies. Hence, the school calls for 
limiting the fields that government controls so that it would intervene only in the fields it is better 
equipped in. Governments should provide the needed infrastructure without necessarily controlling 
it directly
166
.  
Bryce criticized reliance on the bureaucracy of public sector’s firms. He pointed out that 
this bureaucracy consists of civil servants experienced in public administration and who have little 
to do with commercial business, which needs willingness to take risks, awareness of cost-benefit 
analysis and the enthusiasm to innovate. Moreover, he said that: 
Usually they will gain nothing personally if, by great effort, they succeed in 
increasing production or reducing costs. To do so generally will involve risks, and 
they know they will face censure and perhaps dismissal if many failures or mistakes 
are listed against them. Therefore, [they prefer] to take it easy and play safe, even 
though this kind of half-hearted management is bound to give only mediocre results 
without even the possibility of spectacular achievements
167
.   
 
Yet, I have to point out that the Neoclassicists do not consider the fact of the relative 
development of underdeveloped countries bureaucracies as compared to the private sector as I 
previously pointed out. This condition might have changed as compared to the 1960s, but this 
change could not be expected to offset completely the need for a sort of planning.   
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5-The 1960s Heavy Industrialization Experience 
 It was clear from the beginning that the Revolutionary government was intending to 
intervene in the economy in order to achieve high levels of economic development, yet, the shape 
and intensity of this intervention was not clear. Government’s commitment to establishing Heavy 
Industry to support other industries was also obvious. As early as 1954, the government 
constructed the Iron and Steel Company in Helwan and contributed to constructing a factory for 
producing railway wagons. Yet, the escalation of government intervention in this regard was 
witnessed throughout the 1950s until it reached its peak in the early 1960s with the Nationalization 
Decrees. 
 The Pre-1952 Egyptian government did not invest directly in industry except for military 
related industries especially after the 1948 War. Yet, this was changed drastically with the 1952 
Revolution so that in its first year, a Permanent Council for the Development of National 
Production (PCDNP) was created and asked to study various developmental projects, recommend 
policies and to even implement projects directly or in association with ministries or private capital. 
The purpose was to transform manufacturing into the main activity in the Egyptian economy
168
. It 
is worth mentioning that since the mid 1950s industry received the largest share of investment. 
Also, the PCDNP was meant to explore national resources and use them efficiently
169
. It is this 
organization that established the aforementioned Iron and Steel Company and factory for railways 
wagons. It also recommended construction of two oil refineries, a hydroelectric power station on 
the Aswan Dam, two thermal power stations in Cairo, besides recommending construction of the 
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Kima Fertilizer Plant in Aswan, and the Rakta Paper Mill near Alexandria, both of which were 
constructed in the second half of the 1950s
170
. The PCDNP was helped also by the Permanent 
Council for Services established in 1953 and meant to upgrade social development projects
171
. 
 With the 1956 War and the nationalization of many foreign firms after which these 
companies were directed by the government, State’s involvement in the economy and in industry 
increased so that it reached between 1957-1960 a considerable percentage ranging between 30: 40 
% or more
172
. It was the period that witnessed the dissolving of the PCDNP and the creation of the 
National Planning Committee and the Economic Organism instead, with the latter organization 
administering nationalized foreign firms and other companies established by PCDNP. The National 
Planning Committee was entrusted with drafting 2 five-year plans, a plan for agriculture and 
another for industry. By then, a more active role for the Egyptian government was realized in 
industrialization, and the interest in Heavy Industry was reflected in a growing tendency to favor 
big industrial units as compared to small and intermediate ones. As acknowledged in a newsletter of 
the General Union of Trade Chamber in 1957, Heavy Industrial projects (and more generally grand 
projects) cannot be left to individual activities due to their higher risk and their profitability that is 
realized only on the long run
173
. The profit seeking behavior of the capitalist class trying to realize 
short run benefits together with low household savings ratios pointed out the need for 
comprehensive planning and a much more active role for the government. The government was not 
hostile to private investment, but rather it was the conditions that led it to act in the way it did in 
the early 1960s. It is worth mentioning that the government encouraged private foreign and 
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national investment in ventures for producing electric cables and in contracts for Nasr Company for 
Rubber tiers, and it has successfully attracted foreign investment in pharmaceuticals and petroleum 
exploration
174
. 
 Yet, the ambitious objectives of the government and especially establishing Heavy Industry 
had led it, in the existing socioeconomic circumstances, to step towards a much tighter grip on 
industrialization in order to implement its 5 years plan. A Ministry of Industry and another for 
Planning were created, and an ambitious objective was set which was to double national income in 
ten years. The government till then did not lose faith in possible contributions by the private sector 
although it did not let it participate in drafting the 5 years plan. The private sector, however, failed 
to finance the industrial objectives of the plan and nationalization took place in the early 1960s
175
. 
The state almost controlled everything in big industrial establishments leaving the private sector to 
operate only in small factories and industries. The government  nationalized:  
1. All banks and insurance companies 
2. Foreign trade 
3. Strategic and big industries (e.g.: all large textile, food processing and sugar refining plants 
added to all medium and Heavy Industries) 
4. Air and Maritime transport 
5. Public utilities and mass transit 
6. Major department stores, cinemas, hotels and theaters 
7. Newspapers, as well as importation and distribution of newsprint 
8. Reclaimed lands and infrastructure for surface irrigation. 
9. Agriculture credit and supply of fertilizers, seeds…etc. 
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10. Construction companies 
11. Infrastructural assets (e.g.: High Dam, Suez Canal, Power Stations, Ports, airports, 
railroads…etc. 
12. A small proportion of urban retail trade176.  
The private sector was left to dominate only five minor industries which were: leather, 
furniture, wood, wearing apparel, and printing as it was understood that the private sector could 
perform better than the state in these industries due to their nature and because of the low cost of 
labor used in them
177
. According to Abdel Fadil, the private sector persisted in the form of small 
sized enterprises and were centered mainly in 4 industries which were respectively: spinning and 
weaving, engineering industries, the food processing industry, and the chemical industry
178
. The 
government chose the alternative of full control over the economy in order to achieve its ambitious 
industrialization plan, a plan that Heavy Industry was an integral part of. But, did this work out 
efficiently? 
If we look to GDP real economic growth as an indication, it was between 1952/1953 to 
1959/1960 about 4.4%, then it rose between 1959/1960 and 1964/1965 to 6.4/6.6 %, and finally it 
deteriorated afterwards between 1964/1965 and 1971/1972 to 3.5%
179
.  The last period can be 
referred to as one in which the development plan was suspended due to military activities, either 
with the intensification of the Yemen Civil War (1962-1967) and Egypt’s involvement in it, or the 
military conflict with Israel that culminated with the 1967 War and persisted to drain Egypt of 
resources that could have been directed to developmental efforts in industrial development. Yet, 
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Mabro even attributes the high growth rates of the first half of the 1960s to the increasing capacity 
that was created in the second half of the 1950s. He claims that this is due to the lag that exists 
between investment and production. If we agreed with this assumption, we will reach the 
conclusion that the policies of the second half of the 1950s that witnessed a lesser intensity of 
government’s intervention, the involvement of the private sector and the encouragement that it 
received to contribute in industrial development, were behind the industrial boom of the 1960s that 
was thought to be resulting from the five-year plan. Mabro did not deny that active state 
intervention starting from 1954 played a positive role in accelerating growth. He rather implies that 
tightening the grip of the state, in the way that was witnessed after the 1961 Nationalization 
Decrees, did harm this accelerating growth. Consequently, growth rates started to fall after 1963-
1964 until it reached levels below zero in 1966/1967- 1967/1968
180
. 
The government was capable of moving considerable investment for Egypt’s development, and 
its ability increased after 1961 due to its tighter control over the economy. The investment ratio in 
the 1950s ranged between 13.5 and 14% on average while between 1956/1960 and 1963/1964 it 
reached 19.7% to fall again (due to the 1967 War) to 11.8% in 1968/1969. This deficit was partly 
financed by a budget deficit due to the fact that the savings ratio remained the same and did in fact 
fall after 1967 War. Being deprived of US aid worsened things and compelled the government to 
curtail imports and to pull back the investment ratio to the level that was indicated in 1968/1969, 
something that led to the deterioration of GDP growth
181
. This rate of investment was, however, 
still high and proved how tighter control by government over an economy can be beneficial for 
investment and industrial investment in particular, since the Egyptian government was committed 
more to industrialization to the extent of exploiting agriculture for that purpose. One can argue that 
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if private capital was left to dominate the Egyptian economy, the result would be directing much of 
this investment to short run benefit activities. In a basically rural country like Egypt, private 
investment will be more likely directed to agriculture, and in a rapidly demographically growing 
country like Egypt private investment might be more interested in construction activities. It is less 
likely that private investment would be interested in industry in the way that the government is. 
It is true also that the structure of the Egyptian economy became more diversified with the 
rising share of industry and the multiple linkages that it produces to various other sectors and 
within this sector itself. Industry’s share of national output increased between 1955/1956 and 1973 
from 17.4% to 21.3% using 1964/1965 constant prices
182. In another estimate, industry’s share of 
national output rose from 21% in 1950 to 38% in 1970
183
.  
Within the industrial sector itself the small shares of various intermediate and other industries 
were increased and this was reflected in exports as the basket of exported goods became more 
diversified, with a growing share for manufacturing goods. Engineering industries and durables’ 
(e.g.: refrigerators, cars) share of value added also increased
184
. This created more opportunities for 
Heavy Industry to feed these industries although at this time they relied on aggregating imported 
parts. Yet, this did not mean that Egypt fail to recognize the importance of concentrating on goods 
having a comparative advantage for Egypt like textiles. As an indication of a healthy growth of 
industry, the share of the textiles industry within the industrial sector increased and its share of 
exports rose from 2:4 % to 17: 20% between 1952/1953 and 1969/1970
185
. Thus, the government 
acted wisely in its endeavor to industrialize by launching an integrated industrial structure with 
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Heavy Industry feeding other industries without neglecting the comparative advantage that Egypt 
has, as in the case of the cotton crop and using its abundance and high quality in industries based 
on this crop (e.g.: textiles). Almost full government control over major industrial activities seemed 
to function well in creating this balanced structure and avoiding, as much as possible, reliance on 
export led industries that depend on imported intermediate and capital goods that deny the 
opportunity for creating more inter-industrial linkages. 
 Nevertheless, a number of embedded problems were present and led to inefficiency, as 
many critics pointed out.  
The problem of Egyptian industry after 1962 is one of increasing labor 
costs arising from organizational defects, inefficiencies, redistributional policies, 
supply bottlenecks, a deterioration of relationships with firms, and a host of other 
factors
186
.  
 
Most of these deficiencies resulted from the intensely centralized way that the Egyptian industry 
was directed by the government. The non-profit seeking behavior of the public sector (as compared 
to that of the private sector), mingled with tying the system to a number of hierarchies and 
entrusting decision-making process exclusively to a senior level. These impacted negatively on the 
performance and possibilities of growth of Egyptian industries.  
The public sector was organized as follows: managers of public firms were reporting to 
public organizations each of which controlled various firms in the same branch of activity; then 
these organizations were attached to their relevant ministries from which directives, guidelines and 
various other instruments of control were transferred down the ladder from the ministry to the 
organization then to the firm. Investment decisions were centralized in the ministries, and firms 
could neither use profits to expand or invest, nor could they set their prices to attain profits, since 
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prices were administered
187
. Also, the public organizations included those industries having 
homogenous products or services. Consequently, this denied any possibility for competition, unlike 
the situation under the holding companies of the 1950s
188
. As asserted by Waterbury, these 
organizations started even to intervene in all aspects of management and managers had to wait for 
orders in most decisions
189
. Import quotas dedicated to each ministry gave these ministries more 
power since they redistributed these quotas as they saw appropriate. This had its impacts as firms 
were not able to take advantage of low price opportunities and to choose the proper time to import 
raw materials at a lower price. What resulted was foreign exchange costs
190
. Barter deals that the 
Egyptian government engaged in for its exports and imports aggravated the situation, as imports 
might not have been appropriate when compared to needed specifications. Also, these deals were 
subject to delays due to negotiations, ratification…etc. which were more common191. Yet, on 
another level coordination was lacking between various industries. The Ministry of Planning did not 
have much independent power, and planning services were performed in individual ministries
192
.  
 
C- Changes in the Three Factors 
1- The Private Sector 
We will start to examine now the present condition of the three factors (immature capitalist 
class, inadequate infrastructure and the relatively developed position of the Egyptian bureaucracy 
as compared to other organizations and groups) that justified an active role and almost full 
management of the Egyptian government over the Heavy Industrialization drive of the 1960s. We 
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will try to investigate if any of these factors has changed. This would prove to be important to 
reach a conclusion on the role that the government should play in launching a new Heavy 
Industrialization program.  
It should be known that the remnants of the private sector that were left to operate in the 
1960s, received growing attention in the second half of that decade. Small-scale manufacturers 
were encouraged to increase exporting to the Socialist bloc and the state helped by guaranteeing a 
market for their production by annual negotiations with the Soviet Union. Subcontracting between 
the private and public sector started to take place after 1967. Then when the Open Door policy was 
launched, the private sector started to expand again away from the limitations that it encountered in 
the 1960s. 
The UNDP Egypt Human Development Report 2000/2001 shows that the private sector 
has a growing share of manufacturing industries and that has reached to 2/3 by 1996/1997. The 
leading position of the sector in exporting is clear also if we realized that it contributes by 80% of 
manufactured exports, if we set aside highly resource based industries
193
.  Moreover, According to 
Sullivan, in 1999 private investment constituted about 60% of total investment in Egypt. It is clear 
then that the size of this sector and the resulting bourgeoisie makes the private sector play a far 
different role than the one it used to play decades ago. The behavior of this class even should be 
expected to be different from that of the bourgeoisie of the 1950s due to time and social change 
factors. 
Yet, Eberhard noted of unemployment that:  
Indirectly, the increase in unemployment is corroborated by an analysis of 
the creation and destruction of jobs during the 1990s, which not only questions the 
ability of the private sector to create jobs, but illustrates the weakness, even 
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absence, of job creation in agriculture, manufacturing industries, construction and 
transport
194
.  
 
He asserts this view by showing that unemployment increased between 1990-1995 from 8.6% to 
11.3% and other sources claimed this to reach from 12:17%; real growth rate of the GDP, 
however, increased and was in steady rise so that it rose from 0.3% in 1991/1992 to 5% in 
1996/1997
195
. This was before the crises in the stock market in East Asia and its effects on Egypt. 
Yet, we should note that this increase in GDP is the outcome of many factors, not only the 
booming of the private sector. One of these factors includes reduction of the debt burden after 
cancellation of a large proportion of Egyptian debt in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. 
 It should be pointed out that the structure of the Egyptian bourgeoisie has changed and it is 
not as it used to be in the pre 1952 Revolution era. It is true that some remnants of the old 
Aristocracy and the old Bourgeoisie linked with it have retained their power, but new groups have 
climbed within the class structure, especially in the aftermath of the Open Door Policy of the 
1970s. Galal Amin points out that the Noveau Riche were able to acquire their wealth through 
intermediating activities such as contracting, speculation, commission taking activities, and sub-
contracting with foreign firms in addition to high salaried professions
196
. Mahmoud Gad agrees 
with this view saying that the upper bourgeoisie is made up of people involved in trade, 
contracting, industry, agriculture and intermediating activities
197
. He also claims that this class 
resulted from the Open Door Policy era. Furthermore, as elaborated in a study conducted by the 
National Center for Social and Criminal Studies in 1985, the Capitalist class consisted of owners of 
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big firms, hotels, restaurants added to others involved in profitable business. What needs 
highlighting in this study is its acknowledgement that people having higher positions in the 
government, bureaucracy, army and police are among this capitalist class
198
. 
Thus, it is clear that this new capitalist class (bourgeoisie) is one that is greatly different 
from that of the royal age. This new class incorporates the remnants of the pre-1952 feudal-
capitalist class who escaped the grip of various socialist laws, former lower bourgeois officers who 
had moved upwards in the social status thanks to their position in the government and the 
bureaucracy, and finally the group that benefited from the Open Door Policy and who were 
primarily involved in intermediating activities and trade. In fact, intermediating activities and trade 
necessitate strong relations with the bureaucracy for getting approvals and licenses especially if we 
are discussing the post-1952 Revolution era in which the bureaucracy is overwhelmingly dominant. 
Those new bourgeois elements who were army officers and higher officials can be expected to also 
have strong relations with the bureaucracy since this was the apparatus through which they gained 
their new status. Despite all the negative consequences of the mentioned facts, it suggests the 
presence of stronger relations between the bureaucracy and the new bourgeoisie. If policies would 
be adjusted so as to make good use of such a relationship, the blessings would be realized and 
could prove to be very helpful in a Heavy Industrialization drive involving the efforts of the private 
sector and the government. With various government policies and incentives, this new capitalist 
class’ investment can be channeled to industry. This outcome can be reached and encouraged 
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thanks to the mutual trust that has been developing since the time of the Open Door Policy between 
this class and the bureaucracy.  
 
2- Infrastructure 
 The first half of the 1980s witnessed a large boom for industrial infrastructure in Egypt. 
Added to the enhancement of electricity and communications facilities, this period witnessed 
conclusion of the construction of many industrial cities like the 10
th
 of Ramdan, 6
th
 of October, 
Sadat…etc. Establishing factories with reasonable prices was guaranteed, and the needed facilities 
were provided. This infrastructural boom added to other policies (such as protectionism and legal 
measures to encourage industrial investment), have led to the establishment of a considerable 
number of factories in the above-mentioned new industrial cities. This shifted private capital 
interest to industry in the expense of trade that was an attractive field for private investment during 
the Open Door policy years
199
. Thus, the improvements in infrastructure contributed much in 
directing private capital to invest in industry. 
 
3- The Bureaucracy 
Concerning bureaucracy, as years passed the performance of this apparatus showed signs of 
inefficiency. If the Neoclassicists had their body of theory on the concept of rent seeking behavior, 
which I have discussed before, I will argue now that this inefficiency was to a great extent the 
result of over-burdening the bureaucracy in Egypt with various roles.  
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Bureaucracy has been blamed for not having the absorptive capacity to carry on 
developmental objectives due to weak managerial and technical capacities
200
. Yet, I believe that 
most of the blame should be rather on the over-burdening of the Egyptian bureaucracy, added to its 
lack of autonomy in the context of public sector firms. I will focus here on the over-burdening of 
the bureaucracy pointing out that it was both responsible for development and for social welfare. 
The developmental role was distracted by the latter role:  
The government must choose between a bureaucracy capable of playing a 
reasonably efficient and dynamic role in the development process and a 
bureaucracy designed to augment social welfare by absorbing successive 
generations of graduates. They cannot have it both ways
201
.  
 
Instead of establishing a bureaucracy (referring here to public sector employees) that is 
efficient, productive and profit-oriented to meet the objectives of the industrialization drive, the 
government committed itself to employing university graduates regardless to the need of public 
firms to employees. The result was the overstaffing of bureaus without much consideration to 
match between skills and functions, together with overlapping functions between sections. This 
affected negatively the developmental role of the bureaucracy added to other factors like the red 
tape, rigidity and inadequacy of processing equipment. On the side of the developmental role for 
the bureaucracy, Samir Youssef asserted that rapid industrialization in Egypt exhausted the existing 
pool of managers so that there was no other option but to use military officers and mainline 
bureaucrats to meet this expansion
202
.  This shows that it was not possible to meet the over-demand 
over bureaucracy with an expansion in recruiting efficient and productive employees. Hence, the 
malfunctioning of the bureaucracy was not a manifestation of its failure as an apparatus, but rather 
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it was the result of policies disregarding developing the administrative capacities to meet new 
demands and realize a more active role for the government. 
Eberhard shows that the public sector is still in command of the Egyptian economy. The 
Public Business Sector, which was created after the 1991 agreement with the IMF, was meant to 
lead to the privatization of 314 public sector companies. Yet, till early 2000 controlling stakes were 
sold for 114 out of them and minority stakes for another 20 companies, thus less than half of these 
314 companies has been privatized. It is worth mentioning that the book value of these 314 
companies represent only 15% of estimated book value of publicly owned production and service 
unit
203
. Siddiqi points out that as late as 2000, the state still owned about 170 companies in various 
sectors while holding substantial stakes in another 400 companies
204
. 
This shows that bureaucracy, represented in the public sector, is still controlling a large 
segment of the Egyptian economy and can not be simply overlooked in any Heavy Industrialization 
plan, but rather should be relied on. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy should not be over-burdened by 
many responsibilities that outstrip its capacity and this calls for a more active role for private 
capital. 
 
2- Models and Suggestions 
 I am devoting this final part of my thesis to models from other industrializing countries and 
suggestions for how Heavy Industrialization could be realized. I will start my discussion by 
analyzing models of underdeveloped countries which have proceeded successfully in 
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industrialization, how Heavy Industry contributed to this outcome and how this industry was 
established in these countries. 
 
 
 
 
A- Models 
1- South Korea 
 South Korea is one of the economic miracles that the world is speaking of and about how it 
achieved such a progress in a relatively short time. Understanding how things worked out with this 
newly industrializing country (and a former underdeveloped country) would prove to give helpful 
insights for any developing country. 
 South Korea’s economic development is always attributed to export-led industrialization, 
helped by having small internal markets and being favored by generous US and Japanese aid. In fact 
South Korea’s small internal markets had led it to renounce ISI policies quite early and adopt an 
outward looking industrialization strategy aided by the abundance of light industries’ production. It 
is also true that the USA contributed much in the form of financial and technical aid to the 
economic growth of South Korea thanks to the environment of the Cold War and the threats posed 
by Communist North Korea and China, and the need to establish a model for a liberal capitalist 
economy in South East Asia. Direct aid was not the only mechanism of US support, which reached 
the level of even coordinating planning development strategies as in the case of creating the US-
Korean Economic Cooperation Committee established in 1963
205
. Also Japan, to compensate for 
its colonial legacy in pre 1945 Korea and to normalize relations with South Korea, it started to 
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provide grants for the South Koreans. Yet, it was not only due to this that South Korea achieved 
development. It was rather because of a wise industrialization strategy that this country followed.    
South Korea did not rely only on light industries and exporting light industries’ 
commodities. South Korea, starting from the early 1970s, engaged in a Heavy Industrialization plan 
that guaranteed this industrial progress. As industrialization proceeded in South Korea, the 
economy became more and more dependant on imports of machinery, transport equipment and 
chemicals. Also, the growing military tensions in South East Asia at this time (as the Vietnamese 
defeated US troops and the USA started to talk about pulling back their military presence in South 
Korea) provided the incentive to develop an independent military industrial complex with which the 
South Korean army could enjoy self-sufficiency in a number of weapons systems. These two 
factors led to calls for establishing a strong Heavy and Chemical Industrial base, which received 
great care since 1973
206
. The investment in HCI between 1978 and 1980 reached a level of 80% of 
all manufacturing investment, and in 1978 it received 93% of the loans meant for manufacturing
207
. 
South Korea was able to launch Heavy Industrial projects thanks to its cheap labor. With this 
Korea was able to offset costs arising from operation with low capacity and in a sub-optimal size 
for an HCI plant.  
By this means South Korea was moving towards achieving an integrated economy with 
exports paying for Heavy Industry and Heavy Industry providing export-led industries with the 
appropriate capital that they needed, with the process of know-how and building technological 
capabilities proceeding ahead. This is what Ohno and Imako were pointing to when they identified 
Korean industrialization as a dualistic policy, where export led promotion mingled with Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI). In this way, the Koreans were able to make use of existing 
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comparative advantage in certain sectors, as they were developing other comparative advantages in 
other sectors. For the two writers this was an elaboration of the “Secondary Import Substitution” 
phase that was to be followed by a  “Secondary Export Promotion” phase, according to Weiss 
model
208
.  
The role of the government in this was substantial. As Evans points out, the Korean 
capitalist class was weakened due to a number of historical factors like Japanese Colonialism and 
the Korean War (1950-1953). He attributes to this factor the growth of a Developmental State in 
Korea
209
. The concept of a Developmental State will be explored later in this chapter, but what I 
will point to now is that such a state is an active one but it is not in conflict with private initiative. 
Rather it supports and guides private investment. 
Thus, even before the Heavy Industrialization drive of the early 1970s, the South Korean 
government supported the private sector by many ways one of which was the banking system 
(through banking institutions controlled by the government). These institutions provided export 
firms with various generous facilities. Another mean of support was through giving import rights 
based on the export performance of a firm. A third way was through protective policy, by imposing 
tariffs and quotas on competing goods’ imports, so that liberalization did not take place before 
1967
210
. Also, the government utilized the tax system to provide various incentives. Finally, the 
government reduced uncertainty by “procurement of information and coordination of planning.”211 
By this and through other methods the government guided or participated directly to promote these 
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industries bearing in mind the development of self reliance so that exports could be used to “finance 
self reliance through the development of infrastructure and basic industries.”212  
Thus, the motive for self-reliance existed from the beginning and it induced the Heavy 
Industrialization plan that started in the 1970s. Again the government played a major role in this 
drive. This drive was referred to as an HCI Big Push, as it targeted intensively a number of HCI 
projects incorporating petrochemicals, steel, shipbuilding, engines and automobiles. Diversification 
of investment between various sectors was targeted in order to avoid the risk of HCI projects
213
. 
The main guidelines of the government’s policy were to participate, and even directly 
control, Heavy Industries and to provide favorable conditions for private sector investment in 
export led industries. The government, for instance, directly owned petrochemicals and steel 
industries, while “Industrial estates were created to house private sector ventures” in electronics 
and machinery sectors, and negotiations were conducted with large industrial groups for 
conducting projects entailing some foreign equity
214
.  The government negotiated with MNCs to 
acquire the best available technology. Yet, it should be pointed out that Foreign Direct Investment 
did not contribute much, as a proportion of total investment, to the Big Push. Between 1972 and 
1983. It represented hardly 5% of total capital inflow; yet, “equity participation by reputable MNCs 
was secured in order to facilitate rapid technology transfer, but that participation was kept to a 
minimum.”215  
The new industries were protected from foreign competition and given fiscal incentives 
while letting them dominate the domestic market through localization requirements for firms 
forcing them to buy Korean capital goods. Production was meant for domestic markets, but when 
                                                   
212 Haggard, 68. 
213 Auty, 124. 
214 Haggard, 131&132. 
  
119 
domestic demand failed, the government adjusted the exchange rate to induce export of HCI 
products. Moreover, the government used the banking system to provide preferential loans.  
Finally, the government helped in establishing big firms through establishing the General 
Trading Companies (GTC) to act as an exporting agency. Also, the government, through setting 
capital and export requirements, forced the creation of large firms (Chaebols) instead of medium 
and small sized firms. Moreover, as Haggard pointed out, this was done by giving priority for 
investment in larger and more technologically sophisticated firms
216
. Foreign investment was even 
discriminated against for the sake of developing large domestic firms. The government provided 
incentives for these Chaebols in exchange for export performance and growth targets
217
. As an 
example of these Chaebols, Evans referred to the automobile industry pointing to Hyundai and 
Daewoo as two examples. The state induced the formation of these Chaebols agreeing with its 
strategy of forming big firms. Then when the industry was established, it helped the existing firms 
by limiting the number of competing firms as well as the number of models (e.g.: car models) 
produced added to providing them with inputs with preferable prices. The government also guided 
private investment by encouraging investment in this industry, and by entering as an equity holder 
in these chaebols. Negotiations with MNCs were being conducted to transfer technology. This was 
possible thanks to the preferable international conditions at this time which facilitated the 
acceptance of MNCs to transfer their technology. These favorable international conditions were not 
existing in the case of Brazil when it started earlier its Heavy Industrialization drive
218
.   
Needless to say, the automobile industry is a success story for Korea. The HCI Big Push 
was also successful in many other fields, iron and steel being a clear example. Korea became one of 
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the major Steel exporters in the world despite the fact that Korea neither had iron ore nor coke. It 
is no wonder that establishing the Pohang Steel (POSCO) was met in the beginning with much 
criticism. The government solely invested in constructing it using Japanese technical and financial 
assistance. Yet, this investment proved to be of considerable importance as the Steel industry soon 
paid back for this investment and became a major export after a period of protection. The POSCO 
surpassed all US steel firms production and its production was more competitive due to the low 
costs it encounters. It proved to provide linkages of vital importance for the Korean economy as it 
fed the automobile industry and played a great role in its competitiveness and other industries 
competitiveness. It also provided forward linkages for the shipbuilding industry and was an 
“important source of innovative technological knowledge.”219 
Thus, Heavy Industrialization has benefited the Korean economy. Auty attributes this 
success in the HCI drive to a number of things. The first is setting global competitiveness as a 
target from the beginning. The second is using economies of scale and acquiring the best available 
technology. The third is the rapid GDP growth and early involvement in exportation, which have 
led to dwindling market constraints on scale production. The fourth is providing local firms with 
high autonomy and ownership that facilitated the maximization of skill attainment. The fifth is the 
presence of cheap labor, which reduced costs and helped in the competitiveness of the Korean HCI 
industries. Finally, the success was due to a macro policy that “sustained rapid domestic demand 
and export competitiveness.”220   
Yet, many writers, notably the Neoclassicists, criticize the HCI Big Push attributing the 
difficulties of the Korean economy in the 1970s to this drive. The Big Push was accused of causing 
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inflation, increasing foreign debt, decreasing economic growth, deteriorating trade balance and 
causing the economic downturn that toke place between 1979 and 1981. This was blamed on 
“misallocation of subsidized credit to create excess HCI capacity which gave a low financial 
return.”221 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Big Push coincided with the world supply crises 
that happened due to oil shocks of the 1970s. These crises troubled the world economy as well as 
Korea.  Korea in the late 1970s started a liberalization of the economy and minimization of state’s 
involvement, and the Korean economy expanded. Auty points out that this expansion was not only 
because of this liberalization but also due to more favorable international conditions, after the oil 
shocks, as well as due to the HCI rebound
222
. When the HCI projects constructed in the Big Push 
started to stand on their feet, they were able to provide the economy with comparative advantages 
in new sectors and to provide more linkages and it is this point that should be considered for a fair 
judgment on the Heavy Industrialization drive in South Korea. 
 
2- India 
 As for India, one of the countries that is rapidly developing nowadays, the realization of the 
importance of constructing a Heavy Industrial backbone was realized shortly after independence in 
the late 1940s. The Indian manufacturing sector was weak, despite the huge size and population of 
the country. This had implications for the need for infrastructure and long construction periods as 
well as inducing an active role for the Indian government. The size and population of the country 
pointed to the possibility of developing self-sufficiency, in contrast to South Korea, and this meant 
a lot for the industrial policy that India pursued. It is no wonder that India followed an Autarkic 
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economic policy aiming at Import Substitution and not targeting export markets in the early phases. 
The large markets and resources that India is endowed with encouraged such a policy. Thus, Heavy 
Industrialization was receiving a great attention from the start, and there was a realization that 
investing in capital goods will encourage savings unlike investment in consumer goods (as less 
money will be directed to consumption and thus more money will be saved). These savings can be 
used then in further investment causing high growth rates for the Indian economy
223
.  
With these assumptions, India launched the Mahalanobis Big Push between 1956 and 1961. 
In this Big Push, Heavy and Chemical Industries played a central role and received tremendous care 
that persisted even to the late 1980s. The Indian Industrialization strategy that followed this Big 
Push was one of a wise division of roles. Heavy Industrialization was still a priority. As Raj points 
out, long run growth was regarded as depending on increasing production of coal, electricity, iron 
and steel, heavy chemicals, heavy machinery and Heavy Industries more generally with more 
emphasis on heavy machine building industry. Increasing the production of these goods was 
anticipated to achieve quicker rates of industrialization in a fairly short time. The government was 
to own these industries referred to as Department I industries, using the Marxist Soviet term, (e.g.: 
steel, heavy engineering, power generation and machine making). This was led by the assumption 
that the private sector is neither capable nor willing to invest properly in these kinds of 
industries
224
. Returning back to Raj, he said that still an important role was assigned for the private 
sector, which was to be involved in important industries like cement, chemicals,…etc. While 
consumer goods were to be provided by household or hand production, making use of labor 
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abundance and trying to meet the need for creating more job opportunities, although what 
happened in practice was an increase in factory produced consumer goods
225
.  
As Auty points out, this was a sort of guided capitalism where the economy was divided 
between state public firms, big private firms, and informal-sector micro firms. Yet, the state was 
still dominant despite this division of roles. The government controlled the behavior of private 
capital by various means. There were restrictions on new products, technology access, locational 
choice, plant size selection and work force reduction. The state also discouraged private capital 
from investing in large size plants and seemed not interested in inducing this capital to look for 
export markets in the way the Korean government did. On the other hand, the government 
encouraged the expansion of the small industries, and more industries were shifted to them. Yet, as 
Auty points out this sector was not able to expand as they were not equipped “to supply larger 
firms efficiently” and also they had less “resources to finance R&D.”226 
As for the performance of the Heavy Industrialization drive of the Indian economy, it 
should be pointed out that Heavy and Chemical industries surpassed the size of light industries in 
the 1960s, and, thus, dominated the Indian industrial sector. India witnessed high growth rates for 
its industrial production. This growth rate accelerated from an average of 4.7% between 1947 and 
1951, to 5.6% in the First Five Years Plan, then to 7% in the Second and finally to 9% in the 
Third
227
. These growth rates did not persist, however, as Heavy and Chemical Industries did not 
rebound, as Auty asserts. Investment rates continued to grow, but GDP growth decelerated giving 
serious indications as to the inefficiency of Indian economic performance. The deceleration can be 
attributed to the war with Pakistan in the mid 1960s added to the agriculture crop failure at that 
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time. This consequently meant a cut in public spending that should have implicated negatively on 
industrial growth.  
Yet, Auty still refers to a number of policy and performance mistakes that led to the 
problems faced by Indian industry. The most clear of these mistakes is ignoring light industries and 
textiles, which could have acted as export goods for the Indian economy but were growing slowly. 
As for Heavy and Chemical Industries that were controlled by the government, they were 
encountering high capital costs due to long construction periods, poor management of HCI 
projects and infrastructure meant to support them, and low profitability as compared to private 
sector investment. As for government involvement in the economy in general and its ownership of a 
substantial proportion of the Indian industrial sector, by the late 1970s problems emerged for the 
public sector due to lack of autonomy among the firms and inflexible price controls. Evans adds to 
this lack of autonomy for public firms bureaucracy another factor, which is “lack of effective 
embeddedness” so that the Indian bureaucracy was “too removed from day to day operations.”228 
The Indian bureaucracy did not establish proper ties with its local capitalist class and this was the 
reason for its lack of embeddedness as compared to the South Korean model. 
The result was that the public sector, which was contributing by about ¾ of industrial 
investment, gained almost no profits. The steel industry, which was the most favored Heavy 
Industry in India and a major contributor to Indian Industrial expansion as pointed out by Evans, 
was an example that manifested these defects. Thus, the steel industry regressed in performance in 
the 1970s. This was due to a number of factors that were elaborated above and added to it other 
factors specific to the Steel industry like: not operating in the required capacity (even when mini-
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mills were introduced), inadequate infrastructure and excessive protection from foreign 
competition
229
.  
Hence, the reform that India had undergone in the 1980s, by giving more autonomy to 
public firms, easing price controls, decreasing subsidies, encouraging private contribution in joint 
ventures in some sectors like petrochemicals, and finally increasing private sector’s presence in 
public firms’ boards. All these measures resulted in an improvement in the efficiency of the Public 
Sector and Heavy Industries’ firms under its control230. 
 Speaking of another dimension of Heavy Industrialization in India, Raj states that high-level 
income groups influenced industrial production and deflected it from what was planned. He pointed 
out an example which was the increase in the production of hot and cold rolled sheets which are 
used in producing consumer durables and to a similar trend in producing stainless steel
231
. This 
points to the role played by the bourgeoisie, which can exert considerable pressures that can direct 
the industrialization path of an underdeveloped country. We are here considering the demand side 
of the economic equation (demand for certain goods that induce their production), while all my 
previous analysis was based on the effect of the bourgeoisie on the supply side (e.g.: investing in 
short run profitable activities). Confirming this view is what Evans pointed out about the erosion of 
the cohesiveness and cohesion of India saying that: 
Declines in the state’s ability to perform as a coherent corporate actor and 
erosion of effective state-society ties went hand in hand, demonstrating once again 
that capacity depends on putting autonomy and embeddedness together
232
.  
 
The Indian government’s erosion of power has made it less autonomous towards interest groups, 
especially the bourgeoisie. Thus, the government’s role as a corporate actor developing effective 
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state-society ties was affected and the Indian government became rather subject to interest groups’ 
pressures. Yet, from another perspective, Raj’s analysis points out an asset for Heavy Industries, 
which is their flexibility that permits shifting their production according to conditions and changes 
in demand and tastes. 
Despite its initial encouragement for MNCs investment during the Big Push, the Indian 
government thereafter refrained from this due to concerns over deterioration of foreign exchange 
and for the sake of developing “a high level of indigenization of technology,” which India was able 
to achieve as Bruton points out
233
. Thus, India did not rely on MNCs in its industrial development, 
it rather adopted the idea of building up technological capabilities. This strategy was referred to as 
being the reason behind providing the Indian labor with upgraded skills. Yet, this was at the 
expense of trying to acquire the latest available technology, a factor that was pointed to as a major 
defect that might hinder an economy seeking a more outward looking export led industrialization 
strategy
234
. Auty asserted that this strategy affected the steel industry in India. 
Yet, there are supporters to the claim of the appropriateness of using old technologies in 
Third World countries.  
From the point of view of technological requirements there are obvious 
differences between LDCs and advanced countries some at earlier stages of 
development. These include the land/labor ratio, the rate of growth of the labor 
force, the availability of different types of materials, and the world technological 
system in which the LDCs must operate. Thus, it is sometimes too readily assumed 
that old technology from advanced countries is likely to be appropriate to their 
needs
235
.  
 
Pack and Todaro develop this to argue for developing local technologies in Third World countries 
based on old designs from industrialized countries. These designs are the most appropriate for 
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underdeveloped countries, but as they are obsolete they would not be imported from the advanced 
industrialized world in the best shape (e.g.: they might be using second hand machinery or lack 
spare parts as they are not using the most up-to-date technology,…etc.) Thus, it would be 
justifiable to argue for Third World countries to develop their own technological capacity based on 
old designs from the industrialized world
236
. This is the logic that made the Indian strategy 
understandable. 
Yet, it should be pointed out that the Indian government started to renounce this strategy 
and to acknowledge the vitality of relaying on MNCs and acquiring the latest technology without 
renouncing the need for developing its Heavy Industrial sector.  Together with the reform measures 
that have been mentioned regarding the public sector and encouragement of the private sector, 
MNCs were encouraged to invest. These new reforms were reflected in high growth rates
237
.  
Thus, the Indian experience points out to the necessity of involving MNCs in developing 
Heavy Industry for the sake of technology transfer. It also points out the central role of the 
government in this industry (Heavy Industry). The role of the government in this regard should not, 
however, be exclusive and should involve other parties like the private sector and MNCs (especially 
MNCs to upgrade the used technology as evident from the Indian case). Building technological 
capabilities was an achievement in the Indian case, but still there was a need for contacting foreign 
technology to update these capabilities. This is the formula that India seems to have recognized 
recently. 
 
3- Brazil 
                                                                                                                                                                    
235 Ibid., 165. 
236 Ibid., 165. 
237 Auty, 192. 
  
128 
 Brazil was another economic industrializing miracle especially in the 1970s. It also realized 
the importance of establishing a Heavy Industrial backbone, yet the strategy that it pursued for 
creating an integrated industrial structure was somewhat different from the other two models that 
have been discussed.  
What was pursued in Brazil was a strategy that was referred to as the Triple Alliance, an 
alliance that combined the efforts of the state, local private capital and Foreign Direct Investment. 
The government also was the one investing in infrastructure, human capital, and heavy capital and 
intermediate goods industries, but what is novel is that it relied on MNCs in its industrial 
development and in transferring technology
238
. As the UNIDO pointed out, the public industrial 
sector had a substantial presence in those areas that the private sector was unable, due to 
organizational and financial reasons, to invest in. This included steel, due to high capital needed in 
it, petroleum, (acting as a partner with MNCs and indigenous private sector), and chemicals
239
. We 
have to point out that concerning petroleum, the Brazilian government was involved in both its 
refining and extraction as well as in petrochemical industries. The local private sector was left to 
operate freely in other industrial activities but it shared also in Heavy Industries. As for foreign 
capital, MNCs were active in industries of great need for access to “universally applicable, rapidly 
changing technology that cannot be obtained on an open market.” This is added to their marketing 
advantage and to the fact that certain industries were initiated in Brazil by the MNCs
240
. The 
Petrochemical industry in Brazil was a clear example of a Heavy Industry under the Triple Alliance 
where the three forms of capital coexisted.   
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 Heavy Industrialization in Brazil was pursued as a part of an Import Substitution 
Industrialization strategy that Brazil aimed at in an autarkic economic policy. Heavy 
Industrialization took the form of two Big Pushes, one between 1956 and 1960, followed by the 
Economic Miracle, then the second Big Push between 1974 and 1979.  
The first Big Push, the Kubitschek Big Push 1956-1960, entailed more emphasis on the 
steel industry that received around two thirds of total investment. Yet, the petrochemical industry 
was also targeted to some extent together with special targets for automobiles, heavy machinery 
and shipbuilding. Considerable foreign and domestic resources have been devoted to this Big Push, 
and this investment repaid well. High growth rates were witnessed during this period so that GDP 
average annual growth increased from 6.7% between 1951 and 1955 to 8.1% during the Big Push. 
In the manufacturing sector growth rates were 10.2% as compared to 7.9% in the early 1950s and 
this achievement mingled with considerable enhancement in self sufficiency and reduction of 
imports demanded by various sectors (consumer, intermediate and capital goods) by 1960
241
. Yet, 
the Big Push resulted in an increase in Brazilian debt due to the need for tremendous investment 
while export commodities were not receiving much attention, a trend that persisted even after the 
end of the first Big Push. 
The period that witnessed unprecedented growth rates for the Brazilian economy and in 
which the country was referred to as an economic miracle (late 1960s and early 1970s) 
corresponded with the time in which the government increased its share of total invested capital 
from 37 to 45%, and from 60 to 75% of total net worth of Brazil’s largest 100 firms (1968:1974). 
This growing governmental contribution became a trend that persisted and accelerated with the 2
nd
 
National Development Plan starting in 1976 (in the context of the second Big Push) that called for 
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substantial new investments in pulp and paper, energy, petrochemicals, fertilizers, non ferrous 
metals, and steel
242. As for the period of the “economic Miracle”, it should be noted that despite the 
central role that Heavy and Chemical Industries continued to play (capital goods annual growth 
rate was 18%, and for intermediate goods around 13%) some liberalization measures were 
introduced like exchange rate easing while the Brazilian government started to acknowledge the 
importance of export promotion. Yet, this is not the only factor for the high growth rates that 
reached annually 11% for the economy and 13% for the industrial sector. Investment increased to 
25% by 1973 from a level of 18% in the mid 1960s and this was possible due to an increase in 
savings. Another factor was the rebound of the Heavy and Chemical industrial projects of the first 
Big Push, so that full utilization of capacity was achieved
243
. 
The Economic Miracle had however some embedded problems that had developed serious 
implications for the Brazilian economy afterwards. If exports increased fairly, imports as a share of 
GDP surpassed it. This resulted in augmentation of Brazilian debts since the inflow of foreign 
capital was not matched by an equivalent increase in trade surplus. In 1973, foreign debt reached a 
level of $12.9 billion from a level of $5.1 billion in 1970. Manufactured exports were mostly 
agriculture-based industrial output as HCI projects’ maturation was slow, and this meant a great 
loss given the substantial investments that went to Heavy and Chemical Industries.  These were all 
mingled with a dramatic increase in inflation due to the Oil Shock of 1973. 
The government then launched another HCI Big Push plan that was referred to as the 
Geisel Big Push (1974-1979). The hard economic conditions under which this plan was 
implemented called for an active role for the Brazilian government. Public investment increased 
about three times as private investment, and the state controlled about half of the net assets of the 
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biggest industrial firms in 1981. This increase in the involvement of the state, however, was 
matched by an increase in the inefficiency of state firms (attributable partly to low autonomy of 
these firms) and an ill-designed macroeconomic policy confronting the souring inflation and foreign 
debt by import controls instead of tackling exchange rates and export promotion
244
. Yet, the 
problems faced by the Heavy Industrialization of the Second Big Push can be attributed to the 
international economic conditions of the 1970s and the subsequent oil shocks characteristic for this 
decade. Nevertheless, the role of MNCs, which will be discussed below, and government 
macroeconomic policies should also be blamed for this outcome.  
 MNCs played a major role in the Brazilian industry as indicated from a figure stated in 1970 
saying that a considerable proportion (about 75%) of “net fixed assets” owned by US 
manufacturers was concentrated in chemicals, transportation and machinery showing how MNCs 
participated even in Heavy Industry
245
. Andre Gunder Frank spoke of the Brazilian experience with 
MNCs pointing to how their involvement in the industrial sector led to considerable problems for 
the Brazilian economy. He pointed out that in Brazil MNCs controlled almost 90% of motor 
vehicle, 70% of machinery industries together with substantial percentages of textiles, electrical 
equipment, rubber, food, and mineral non-metallic industries, although this was through joint firms 
with government and private capital
246
. This strong dominance of MNCs over industries of that 
considerable importance has led to a deterioration in the trade balance so that even though 
Brazilian exports increased impressively, a trade deficit of –$4 billion was witnessed in 1975 as 
compared to a positive trade surplus in 1964. Frank attributed this to the massive importation of 
capital and intermediary goods and services by MNCs. To offset this trade deficit, Brazil started to 
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rely heavily on foreign borrowing, which has led, together with other international economic 
factors of the late 1970s, to ruin the industrial Brazilian miracle. In highlighting the defects of the 
Brazilian model, Frank said:  
The model, moreover, shows three contradictions that have political 
explosive power: firstly, the de-Brazilianization of the economy is increasingly 
getting the upper hand, so that the power of decision is being transferred to the 
center of international capital. Secondly, the need for imported goods, foreign 
technology and foreign capital increases all the more the stronger the presence of 
the multinational becomes, which leads to an alarming increase in the Brazilian 
external debt
247
.  
 
The third contradiction for Frank was increasing the polarization of Brazilian society by targeting 
special groups in the developmental process, a point that is not relevant to my analysis. Evans 
referred to this simply as the internalization of imperialism through Foreign Direct Investment, and 
referred to the Brazilian developmental trend as “Dependent Development” indicating another form 
for Imperialist Core-Periphery relations involving some industrialization for the periphery and a 
Triple Alliance as in the case of Brazil
248
. 
As for Heavy Industries, the Steel industry was performing well in Brazil and contributed 
much for its industrial expansion. Brazil became a major exporter of steel to the extent that their 
exports surpassed that of the USA
249
. Yet, the Brazilian performance encountered many problems. 
Construction costs were high as compared to the Korean case in which cheap labor minimized this 
cost. In fact, in Brazil these costs were higher then the industrial average. Maturation periods were 
long, and exchange rates kept the Brazilian currency overvalued providing a price disadvantage for 
exporting Steel. Another problem originated from the social structure of Brazil, where equality 
between various regions constituting a big country like Brazil induced a strategy of multi-plant 
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expansion for steel to avoid favoring a region more than others. This was something that led to the 
augmentation of costs as well as dilution of technical and managerial skills. Consequently, this led 
to the inefficiency that was attributed to the performance of state firms
250
. Another social dimension 
has harmed the steel industry in Brazil. This was the fragmented nature of the Brazilian government 
and its low autonomy from private capital. Thus, the government found it proper to sacrifice its 
agenda for the sake of its private collaborators, so that indecision resulted and delays concerning 
investment implementation was the outcome
251
.  
The petrochemical industry proved to be a promising Heavy Industry for Brazil. This was 
due to the low scale requirements of this industry (unlike steel), lower technical barriers and lower 
cost for its establishments
252
. In fact, the petrochemical industry has received much attention since 
the time of the first Big Push. About 1/9 of total investment in the first Big Push (1956-1960) was 
directed to the petrochemical industry, while steel received 2/3 of total investment
253
. This shows 
that the petrochemical industry took a big share of the total investment that was not being directed 
to the steel industry (which was a major industry and contributor for Brazil’s industrial expansion 
as I pointed out before). Given this considerable investment in the petrochemical industry and 
knowing that Brazilian GDP growth rate and manufacturing sector growth rate expanded in this 
period, indicates that the petrochemical industry has contributed much to Brazil’s industrial 
expansion. GDP growth rate reached a level of 8.1% annually in this period (1956-1960 as 
compared to 6.7% between 1951 and 1955), and the Brazilian manufacturing sector growth rate 
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was 10.2% (between 1956 and 1960) as compared to 7.9% in the early 1950s 
254
. In the years that 
followed and in the second Big Push, the petrochemical industry still received an important share of 
investment and has contributed to Brazil’s industrial expansion. 
As for the automobile Heavy Industry, it performed well and opened export markets for 
Brazil. It was exclusively owned by MNCs while being protected by the government from 
competition. As Evans points out, it contributed much to the “Economic Miracle”, “spawning a 
large local parts industry with a substantial proportion of local ownership.”255 Thus, although this 
industry was in the full grip of MNCs, the Brazilian economy benefited from the linkages it created 
together with the fact that automobiles became a major export for the country. 
 
B- Suggestions 
1- Lessons from the Models 
In this subsection we are going to discuss suggestions regarding the anticipated role of the 
Egyptian government in the proposed program, which should be expected to be different from that 
of the 1960s in intensity and strategies, putting the new global and internal settings in 
consideration. Suggesting various ways by which the Egyptian government can foster or direct this 
plan and how this can be in coordination with or guidance for the private sector, will conclude my 
thesis. I will start with deducing lessons out from the models that was discussed in the previous 
section. 
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a- Pros and Cons of a Big Push 
 In his discussion about the Heavy Industrialization strategies of the NICs, Auty discussed 
the idea of establishing this industry in the form of a Big Push. As for those advocating this 
strategy, they point out that:  
The cost savings anticipated from the capture of both the internal and 
external economies of scale encourage the pursuit of HCI as a Big Push: that is, via 
the simultaneous start-up of complementary upstream and downstream sectors 
(say, steel and auto assembly) which thereby provide each other with markets that 
are larger than would be the case, and so capture the scale economics earlier
256
.  
 
Yet, Auty points out that such a strategy, despite its advantages, can be a substantial burden 
on the resources of a developing country added to its reliance on the increase of demand to justify 
operating on a large scale. Thus, a Big Push is a more feasible option for a big country, with 
various resources and big markets, than for a small country. Referring to empirical evidence from 
countries that pursued this strategy, Auty asserted that a Big Push “strains domestic 
implementation capacity and lowers economic growth”; this passes through three stages: 
1- The HCI Big Push: this stage is characterized by inflation, microeconomic imbalances and 
exchange rate appreciation. 
2-  The second stage starts after four or five years and is characterized by GDP slow down 
due to stabilization measures meant to support HCI projects. These measures, however, 
cause low capacity (and, thus, problems for servicing debts) and minimize domestic 
demand. 
3- The third stage is the HCI rebound, which is dependent on the success of stabilization 
measures. In this stage demand increase and HCI projects can work to excess capacity
257
. 
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Thus, a Big Push might be a successful strategy for a big country provided that stabilization 
measures in the second stage succeed and Heavy Industrial projects can rebound. I anticipate that 
Egypt cannot sustain a Heavy Industrial Big Push despite the fact that it has a big market. A rather 
milder strategy should be adopted in stages. For a highlight of such a proposed strategy, I 
anticipate that intermediate goods Heavy Industries should be developed and given more attention 
first, especially Steel and Aluminum in the Egyptian context. Also, the petrochemical industry 
should be developed in this stage since Egypt has many cost advantages in such a strategy given its 
oil and gas production and the low cost and scale of operation needed for this industry. Then at a 
later stage, Egypt then should develop the machinery and equipment sector industry and other 
industries that develop local technological capabilities. This will be a strategy that is reasonable and 
less pressuring on the country’s resources.  
I have shown in my analysis in the first chapter how three of the most important 
intermediate Heavy Industries in Egypt (aluminum, steel and petrochemicals) are in fact promising 
and one can anticipate their further expansion based on their performance and to wise government 
strategies (especially the twenty years plan for the petrochemical industry). I have also shown in my 
analysis how there is a growing demand for machinery (especially in the textiles industry and 
agriculture) that is being imported despite the rising costs emerging from the appreciation of 
foreign currencies in comparison to the Egyptian Pound. This points to the possibility of 
implementing the strategy that I am calling for, starting with intermediate Heavy Industries and 
then moving to the machinery sector. 
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b- Size of the Market and Heavy Industry 
On his comment on why Heavy Industrialization proceeded in South Korea and Taiwan and 
has been the reason for their further growth and how this was achieved, Haggard stated that:  
Korea and Taiwan could entertain a deepening of the industrial base 
through integration into intermediate and capital goods, whereas the city-states 
(e.g.: Singapore) could not. Sectoral choices, in turn, influenced the mode of state 
intervention. In capital-intensive industries or in natural monopolies Korea, Taiwan 
and Singapore formed or expanded state-owned enterprises. In other sectors where 
private investors were capable of organizing production, the state’s role was to 
reduce risk by subsidizing credit, extending infrastructural and technical support, 
and providing market information
258
.  
 
Hence, one can infer that industrial deepening through creating a much-integrated industrial 
structure depends on the size of the market. This can be a positive point in campaigning for such a 
development in Egypt. Egypt is having a growing market with its population of almost seventy 
million, the second largest in Africa and one of the largest populations in the Middle East. The 
growth of the Egyptian industrial sector that has been witnessed since the 1952 Revolution, and the 
increasing demand of the growing population for industrial goods, which has been reflected in a 
growing share of imports and big trade deficits, all show how big is the Egyptian market. Galal 
Amin, for instance, in his book “what has happened to Egyptians”, points to social mobility that 
have resulted from the 1952 Revolution and then free education and labor remittances from the 
Gulf. The newly enriched classes have been trying to show that they are better off by consuming 
more, with consumption becoming the hallmark of social status. Expansion in consumption means 
the expansion for the Egyptian market, which has unfortunately met this growing consumption with 
more imports. Creating an integrated industrial structure will make better use of this consumption 
behavior and convert it to an engine stimulating more industrialization. Heavy Industry will benefit 
from these developments, since it will provide the backbone for this integrated industrial structure. 
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If we can think further of a kind of a future Arab economic integration then this calls much 
for taking such a step and reinforcing Heavy Industry in Egypt. Yet, another point that should be 
elaborated is that tackling Heavy Industries will mean also a more active role for the Egyptian 
government. 
 
c- Institutional History and the Role of the Government 
Haggard added that the institutional history and patterns of interaction between society and 
the government determined the way in which governments intervened in their economies so that it 
differed between the South Korean and Taiwanese cases. Moreover, these strong governments 
were able to avoid the influence of pressure groups on economic decision-making process. They 
seemed to manifest Mancur Olson’s discussion on containing social groups’ influence on economic 
policy as being critical to development
259
. This development was a characteristic of Korea and was 
made possible due to its conditions. Auty, in his analysis on the industrial policies in the NICs 
stated that:  
The differences in industrial policy choice among the larger NICs are rooted 
in the greater ability of the resource base of the larger Latin American countries to 
sustain an autarkic policy for longer than the resource-deficient Korea. This 
permitted the emergence of powerful urban pressure groups in Brazil and Mexico, 
which benefited from an inward-oriented trade policy, an overvalued exchange rate 
and generous state assistance. In Korea, however, the deficient resource base 
forced the early abandonment of autarky before such groups became consolidated. 
In fact, the competitive industrial policy which Korea then adopted created urban-
based groups with an interest in the maintenance of competitive exports, and they 
were prepared to subsidize the lagging rural sector
260
.  
 
It is striking that resource deficiency can be a positive factor for acknowledging a more 
active role for the government and for preventing the pressure of interest groups from influencing 
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government’s formulation of policies. Consequently, a wise industrial policy was realized in the 
Korean case as the government was able to play a more autonomous and active role than that 
played by the Brazilian government. Thus, a more active and autonomous government intervention 
is crucial for the proliferation of Heavy Industries.  
The third point that is worth commenting on is that institutional relations between society 
and government determine the nature of government intervention. It should be obvious that the 
sociological perception of the state by society in general in the Egyptian context is one of almost 
absolute reliance and dependency. It can always be seen in the comments of most of the common 
people when a problem happens and they start to blame the government and government agencies. 
What aggravates things is the historical mistrust between the state and the private sector due to the 
remnants of the memories of the nationalizations of the 1960s and the everlasting changing 
government regulations and laws governing private investment. If all these factors are taken into 
consideration, one might anticipate that the only possible kind of government intervention is at least 
full ownership of Heavy Industries and a sort of government guidance and Dirigisme to other 
industrial sectors, if an industrial strategy is to achieve success. The need for avoiding the influence 
of interest groups on economic decision-making gives another negative impulse to move against 
political liberalization.  
It seems that a lot must to be done to furnish the way for the private sector to play an active 
role in the Egyptian economy generally and in the sector we are focusing on in this thesis (Heavy 
Industry). Developing the capabilities of the people and teaching them to organize and try to solve 
their problems and giving more guarantees and incentives to the private sector, will all help in 
changing the sociological perception of the Egyptians and will prove to be very helpful in diluting 
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reliance on government’s control. This will be reflected in the increasing contribution of private 
capital in the Heavy Industrialization plan and will possibly dilute the role of the government to one 
of partnership, protectionist or supervisory. 
 
d- Specificity of Industrial Experiences 
The concept of institutional history and the relative role of the government leads us to the 
idea of the specificity of industrial experiences that should be acknowledged when studying various 
models of underdeveloped countries’ industrialization experiences. 
In this regard Raj said:  
Intersectoral linkages, as also the industrial structures that have developed 
in different countries, are likely to have been influenced to a considerable degree by 
institutional factors; that, if this is correct there is more scope for choice and 
flexibility than if one were to interpret them mechanistically in terms of some kind 
of a standard industrial structure or reference technology; and that, from the point 
of view of future policy, it is perhaps more important for the developing countries 
to be aware of the nature and implication of such choice than to proceed  in terms 
of what are believed to be inescapable technological compulsions
261
. 
 
This invites a much deeper analytical understanding for various models, an analysis that 
should explain the unique conditions of the country in question. I tried to consider this point in my 
discussion on the different experiences of South Korea, Brazil and India. 
 
e- ISI Policies and Industrialization 
When Haggard wrote of the experience of Latin America (I have discussed Brazil as an 
example), he mentioned how these economies moved from trading and specializing in primary 
goods into adopting ISI policies.  Primary goods together with foreign borrowing were still 
financing ISI policies that started with producing consumer goods. As compared to the case of 
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Korea, ISI persisted for a longer time as a result of the existence of large markets. These large 
markets also encouraged investing in intermediate and capital goods and, thus, permitted a 
movement to a more developed stage of ISI. Yet, exporting primary goods and foreign borrowing 
continued, while the ISI increased importing capital and intermediate goods (a point that was 
criticized by Structuralists as I pointed out before calling for an integrated industrial structure). 
Protectionism paved the way for intensifying FDI investment in the form of MNCs operating in 
Latin American countries so that they became a contributing factor for these countries’ 
development. At a later stage ISI policies moved towards producing manufactured goods to 
compensate for the balance of payments losses that were the expected outcome of the previous 
stage of ISI policies (consumer goods sufficiency stage)
262
.  
I have went through this analysis in my previous discussions (e.g.: big markets and Heavy 
Industries, ISI policies…etc.). It suggests an industrialization strategy relying on MNCs and 
financed by income coming from exporting primary goods. Evans regarded this as “Dependent 
Development,” while many Structuralists (e.g.: Sutcliffe) criticized reliance on MNCs as well as 
other ISI policies that were common in Latin America. They thought that these policies failed to 
produce many linkages within the economy, and that countries which applied ISI policies imported, 
in the first stages, much of their needed intermediate and capital goods. They suggest that ISI 
policies can only be useful if they target establishing an integrated economy. If a country can 
successfully manage to establish such a structure with a Heavy Industrial backbone, then its ISI is a 
great accomplishment. Nevertheless, ISI policies are an invalid option in our contemporary world 
where a great majority of world’s nations have signed the GATT agreement and became members 
of the WTO. It is illogical to call for producing everything locally; it is beyond the capacities of a 
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developing country and is not possible in the age of Globalization and fierce competition. A call for 
an integrated economy or a Heavy Industrial backbone in the age of Globalization is rather a call 
for establishing those very important and strategic industries that can feed other competitive 
industries and promote their comparative advantage. Also, such a call is for the sake of developing 
technological capabilities of an underdeveloped country and equipping it with tools with which it 
can shift production and meet changing market conditions as well as helping in developing a 
technology that is relevant for resource endowments of this country.   
 
2- Proposed Scenarios  
a- Full Government Ownership 
Given the size of the public sector and the institutional relations between society and the 
Egyptian government that was pointed out previously in this thesis, added to other factors as 
private sector’s disinterest in Heavy Industry in the inception period, all of these invite a full 
government direction to any future Heavy Industrialization in Egypt. This suggests a full 
government ownership of Heavy Industries’ establishments especially that most of the countries 
stated as models show similar trends of behavior. The radical proposition of a more direct control 
of the public sector over, not only Heavy Industry, but also on major industries (e.g.: textiles, 
sugar…etc.) should be discredited since the conditions are not at all favorable for this. All the 
discussion on the burden that was on the public sector since the 1960s provides a great disincentive 
for such an option. What is meant from this scenario is rather confining government ownership to 
Heavy Industrial establishments and leaving the private sector to operate in other sectors proposing 
some sort of assistance and guidance for the private sector in this regard.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
262 Haggard, 24,26&27. 
  
143 
Among the various advantages of such an alternative, as stated by Bryce, are: the capability of 
governments to raise more capital as compared to other parties, and the credibility that they enjoy 
which invites foreign capital to invest in joint ventures with governments and assure foreign 
investors and bankers that their loans would be repaid. It should be noted that this was the case in 
the years of the Open Door Policy when the overwhelmingly dominant public sector invited foreign 
investment without giving much incentives for the indigenous private capital to share in big 
industrial establishments. 
I have to note that governments can be bankrupt; however, the risk of that outcome is much 
less than in the case of a private firm. Moreover, the private sector is discouraged to invest in 
certain projects due to their high risks; the government is the only institution that can be willing to 
do this as the Structuralists points out
263
. It can be argued that foreign capital is more interested in 
collaborating with private capital as they both seem to understand the same language and logic, and 
both are guided by market laws and mechanisms. Yet, it should not be denied that collaborating 
with the public sector has the above-mentioned advantages for foreign capital. 
 Public firms can also enjoy many advantages once they are established. Governments can 
provide them with import licenses for needed inputs (not a valid advantage now in the age of free 
trade and Globalization), necessary infrastructure, free foreign technical assistance (that can only be 
channeled through the government), government purchases (expanding the market for public firms’ 
goods) and finally governments provide loans or equity to these firms when need arises
264
. Using 
these advantages efficiently would improve the performance of public firms as compared to private 
enterprises, which do not have access to many of the above-mentioned facilities. 
What argues more for a government monopoly over Heavy Industrial establishments is that:  
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The truth is that in the absence of monopoly situations and high tariff 
protection, profits in manufacturing are not likely to be that high, and can easily be non 
existent if high efficiency and effective cost controls are not established through good 
management
265
.  
 
Only the government can provide such a monopoly due to the substantial resources needed for 
realizing such a monopoly in Heavy Industry. Also, through government monopoly, prices can be 
set so as to target expanding the market for certain commodities even if this meant selling these 
products at their cost price or near it. 
As for the Egyptian experience with Heavy Industry, Waterbury said that protection and 
oligopoly mingled with state intervention have benefited this industry leading to high rates of 
growth. Nevertheless, high protective costs, soft budget constraints and being in oligopoly or even 
monopoly have led to deteriorating performance for these industries
266
. This suggests that 
monopoly might be good for only the inception period after which the market mechanism and 
competition should replace it. It should be noted that many Heavy Industries must be oligopolized 
or monopolized due to the large size of firms and the extensive need for capital. What I am 
suggesting is the minimization of market imperfections (e.g.: Monopoly) in this regard as much as 
possible.  
To improve the performance of government firms, Bryce suggested a number of measures, 
which I find very suggestive if we are to pursue a government monopoly on Heavy Industry. He 
suggests defining clearly the objectives of the project and how to measure its progress, using an 
incentive mechanism, and providing autonomy for the management away from political pressures 
that they normally encounter. The last point means that Public firms’ management should not be 
compelled to employ more labor for social objectives or wait for decisions from the Ministry. It 
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also means that they should be given freedom to set their budget and to sell their products 
commercially. The management itself should be effectively selected
267
. In this context it should be 
noted that the ideological orientation of the 1952 Revolution had possibly harmed the public sector 
by choosing mangers that agreed with the political affiliations of the government rather than basing 
their selection on their efficiency. It was common then that army officers with little administrative 
experience were selected for the finest positions in the bureaucracy and public firms only for the 
sake of their loyalty to the revolutionary regime. Now that conditions have changed and 
revolutionary sentiments have subsided, it should be expected that the selection of management for 
public firms would be based only on experience and efficiency. 
Thus, arguing for government dominance and ownership for Heavy Industrial establishments is 
justifiable on the grounds that the market for Heavy Industries requires some form of monopoly for 
the sake of economy of scale. Due to the high costs and risk in the inception period, the 
government can be the only possible candidate to monopolize these industries. This assumption is 
also reinforced by the fact that the Egyptian public sector is still dominating industrial production 
and other utility services in the country. A government monopoly over Heavy Industry seems to be 
promising even for the inception period after which private capital can be involved. Yet, in a 
political economic climate that calls for economic liberalization and relying more on the private 
sector, state monopoly over Heavy Industry might not likely be considered as a best option. The 
high burden of costs and risk (originating from investing in Heavy Industry) represents a big burden 
over the government budget especially that the state has been trying since the early 1990s to reduce 
the budget deficit. This leads us to discussing the second scenario, which is a government / private 
sector partnership on Heavy Industry. 
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b- Government / Private Partnership 
The burden of managing the whole Heavy Industrialization plan as well as the realization, from 
my side, that many of the Heavy Industrial establishments should be entrusted to the private sector 
after the inception period and when prospects of profits are present, invite us to think of a joint 
governmental / private sector effort to carry on this plan. It is worth mentioning that this did 
happen in the 1950s when the Misr Bank group contributed in establishing the Iron and Steel 
Company in Egypt. Such a strategy would help in the maturity of the Egyptian entrepreneurial class 
and getting it involved in Heavy Industrialization from the beginning so that when conditions are 
ripe and the government withdraws its presence, this private sector would be able to carry on 
maintaining and expanding Heavy Industrial output effectively. Also, the profit seeking behavior of 
the private sector can limit, to a great extent, costs that could be encountered if the private sector is 
to be excluded from the Heavy Industrial sector. The incentive of having more profits can be 
anticipated as pushing forward the innovational skills of private management leading to more 
technological upgrading and realization of resource endowments in selecting the appropriate 
technology. 
Yet, the mentioned profit should not be expected to be always a real one in the first stages. 
Rather, the government can assist the private sector by subsidizing inputs and liberalizing Heavy 
Industrial output so that a profit results, not in market terms, but a profit that will act as an 
incentive for further private investment in Heavy Industry. With the progress of time, gaining of 
experience and diminishing average fixed cost, the government can withdraw its assistance and 
things shall operate smoothly.  
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Bryce again spoke about what government can do in this regard. For him the government can 
establish an agency specialized in conducting research on industrial development problems and 
provide policy guidance to direct investment in needed areas even if this meant providing this 
guidance to the private sector leaving it to operate freely. The government can also invest in social 
overhead capital and invest in human capital. He thinks that the government should create favorable 
conditions for creating a strong and capable private sector and also set favorable conditions for 
having foreign assistance (e.g.: hiring consultants, training…etc.) in order to accelerate industrial 
development
268
.  What confirms this view is the experience of the two Asian miracles South Korea 
and Taiwan. In these countries the government trained their labor using scientific and technical 
education to promote their skills and feed various industries with these skilled labor contributing to 
the upgrading of these industries
269
. 
 Speaking of the developmental state, Leftwich identified six components for these states 
which are: having an elite that is determined to develop its own country, the presence of a 
bureaucracy that is capable and powerful as well as insulated, the “effective management of non 
state economic interests” (as in the case of forming chaebols and managing the presence of MNCs 
in the way benefiting South Korea), the presence of relative autonomy (no class or interest groups 
control over the state), the existence of a “weak an subordinated civil society”, and the use of 
repression while the regime is identified as legitimate thanks to its economic performance
270
. The 
last two points seem to be discouraging about the Developmental State. They were not pointed out 
in Evans’ discussion, suggesting that they should not be taken as requirements for realizing this 
model of active fruitful state involvement. 
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Evans elaborated the concept of “Embedded Autonomy” that he identified as the major 
attribute of the Developmental State. It is Autonomous in the sense that it can formulate its goals 
independently from interest groups’ pressures, while Embeddedness “implies a concrete set of 
connections that link the state intimately and aggressively to particular social groups with whom 
the state shares a joint project of transformation.”271 This is the role that the South Korean 
government played in the development of this country where decision making was independent 
from political pressures of interest groups, while the links that the government developed with 
private investment were able to guide government’s policy to what benefits the Korean economy. 
Evans asserted that private individuals did not regard a powerful state as an enemy or deterring 
factor for their investment. At least such a state was protecting and promoting their interests (e.g.: 
against labor riots) for the sake of national welfare.  
Rapley identified various characteristics of a Developmental State. Such a government 
should make development its first priority, commit itself to private property, give autonomy to a 
highly skilled bureaucracy, and invest heavily in human capital with a special focus on the technical 
and engineering corps. Also, this government should guide the market through various measures, 
among which are changing the incentive structure, playing with prices to benefit an emerging 
sector, protecting some selected infant industries, sponsoring technological change and opening the 
rest of the economy to foreign competition so that firms performing poorly would wither away
272
. 
This is very suggestive for a kind of government / private sector partnership and these are the 
possible means by which governments can intervene given that we are now entering the age of free 
trade where import restrictions and protectionism through tariffs are invalid. Protecting a certain 
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industry can be realized now through subsidization and can also be realized through increasing 
government purchases of that industry’s goods. 
As for Intermediate States, which are also suggestive, the form of embeddedness and 
autonomy were rather mild. Different forms of autonomy and embeddedness are existing which 
“can play themselves out against disparate societal backgrounds.”273 Brazil was an example of such 
a regime where pressure groups were much stronger than in the case of Korea and, consequently, 
the government could not enjoy similar forms of autonomy like that entertained by South Korea. 
Still there is no conflict between the state and private sector; there is recognition that the state is 
much more farsighted than the private sector. Yet, the government should disengage from its 
involvement in the economy when conditions are ripe for the rise of an indigenous capital, which is 
also true for the case of South Korea
274
. I anticipate that the concerned government should have 
the willingness to do and the capability of planning such a transfer so that the process would take 
place safely and easily. 
In a study conducted by Baer and Salehi on the ideas of Evans and taking Egypt as a case 
study, it was stated that the Egyptian bureaucracy needs the embeddedness that could make a 
considerable improvement in Egyptian industrial and economic policy given the relatively moderate 
administrative capabilities of the Egyptian bureaucracy. According to their analysis, the efficiency 
of government intervention depends on two things, which are administrative capability (meaning 
organizational capacity and expertise enabling the implementation of a certain job with low costs) 
and embeddedness. For the two writers, if administrative capability is very high, this will be 
sufficient to induce government intervention, and thus embeddedness in this case is irrelevant. If, 
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however, administrative capability is very low, then embeddedness would not help much either. It is 
at reasonable levels of administrative capability that embeddedness is crucial. Egypt is considered 
by them to have this reasonable administrative capability and, hence, they think that increasing 
embeddedness will much benefit Egypt. The extreme autonomy of the state was attributed to the 
background of the governing elite since the 1952 Revolution, as this military elite came from the 
Egyptian middle class without a political power base other than the army. The policies pursued, 
since the time of the revolutionary regime, made of the government and its establishments a form of 
political control and education rather than being involved with the public and communicating with 
them through effective participation. This form persisted in a way or another and the result was the 
lack of embeddedness that should be tackled for a much wiser industrial policy. 
In this context, I should refer to what I have discussed before when I was talking about the 
change of the structure of the Egyptian bourgeoisie. It is true that during Nasser’s era the state was 
patrimonial rather than embedded and that can be attributed to the class origins of the emerging 
bureaucratic elite, which came from the lower bourgeoisie (especially if we are referring to army 
officers and Nasser’s associates) and thus was distinct from the pre-1952 capitalist class. What 
aggravated the situation between the bureaucratic elite and the indigenous capitalist class is the 
mutual mistrust that led first to the extermination of the land power base of the feudal-bourgeois 
class through various land reforms and then by the Nationalization decrees of 1961. Yet, as I have 
said before, the structure of today’s bourgeoisie is much different and it incorporates people who 
were from the bureaucracy (e.g.: former army officers and higher officials) or involved in active 
relations with the bureaucracy (e.g.: businessmen involved in intermediating activities). This 
structure suggests a deeper possible relationship between the bureaucracy and the private sector 
and this relationship can be used effectively. Embeddedness in the South Korean fashion can result 
  
151 
if relevant policies can be identified and implemented. Yet, this should not be at the expense of the 
autonomy of the Egyptian bureaucracy, which is still high. 
In fact, some indications of a growing embeddedness can be seen in Egypt, business 
associations that became very active since the 1980s being an example. 
They [business associations] are frequently consulted before the enactment 
of a new law or changing an existing one. Owing to the liberalizing tendencies of 
government economic policies, representatives of these associations and various 
business groups are often invited to voice their opinions or to be part of 
committees assigned to certain issues. Businessmen who choose this strategy are 
usually powerful and have contacts in high places
275
.  
 
Ayubi also refers to this trend in his discussion on the Association of Egyptian Entrepreneurs: 
New interest groups are emerging to represent and defend the evolving 
constellation of interests within the country. Particularly influential is the 
Association of Egyptian Entrepreneurs (Jam’iyyat rijal al-a’mal al-misriyyin), where 
the interests of segments of the state bourgeoisie, domestic investors, and 
international capital coincide. In addition to ex-ministers and officials, the 
Association includes a large number of members of the Boards of banks and public 
sector companies (in industry and trade), as well as private import-export “big 
shots” and commercial agents (28% of all members in 1984) and investors in the 
fields of foodstuffs, textiles, furniture and, of course, tourism, and consultancy. 
Foreign capital is represented through contributions from affiliate committees…. 
and from a number of international finance agencies
276
. 
Moreover, Samir Youssef points out that businessmen hire some former officials as consultants or 
in other high positions so as to facilitate communication with the bureaucracy and help in acquiring 
various needed approvals or resources
277
.  
Thus, business associations should receive more attention and on the long run they can act 
as a mean of increasing the embeddedness of the Egyptian government. They can also lead to the 
intensification of relations between the government and the private sector. This will help in guiding 
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the policies of the government and assist it in formulating plans that are more feasible and that will 
mutually benefit both parties (the government and the private sector). Through these associations 
the government would have a better understanding for what fields the private sector is interested in 
investing in and what kind of assistance the private sector needs. On the other hand, the private 
sector will more clearly understand the objectives of government policies and will act more as a 
partner in implementing and formulating plans.  
Also, hiring ex-bureaucrats in higher positions in private firms helps in increasing the 
embeddedness of the government and in developing stronger relations between the bureaucracy and 
the private sector. Ex-bureaucrats can be expected to still have connections with officials and 
bureaucrats that are still at office. This will help in the intensification of relations between private 
firms and the bureaucracy and will help in increasing communication and mutual understanding 
between both parties. The ex-bureaucrat or ex-official, now serving in a private firm, will help in 
better communicating the interests and needs of private capital (e.g.: infrastructure and other 
utilities) thanks to his ties with the bureaucracy and his knowledge of how things operate within the 
bureaucracy. He will also be more helpful and capable of coordinating a joint activity or a 
partnership as well as building mutual trust between the government and a private firm. What 
should be avoided, however, is that stronger relations might lead to more corruption rather than 
embeddedness. Business associations seem to be more favorable in this regard as they are more 
reflective for the collective interest of private firms and the government, while employing ex-
officials can involve an element of corruption for favoring the individual interest of a certain firm or 
a big industrial group rather than the collective interest of private capital. 
Another possible model for a suggestive state-private sector interaction is what was 
referred to by Waterbury as Property Regimes. These regimes allow economic actors to develop 
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interdependencies while these regimes (governments) would ensure that rules for this interaction 
are observed. Thus, their role is one of monitoring and enforcing these laws, but if the costs of this 
process are prohibitive then governments should develop a self-enforcement mechanism
278
. As I 
anticipate it, such a regime can be appropriate once the government pulls back from its involvement 
in the Heavy Industrial sector (when this sector starts to yield profits) and when the government 
decides to entrust the private sector with further expansions in this sector. Yet, I do not think that 
such a regime will be effective for the inception period meant for establishing a Heavy Industrial 
backbone. In the inception period I anticipate a more direct involvement of the state which will be 
needed to face the high risks and costs encountered in this stage. These risks and costs might deter 
private investment in Heavy Industry. This anticipated involvement should include a form of 
government ownership (this can be a partnership with private capital) for Heavy Industrial 
establishments. 
 Speaking again about the Post-Fordist debate, there are writers who spoke about Neo-
Statism in this Post-Fordist era. What they meant by this is that Post-Fordism is “promoting a state 
guided approach to economic reorganization through intervention from outside and above the 
market mechanism.”279 The government is one among various economic actors, but one that has an 
important coordination role in a Post-Fordist era. This is added to: “structural policy in which the 
state sets strategic targets for flexible accumulation, continuous innovation and promotion of 
overall structural competitiveness of the national economy.”280 States can help in training their 
labor force so as to foster flexibility of labor’s skills. They can also assist in restructuring poor 
performing industries and promote well functioning ones. This is how the government can promote 
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a flexible specialization strategy targeting specific high technological sectors
281
.  Again I would like 
to point out that in addition to this the role of the state should go beyond this dimension. The 
above-mentioned strategy should be adopted towards industry in general while pursuing a much 
more active governmental role in Heavy Industry in the inception period. 
The UNDP Human Development Report of 2000/2001 agrees with this analysis. The report 
affirms that developing industrial capabilities needs time and in order to speed things up there is a 
need for government intervention even in the age of Globalization.  
Government actions are indispensable to implementing a national 
innovation system, to guide firms in how to acquire technology, and to support 
scientific bodies and educational organizations to provide firms with a continuous 
stream of technology, information, and knowledge
282
.   
 
What supports this view is modern Structuralists’ belief in an active role for government in 
protecting certain industries for certain period of time that might stretch to a decade to help in 
learning and acquiring technological capability. They believe that only governments are able to 
establish certain industries due to their high risk and their need for huge capital investment that 
refrain local and foreign capitalists from investing in them. 
Another perspective is implied from Chakravarty who, speaking of technological adaptability, 
said that: “While technological primitivism cannot constitute an answer for developing countries, 
the problems of adaptation of technology in directions more appropriate to the factor endowments 
of developing countries deserve very close consideration. It would be most inappropriate to leave 
questions of adaptation to technologists alone. In many cases, the overall macro-economic 
framework must also be made conducive to the process of adaptation.”283 Speaking of making the 
overall macro-economic framework more conducive for technological adaptation invites the 
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government to play this role. If governments can guarantee that such a framework exists while 
leaving the private sector to achieve such adaptation, a new form of government/ private 
collaboration can exist. The Japanese experience provides an insight for how this could be done; 
the government encouraged technological innovation through providing guidelines and also by 
protectionism, while substantial investments were directed to Research and Development and 
companies sponsored scientific education
284
.  
Hence, involving the private sector in Heavy Industrial projects will prove to be valuable thanks 
to its profit seeking behavior which will help in reducing costs, developing innovational skills and 
using the most efficient available technology. This involvement will also help in the maturity of the 
Egyptian private sector so that after the inception period it can be relied on to operate Heavy 
Industrial establishments. Partnership between the state and private sector in Heavy Industry and 
adjusting the role of the government to a developmental one can be expected to yield a better 
outcome than a government monopoly even if this monopoly is limited to the inception period. I 
have shown that the embeddedness of the Egyptian economy has in fact been enhanced and that it 
might improve more in the future. This makes a partnership between the private sector and the 
state in Heavy Industry more possible. Nevertheless, the need for using an advanced technology 
that is essential for the competitiveness of Heavy Industrial products calls for involving another 
party, which is MNCs. As evident from the experience of India, MNCs should be incorporated to 
the formula besides the government and the indigenous private sector. This is what I will try to 
investigate in the following subsection.  
 
c- Government / Private / MNCs Coordination 
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The last scenario is one in which a possible interaction in the efforts of the government, 
public sector and MNCs would achieve Heavy Industrialization. The petrochemical industry in 
Egypt is showing some signs of such a collaboration.  
Auty points to the vitality of the role of MNCs in developing Heavy Industries in a 
developing country. He considers the technology and capital needed for Heavy Industries as an 
entry barrier that can deter local private investment and rather invites Foreign Direct Investment in 
the form of MNCs. He points to a strategy in which states encourage the establishment of joint 
ventures between local capital and MNCs so that entry risk can be reduced. The state can induce 
such an action by playing an active role so that it “collates information, synchronizes 
complementary investments via sectoral plans, negotiates technology transfers and provides a time-
constraint package of incentives.”285 Sabin and Kato assert that these arrangements can provide 
tremendous economic net benefits, regardless to the financial return of the project concerned.  
Yet, the Structuralist view in this regard is worth discussing. The Structuralists and the 
Dependentistas criticized industrialization through reliance on foreign capital. They believed that 
free flow of capital will lead to the direction of most of this capital to the developed world as they 
have the needed infrastructure, extensive markets and political stability which ensure profitability 
for foreign firms. Even when foreign firms are interested in investing in underdeveloped countries, 
the result was that these Multi National Corporations (MNCs) dominated most of the dynamic 
sectors of these countries’ economies. This led to the dominance of international capital and its 
agenda, rather than creating a national bourgeoisie that has an interest in promoting its future 
country’s development. Added to this is the resulting profit outflow. MNCs are entitled to much of 
the profits that they gain in their operation, and this leads to draining Third World countries from 
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possibilities of growth. The more foreign capital is being invested, the more the resulting 
outflow
286
.  
The Dependentistas assert the irrelevance of the techniques used by MNCs, which are 
mostly capital-intensive creating less jobs and trying to exploit the existence of cheap labor in 
underdeveloped countries. MNCs do not create a research or a development capacity, and rather 
they use second-generation technology, as the Dependentists accuse them of doing. What supports 
this claim is a report on MNCs prepared by the US. Tariff Commission in 1966.  It stated that only 
6% of R&D expenditure of American MNCs is done outside the US. In fact affiliates contribute 
more than benefit from R&D, since they pay fees and royalties
287
. Thus, MNCs use techniques that 
are more relevant to their home countries.  
Furthermore, these firms, being owned by foreigners, rely on imported inputs. 
Consequently, it is not expected that they would care for national well being and establishing 
linkages. By relying on imports, MNCs worsen the balance of trade, and, thus, compel 
underdeveloped countries to export more primary goods to offset this outcome. This will lead on 
the long run to a further specialization in primary goods
288
. Thus, rather than industrialization, an 
underdeveloped country will find itself moving in the opposite direction and specializing in primary 
and agricultural goods. 
No wonder that Sutcliffe calls for economic independence by which he meant directing 
production primarily to the underdeveloped countries’ domestic market and raising investment 
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funds locally or under local control. This independence shall also include establishing an 
independent technology and a diversified economy that is less dependent on foreign imports
289
. 
Yet, this pessimism towards achieving an industrialization strategy through MNCs can be 
minimized by thinking about alternatives to limit the power of MNCs and direct them to what 
achieves our objectives. The Structuralists call for government control over the activities of these 
multinationals; governments, for instance, can provide protection to local private firms in their 
bargaining with MNCs for the transfer of technology.  They believed also that governments can do 
unpacking of technology, which is a process meant to importing only those needed parts that are 
not produced locally. By this governments can help in developing a local technology that is relevant 
to the conditions of their countries
290
. This provides us with the possible role that the Egyptian 
government can play to launch a Heavy Industrialization plan.  
Another interesting option is what is referred to as “Turnkey Agreements.” According to 
the terms of these agreements a complete factory is being constructed and operated by foreign 
capital. However, after some time, the factory together with its expertise of building and operating 
it is being handed to either the government or the indigenous private sector. By this way a transfer 
of technology can be realized
291
. Certainly, the Structuralists would criticize this as not leading to 
building indigenous technological capabilities. Yet, I argue that this can be a possible mean of 
implementing an effective Heavy Industrialization plan if it was accompanied by a learning process.  
This will help in building technological capabilities with time and minimize the need for foreign 
technology on the long run. Till then, however, MNCs can provide such a technology through the 
above-mentioned Turnkey Agreements. MNCs will be encouraged to do this since they can benefit 
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for some time from the establishment that they created before handing it over to the private or the 
public sector. I believe that the government would prove to be very helpful in conducting 
negotiations with MNCs for reaching these agreements with favorable terms for the public or the 
indigenous private sector . 
It should be noted that the Egyptian government has been eager to attract foreign 
investment since the days of the Open Door Policy. This was happening at a time that the private 
sector was not given its due attention. The government was trying then to make partnerships 
between public firms and foreign capital so as to upgrade these firms
292
. Yet, the government 
should do a lot to stimulate Foreign Direct Investment to Egypt in Heavy Industry and to the 
industrial sector generally.  
The World Bank reached some conclusions from a survey they made of 
Egyptian businesspersons about why FDI might be slow in moving into Egypt. The 
reasons include the following: unclear information about liberalization causing 
uncertainty among investors; complex and restrictive labor laws, weak protection 
of intellectual property rights, consumer rights (or rights in general one might add 
to the list); inadequate antitrust and trade legislation; complex and prohibitive 
regulations on corporate approval and licensing, both at the national and local 
levels; inefficient and inadequate public institutions responsible for policy 
administration and enforcement; time consuming and expensive litigation 
procedures that harkens back to the days of a socialist planned economy. Add to 
this a weak legal system that is manipulated, if not controlled, by the powerful and 
corrupt; inadequate credit mechanisms for small and medium sized businesses, a 
limited securities market and virtually non-existent derivatives market; a lack of 
adequately educated workers and managers; and cumbersome and time consuming 
tax administration procedures
293
.   
Again as was indicated in the Machinery industry sector, Egypt is in great need of 
institutional changes for inducing more FDI and for encouraging private investment generally and 
this shall reflect positively on Heavy Industry in Egypt. 
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Finally, What Waterbury has pointed to should be considered also in my analysis. He asserts 
that Egypt's freedom of action is limited by its socioeconomic makeup and dependency on external 
sources of finance capital, technology, markets and arms.  For Waterbury this meant that Egypt 
was always in need for a patronage to proceed in its development projects, but it also meant that 
the government is obliged every now and then to meet short term obligations by policies that may 
limit future options and place the country always in a transition phase
294
.  
These two points (needing patronage- meeting short term obligations) should be considered 
as parameters both for the industrialization of the 1960s and for any future industrialization plan 
especially if it is a Heavy Industrialization plan, which needs large investment, expertise, and 
technology. The government can secure a more stable environment for the plan by trying not to be 
distracted by other short-term obligations as much as it can. On the other hand, in an age where 
international non-state actors are becoming more active, MNCs can replace the role of the 
traditional form of patronage (as the role of the Soviet Union in the 1960s and that of the USA 
afterwards). MNCs can act as transferors of technology, as providers of technical expertise (if they 
are employing Egyptian technocrats in their firms) and can generally help in Egypt’s 
industrialization through investment. Their activities however should not go unchecked; and the 
government again should ensure this and help domestic private sector to learn from and work and 
compete with MNCs. 
To conclude, it seems that the best formula is one that involves the three parts: the 
government, the indigenous private sector and MNCs. I have pointed before in the previous 
subsection to the advantages of a collaboration between the government and the indigenous private 
sector. In this subsection I have also shown how it is important to involve MNCs but without 
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letting their power go unchecked. The government plays a central role in this, both in attracting 
MNCs through institutional changes, and in checking their power through various means. The 
presence of an active role for the state will give a strong support for the indigenous private sector 
when negotiating partnerships with MNCs. So even when the state pulls back from directly 
operating Heavy Industrial establishments after the inception period, the government can still help 
private capital to reach better terms from collaborating with MNCs. This is added to other roles 
that a developmental state plays and that were stated in the previous subsection. With the 
collaboration of the three parties (the government, the private sector, and MNCs) a Heavy 
Industrialization drive can be a success and can help Egypt in its industrial development which will 
reflect on every aspect in the Egyptian economy. Yet, a wise industrial policy is also needed so as 
to make the collaboration of the three parties one that promotes industry and avoid a rent seeking 
behavior. 
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